Village of Mackinaw City v. Union Terminal Piers, Inc.

302 N.W.2d 326, 103 Mich. App. 60, 1981 Mich. App. LEXIS 2674
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 21, 1981
DocketDocket No. 46153
StatusPublished

This text of 302 N.W.2d 326 (Village of Mackinaw City v. Union Terminal Piers, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Village of Mackinaw City v. Union Terminal Piers, Inc., 302 N.W.2d 326, 103 Mich. App. 60, 1981 Mich. App. LEXIS 2674 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

G. R. McDonald, J.

Defendants appeal as of right from a summary judgment entered by the Cheboygan County Circuit Court enjoining defendants from using their property for the sale of ferry boat tickets.

Defendant Arnold Transit Company is the wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant Union Terminal Piers, Inc., and operates one of three ferry lines running between the Village of Mackinaw City and Mackinac Island. Union Terminal Piers owns property within the central business district of Mackinaw City from which Arnold Transit Company sells ferry tickets.

Plaintiff Mackinaw City’s zoning ordinance, in effect since August 25, 1966, divides the village into 12 use districts. Defendants’ ticket office is located on Central Avenue, in an area classified as a "B-3” business district. Plaintiffs zoning ordinance provides in pertinent part:

"Article 11 'B-3’ Business District
"Sec. 11.1 USES PERMITTED, in the 'B-3’ Business District, no building or premises shall be used and no building shall be hereafter erected or structurally altered except for one or more of the following uses:
"1. Store or shop for the conducting of retail business.
"3. Bank, theater, office.
[62]*62”5. General office or professional office building.”1

[63]*63Defendants’ ferry dock is located in an area classified as an "M” manufacturing-industrial district.. Passenger ferry operations are permitted in "M” districts. Plaintiffs zoning ordinance was amended on June 19, 1969, to provide:

"Article 14 'M’ Manufacturing — Industrial District
"Sec. 14.1 USES PERMITTED. In the *M’ Manufacturing — Industrial District, no building or premises shall be used in whole or in part and no building shall hereafter be erected, converted, or structurally altered, except for one or more of the following uses:
"16. Port and dock facilities, boat repair and storage, ferry operation, except that ferry tickets shall be sold only on the premises actually used for docking ferries, embarking and disembarking passengers.”

The ordinance also permits ferry operations in "B-4” business districts and "C” community districts, [64]*64and limits ticket sales in those districts to premises actually used for docking ferries.

The ticket office was constructed subsequent to the effective dates of the zoning ordinance provisions. When ticket sales actually commenced, plaintiff notified defendants that the sales were in violation of the zoning law. Suit was instituted, culminating in a summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

Defendants contend on appeal that the ordinance does not actually prohibit ticket sales in a "B-3” district, and that, in any event, such a restriction would violate the due process clause of the constitution since it is not reasonably related to any governmental interest. Because we agree with defendants’ interpretation of the ordinance itself, consideration of the constitutional issue is unnecessary.

In his opinion granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court stated:

"It is the scheme and purpose of Plaintiffs Zoning Ordinance to restrict the operation of ferries to its waterfront area and further to restrict the sale of ferry tickets, within the village, to the same premises from which the ferries actually operate.” (Emphasis added.)

The zoning ordinance expressly limits ticket sales within B-4, C and M districts to dock areas. No restriction on ticket sales appears in the ordinance sections defining B-3 districts. Therefore, an implication arises that ticket sales are a permissible use of property in districts where not expressly prohibited or otherwise restricted. Cf. Peacock Twp v Panetta, 81 Mich App 733, 737; 265 NW2d 810 (1978). The trial court erred in extending the restriction to the entire village.

Plaintiff argues on appeal that the sale of tickets [65]*65is precluded in a B-3 district because it is not specifically listed among permissible uses. However, the zoning ordinance clearly permits property for office use and for the conduct of retail business. The ordinance fails to define "office” or restrict retail business to particular types of sales.

" 'In interpreting the language of the ordinance to determine the extent of the restriction upon use of the property, the language must be interpreted, where doubt exists as to the intention of the legislative body, in favor of the property owner.’ 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed), 1974 Cum Supp, § 25.71, p 50.” 81 Mich App 733, 736-737.

We therefore interpret "office” in a broad manner for the purposes of this ordinance and to include the building used by defendants for the conduct or transaction of their business. Had plaintiff desired to restrict the term "office” to a particular type, the ordinance could have been so worded. Cf. Tel-Craft Civic Ass’n v Detroit, 337 Mich 326, 331; 60 NW2d 294 (1953). We construe the ordinance to allow defendants to use their property for the sale of ferry tickets.

Because of our conclusion regarding the construction of the ordinance, we need not consider whether the anticipated restriction was constitutionally permissible. We do note, however, that, independent of its zoning powers, a village is statutorily authorized to regulate ferries. MCL 67.40; MSA 5.1324.

Reversed.

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Related

Peacock Township v. Panetta
265 N.W.2d 810 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1978)
Tel-Craft Civic Ass'n v. City of Detroit
60 N.W.2d 294 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1953)

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Bluebook (online)
302 N.W.2d 326, 103 Mich. App. 60, 1981 Mich. App. LEXIS 2674, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/village-of-mackinaw-city-v-union-terminal-piers-inc-michctapp-1981.