Village of Pemberville v. Dietrich

455 N.E.2d 727, 7 Ohio Misc. 2d 48, 7 Ohio B. 399, 1983 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 393
CourtBowling Green County Municipal Court
DecidedJuly 26, 1983
DocketNo. 83-TRD-2128
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 455 N.E.2d 727 (Village of Pemberville v. Dietrich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Bowling Green County Municipal Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Village of Pemberville v. Dietrich, 455 N.E.2d 727, 7 Ohio Misc. 2d 48, 7 Ohio B. 399, 1983 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 393 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1983).

Opinion

Bachman, J.

Introduction

This case involves a traffic charge against the defendant, Frank Dietrich, where the complainant alleges in his traffic ticket that on April 5, 1983, at 2:14 a.m., the defendant operated a vehicle at a speed unreasonable for conditions, namely, forty-two m.p.h. in a twenty-five m.p.h. zone, contrary to Pemberville Ordinance Section 73.10.

Uncontested Issues: Findings of Fact

The court finds from the evidence, and it is not seriously controverted, that beyond a reasonable doubt:

1.On April 5,1983, at 2:14 a.m., the defendant, Frank Dietrich (“Dietrich”), was operating a vehicle, namely, 1979 four-door Chevrolet, moving eastbound upon a public street, namely, East Front Street, near Memorial Drive, in the village of Pemberville, Wood County, Ohio;

2. At that time, the complainant, D. K. O’Connor (“O’Connor”), a law enforcement officer for the village of Pember-ville, was on duty, and was operating a patrol car moving at about twenty-five m.p.h. westbound on Front Street. He was in a uniform prescribed by the village of Pemberville. His patrol vehicle had the village of Pemberville emblems on the side and a visibar light on top;

3. O’Connor was using an MPH model S-80 radar to detect the speed of moving vehicles, including Dietrich’s vehicle;

4. It was nighttime and the visibility was clear for at least six hundred feet. There was no other traffic in the vicinity. At the spot where Dietrich’s vehicle was radar checked by O’Connor, the roadway was one lane on Dietrich’s side and one and one-half lanes on the opposite side. There was a guardrail along the right edge on Dietrich’s side of the roadway; and

5. At the time and place pertinent herein, the prima facie speed limit was twenty-five m.p.h., the area being a business district.

Contested Issues

The real contested issue here is the speed of Dietrich’s moving vehicle at the date, time, and place alleged in the complaint. More specifically, the issue is whether the S-80 radar is a reliable device for determining the speed of a vehicle moving on the roadway, and whether at the time of this incident the radar was in proper working order and was being used by a qualified operator. Below, the court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Radar Operator’s Qualifications

The court finds from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that [49]*49O’Connor’s qualifications as a radar operator are:

He is a police officer, presently with the village of Pemberville for two years, and previously with the village of Wayne for one year;

He has an undisclosed number of hours of classroom training on how to use the K-55 radar, and has one year of on-the-job training in the actual use of the K-55 radar;

At some time in 1982 during a two-week period (for an undisclosed number of hours), he monitored the use of the S-80 radar while — the court infers — it was being operated by a trained radar operator;

On June 9,1982, he successfully completed one-day (four to six hours) of classroom and on-the-road instruction, plus oral and written tests, in the use of the S-80 radar, conducted by a manufacturer’s representative at the Findlay Police Department; and

On June 24, 1982, he successfully completed a similar experience at the Pemberville Police Department.

As to O’Connor’s experience in using the S-80 radar, from June 1982 to the date of the citation, he used the S-80 radar continually while on duty. During that time, he made several hundred speed readings each shift, or over one thousand readings per week, or nearly fifty thousand readings for that ten-month period. (A Mr. Sargeant, the patent holder of the S-80 radar and an officer in the company which manufactures it, was of the opinion that O’Connor was qualified to use that radar.)

From all of the above, the court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that O’Connor, by training and experience, was qualified to use the S-80 radar. See State v. Shelt (1976), 46 Ohio App. 2d 115 [75 O.O.2d 103]; State v. Wilcox (1974), 40 Ohio App. 2d 380 [69 O.O.2d 333].

Radar’s Working Order

The court finds from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that three times on the date of this incident, at the beginning of O’Connor’s shift, once during it, and at the end of it, he checked the calibration of the S-80 radar. That procedure included:

1. The light check, where the officer pressed a button, and all the lighting elements lighted up. This indicated that all of them were functional and not burned out;

2. The internal check, where the officer pressed a button, and the radar unit’s readout was “32.” This indicated that the radar’s internal functions were operational;

3. The tuning fork check, where the officer struck a thirty-five m.p.h. tuning fork, and then an eighty m.p.h. tuning fork, and the radar unit’s readout was, respectively, “35” and “80.” This indicated that the radar’s internal functions were operational; and

4. The SOS adapter check, where the officer flipped on a switch while the patrol car was moving down the street. In this test, the radar compared two readouts for the speed of the moving patrol car: the first speed, obtained directly from the transmission; and, the second speed, obtained by the radar’s beam directed onto the roadway. The two speeds should have the same readout if the radar is working properly. When the officer performed the SOS adapter check, the two speeds did have the same readout, and he concluded that the radar was operating properly.

Thus, O’Connor found each time that each calibration result was what it should be, and he concluded from those results that the radar was in proper working order. The procedure followed by O’Con-nor was in accordance with the radar manufacturer’s instructions.

Therefore, the court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of this incident the S-80 radar was in good condition for accurate use. See State v. Shelt and State v. Wilcox, supra.

[50]*50Radar’s Reliability

Is an S-80 radar mounted in a moving patrol car a reliable device to determine accurately the speed of a target vehicle moving toward the patrol car? From evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the court concludes that it is. More specifically, does the S-80 radar have the ability to differentiate correctly between the target vehicle’s speed and the two vehicles’ combined speeds as they approach each other from opposite directions? From evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the court concludes that is does.

Sargeant gave more than adequate scientific testimony to support the court’s two conclusions above. This is so despite the fact that Sargeant has an interest in the S-80 radar. The court determines that in this case he is a credible witness and his testimony is entitled to great weight.

Secondly, the S-80 radar, according to Sargeant, operates on the Doppler principle, in a fashion similar to K-55 radar. Other courts have found the K-55 radar (as well as the MR-7 radar, that was developed before it) to be a scientifically reliable device for measuring the speeds of moving vehicles. See Akron v. Gray (1979), 60 Ohio Misc. 68 [14 O.O.3d 303], and the cases cited therein: State v. McCoy (January 11, 1979), New Philadelphia M.C. No.

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Bluebook (online)
455 N.E.2d 727, 7 Ohio Misc. 2d 48, 7 Ohio B. 399, 1983 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 393, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/village-of-pemberville-v-dietrich-ohmunictbowling-1983.