Village of Silver Lake v. Department of Revenue

275 N.W.2d 119, 87 Wis. 2d 463, 1978 Wisc. App. LEXIS 602
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedDecember 28, 1978
Docket78-024
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 275 N.W.2d 119 (Village of Silver Lake v. Department of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Village of Silver Lake v. Department of Revenue, 275 N.W.2d 119, 87 Wis. 2d 463, 1978 Wisc. App. LEXIS 602 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinion

MOSER, P.J.

This is an appeal from an order entered January 30, 1978 affirming an order of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission dismissing the appeals of the Village of Silver Lake and the Town of Randall for lack of jurisdiction.

In 1975, the assessments of municipalities in Kenosha County as established by the State Department of Revenue were.:

Townships 1975 Recommended Values

Bristol 61,050,000

Brighton 20,899,000

Paris 32,710,000

Pleasant Prairie 165,563,000

Randall 47,098,000

Salem 88,459,000

Somers 96,697,000

Wheatland

*465 Villages 1975 Recommended Values

Paddock Lake 21,004,000

Silver Lake 15,166,000

Twin Lakes 63,115,000

Cities 1975 Recommended Values

Kenosha 871,007,000

The appellants claim such assessments are in error by approximately 20% for the three larger municipalities in Kenosha County. They claim that these communities should be assessed as follows:

Pleasant Prairie 206,953,000

Somers 120,871,000

City of Kenosha 1,088,758,000

If these three communities were assessed at the higher values asserted by the appellants, they would bear 78.2% instead of 74.3% of the county’s tax burden. All of the other townships and villages in the county, including the appellants, would bear a correspondingly smaller share of the taxes.

On March 1, 1976, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue denied the appellants’ request for redetermination of the 1975 assessment pursuant to sec. 70.57, Stats., because it had no jurisdiction. The appellants appealed that determination to the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission. The Department of Revenue’s motion to dismiss the appellants’ petition to the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission was granted February 28, 1977 on the basis that the tax commission lacked jurisdiction over the appeal under sec. 73.01, Stats. The appellants appealed that decision to the circuit court for Kenoska County pursuant to ch. 227, Stats., for an order overruling the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission ruling. The circuit court dismissed *466 this appeal on January 30, 1978 on the basis that the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission had no jurisdiction under either sec. 73.01 or sec. 70.57, Stats.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a petition by a town or a village requesting a redetermination of the 1975 state tax assessment made by the Department of Revenue pursuant to sec. 70.57 and sec. 70.575, Stats.

The appellants are attempting to appeal the assessment by the Department of Revenue under sec. 70.57, Stats. 1 *467 The Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission, under its broad authority in sec. 73.01 (4) (a) and (5)(c), Stats., 2 has *468 jurisdiction to overrule the Department of Revenue and order it to redetermine the 1975 assessment for Kenosha County only if the department had jurisdiction to hear claims by towns and villages under sec. 70.57, Stats.

[1-3]

Administrative boards and commissions have no common law power. Their powers are limited by statute conferring such powers expressly or by fair implication. 3 It is the general rule that an agency or board created by the legislature only has the powers which are either expressly conferred or necessarily implied from the four corners of the statute under which it operates. The effect of this rule has generally been that such statutes are strictly construed to preclude the exercise of a power which is not expressly granted. 4 The question of administrative authority generally arises when boards or commissions have decided issues beyond their statutory authority. Here *469 the Department of Revenue has ruled that it lacks the statutory authority to address the appellants’ claim. Our inquiry into statutory authority is the same in either situation.

In the case of a county having a county assessor system, such as Kenosha County, sec. 70.57(1) and (4), Stats., provides that the Department of Revenue shall determine the full value of the taxable property in the county without regard to municipal boundaries. Section 70.575, Stats., then provides that the assessment made by the department for each county in the state shall be added, and the total shall be known as the state assessment. Section 70.57(2), Stats., provides that the Department of Revenue shall set up rules, orders, and procedures to institute hearings on complaints of counties.

The construction of this statute urged by the appellants is that cities, towns, and villages, by implication, have the right to appeal to the State Department of Revenue. Clearly, from the four corners of sec. 70.57 (2), Stats., the only proper party to appeal the 1975 assessment of Kenosha County made by the Department of Revenue is the county. Nothing in sec. 70.57 (2), Stats., can be said to imply a right by cities, towns, and villages to appeal to the Department of Revenue. If the Department of Revenue entertained such appeals, it would be operating beyond those powers expressly conferred on it by the legislature since such exercise of alleged power must be strictly construed against the department. 5

There is no authority in sec. 70.57, Stats., for a town, city, or village to appeal to the Department of Revenue for a redetermination of the 1975 assessments for Kenosha County. Since there is no authority for the Tax Appeals Commission under sec. 73.01, Stats., to order the Department of Revenue to do something it cannot *470 do, the Commission has no jurisdiction to order the Department of Revenue to hear the appellants’ claim. It follows that a court cannot order either the Department of Revenue to do an act not authorized by statute or the Tax Appeals Commission to hear a matter in which it has no jurisdiction. 6

By the Court. — Order affirmed.

1

70.57 Assessment of counties by department.

(1) The department of revenue before September 15 of each year shall complete the valuation of the property of each county, city, village and town of the state except that in counties having a county assessor system in which the county assessor is required under s. 70.99 (9m) to meet with the county board the value of each county, city, village and town shall be determined under sub. (4).

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Bluebook (online)
275 N.W.2d 119, 87 Wis. 2d 463, 1978 Wisc. App. LEXIS 602, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/village-of-silver-lake-v-department-of-revenue-wisctapp-1978.