2025 IL App (2d) 250080-U No. 2-25-0080 Order filed December 16, 2025
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
VILLAGE OF HAMPSHIRE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 24-MR-364 ) ILLINOIS FRATERNAL ORDER ) OF POLICE LABOR COUNCIL, ) Honorable ) Kevin T. Busch, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where the issue on appeal is whether the arbitrator’s reinstatement of a police officer terminated by the village was against Illinois public policy, we determine that (1) Illinois public policy holds that a police officer must be honest in the execution of job duties, but does not hold that termination is the only discipline appropriate for a police officer found to be untruthful; and (2) reinstatement of the officer was not against public policy, because the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident of untruthfulness were unclear and the officer’s service thereafter was highly praised by his employers.
¶2 Sandro Palomares served as a police officer for plaintiff, the Village of Hampshire, from
December 2021 until February 2023, when his employment was terminated. Defendant, the Illinois
Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, represented Palomares throughout the grievance process 2025 IL App (2d) 250080-U
and the arbitration that followed. In an opinion and award dated August 1, 2024, the arbitrator
found that plaintiff lacked just cause to terminate the employment of Palomares and ordered
plaintiff to reinstate Palomares as a police officer. Plaintiff filed a motion in the circuit court of
Kane County to vacate the award. The trial court denied the motion and confirmed the award, and
plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court and confirm the arbitrator’s award.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 When Palomares’s employment was terminated in February 2023, plaintiff and defendant
were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that was valid from May 1, 2020, to April
30, 2023. The CBA provided that the suspension or dismissal of nonprobationary police officers
could be challenged through a grievance and arbitration proceeding specified in the CBA. On
February 28, 2023, Palomares filed a timely grievance under the CBA. When the dispute was not
resolved during the grievance process, arbitration proceedings followed. An arbitration hearing
was held on May 14, 2024. Testimony was given by Janet Mahoney of the Kane County State’s
Attorney’s Office (Kane County SAO); Douglas Pann, plaintiff’s chief of police; and James
Kruger, who had previously served as chief of police in East Dundee, Oak Brook, Roselle, and
Winfield. The parties also agreed to the admission of the stipulated testimony of Hobert Jones, a
police lieutenant employed by plaintiff.
¶5 The following evidence was adduced during the arbitration proceedings, including the May
14, 2024, hearing. In the fall of 2021, Palomares applied to become a police officer in plaintiff’s
police department. His employment application listed these previous positions: March 2016 to
present, dispatcher for the Wheeling Police Department; May 2016 to April 2021, part-time police
officer for Prairie Grove, Holiday Hills, and the marine unit of the Wauconda Police Department;
January 2007 to March 2016, police officer for the Wheeling Police Department.
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¶6 Palomares stated on his application that he left his position as a police officer in Wheeling
because of “[r]eassignment of duties due to conflict w/past supervisor.” In response to the question,
“Have you ever received formal discipline during any prior employment or job positions such as
an oral reprimand, written reprimand, or suspension?” Palomares checked “Yes” and wrote,
“Copies of the documents regarding the suspensions have been tendered to Chief Thompson,” i.e.,
Brian Thompson, plaintiff’s then-chief of police. In response to the question, “Have you been
discharged or forced to resign from any employment (not including layoff)?” Palomares checked
“Yes” and wrote, “Copies of the documents regarding the resignation have been tendered to Chief
Thompson.”
¶7 As part of his application, Palomares provided plaintiff with three documents relevant to
this case: an order of suspension dated April 6, 2014, from Wheeling Chief of Police William
Benson; a temporary administrative leave directive dated January 22, 2016, from Wheeling Chief
of Police James Dunne; and a voluntary separation agreement dated March 3, 2016, between
Palomares and Wheeling. The 2014 order of suspension stated in part: “This suspension is based
on your actions on February 19, 2014 when you altered the disposition of a traffic stop initiated
on January 31, 2014.” Page two of the order of suspension purported to quote as follows from
“Standard Operating Procedures A-24, Section I. A., 3 & 4”:
“3. Written warning notice with Traffic Stop Data sticker (see Appendix A). Stickers will
be placed on the back of the manila copy of the ticket. 4. A Traffic Stop Data Sheet shall
be completed on traffic stops where a verbal warning is given and no citation issued (see
Appendix B).”
¶8 Also listed on page two, under “Wheeling Police Department – Rules and Regulations,”
were citations to “210.10 Integrity” and “210.26 Truthfulness.”
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¶9 The administrative leave directive from Chief Dunne stated in part:
“I have been notified by a representative of the Cook County State’s Attorney that they do
not intend to prosecute any misdemeanor or felony cases where you were the arresting
officer, or in which you are the material witness. Based upon that notice, I am hereby
placing you on a temporary administrative leave of absence, with pay, pending further
inquiry. ***.”
In the voluntary separation agreement, Palomares agreed to resign from his position as a Wheeling
police officer and to “not seek or accept future employment as a police officer with [Wheeling] at
any time.” The agreement also stated that Wheeling would offer him “a non-sworn position of
Radio Operator.”
¶ 10 In October and November 2021, Jones conducted a pre-employment background
investigation of Palomares. As part of that process, Jones sent a memo dated October 14, 2021, to
Thompson. The memo stated in part:
“I spoke to Chief James Dunne of the Wheeling Police Department in regards to a memo
that was given to [Palomares] dated January 22, 2016. Chief Dunne explained that the
previous administration had some complaints filed against it by a few [o]fficers in the
department ([Palomares] being one of them). When the investigation was completed the
person who they were going to promote to Chief retired from the department. Chief Dunne
was given notice by Cook County ASA Office about an issue with [Palomares] not being
truthful in an internal investigation about a traffic ticket. Chief Dunne talked with Union
officials and [Palomares] and it was decided not to pursue the matter ***. Chief Dunne
tried to look further into the Cook County ASA Office on whether this was a lie during
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[an] internal [investigation] or something misspoken that would not rise to the level of a
‘Brady Officer’ and had a negative result.
He could not get an answer. I asked if he had anything that would list him as a ‘Brady’
Officer at the [p]olice department and he stated there was nothing in the police department
that would put him in the ‘Brady’ category. Chief Dunne stated [Palomares] is an excellent
officer.
Based on what I found out I would recommend [Palomares] to continue through the
process.”
Following the completion of the pre-employment investigation, plaintiff hired Palomares as a
police officer.
¶ 11 In early January 2022, just weeks after hiring Palomares, plaintiff received an anonymous
letter accusing Palomares of inappropriate and criminal actions while he served as a Wheeling
police officer. The writer claimed to know Palomares through a mutual friend. The writer also
claimed to have learned from a Wheeling police officer that Palomares had “officially lied” and
that “there was a law that he could not testify in court so therefore he could not be a police officer.”
The letter also referenced “Brady-Giglio.” Under that pair of United States Supreme Court cases—
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)—
prosecutors must notify criminal defendants of any evidence that may be used to impeach the
credibility of prosecution witnesses, including police officers.
¶ 12 After plaintiff received the anonymous letter, Jones investigated the allegations contained
in the letter. In January 2022, plaintiff’s police department asked Palomares to provide a written
response. In his response, Palomares stated, “In reference to the incident involving the altering of
a traffic stop from a verbal warning to a written warning, I did not lie and presented investigatory
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records to the Hampshire Police [D]epartment regarding the incident.” As part of his investigation,
Jones reviewed Palomares’s personnel file from the Wheeling Police Department. Jones ultimately
issued a memo recommending that plaintiff continue employing Palomares as a police officer.
¶ 13 In September 2022, Thompson was replaced on an interim basis by Pann, who became
plaintiff’s permanent police chief in February 2023. In the fall of 2022, Pann began reviewing the
personnel files for each officer in his department. Pann testified at the arbitration hearing that, in
December 2022, he reviewed Palomares’s file, including Jones’s memos regarding his
investigations into Palomares’s application materials and the anonymous letter. Pann had
“concerns” and “questions” after reading those materials. Referencing Jones’s memos specifically,
Pann said, “Neither process was done to what I would expect or what I do in background
investigations or internal investigations today.” However, Pann decided not to take any action at
that time; he believed he needed to “trust that the previous administration vetted these things out
and appropriate decisions were made.” When asked about Palomares’s performance as an
employee, Pann testified:
“As far as my observations and what I was informed from the previous
administration as far as his performance as a police officer was it was exemplary. I had no
disciplinary issues with [Palomares]. I had no complaints about him. I thought he did a
very good job, and I gave him additional responsibilities. ***.
And as far as I could tell, he was a good employee and he was doing a good job and
he was collecting evidence for us on very significant cases, the most significant cases that
we had. I also was planning on moving him into evidence room custodian. And all of these
things were in the works. So he was a good employee for me.”
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¶ 14 On December 21, 2022, Pann created a post on plaintiff’s Facebook page, sharing that the
Kane County SAO had presented a training program to the police department on the Illinois SAFE-
T Act. An anonymous Facebook account made this comment on Pann’s post:
“I support the [p]olice. But every profession has problems and rogue officer(s). The SAFE-
T Act may assist in holding rogue officers accountable. Unfortunately, HPD hired one of
those officers in 2021. The officer is ineligible to testify in court and is on the Brady list.
Hope this does not come back to bite the tax paying good citizens of Hampshire once the
defense attorneys discover this and arrests/convictions can be appealed/lawsuits will be
filed. REGULAR MEETING OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES MINUTES December 2,
2021.”
¶ 15 After seeing the anonymous comment, Pann reviewed the meeting minutes from December
2, 2021, and discovered that that was the day Palomares was sworn in as a police officer for
plaintiff. Pann reviewed Palomares’s personnel file again and met with Palomares. Pann informed
Palomares that he would be investigating the information in the Facebook comment as well as the
anonymous letter that the department had received nearly a year earlier. Pann testified that
Palomares was upset about the Facebook comment and believed it was written by the same person
who sent the anonymous letter. Palomares asked if there was any way to stop the anonymous
accusations. Pann said he would discuss Palomares’s file and the Facebook comment with the
Kane County SAO.
¶ 16 Pann next contacted Chief Dunne of the Wheeling Police Department to try to obtain
information about Palomares’s suspension and resignation. Dunne said the records had been
destroyed in accordance with Illinois law in place at that time. Dunne also indicated that he was
never able to obtain any information from the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (Cook
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County SAO) regarding Palomares’s placement on a Brady disclosure list. Pann then contacted
the Cook County SAO but never heard back. Pann testified that, for three primary reasons, he next
contacted the Kane County SAO:
“One, because I felt they could help me with the [Cook County SAO], so like state’s
attorney to state’s attorney perhaps they could get information if there was any information
they could help me to get that.
And second was *** I felt like they needed to weigh in on the significance of the
information in the employee file in Kane County.
I also *** wanted to talk to them about this anonymous poster and *** whether
there was any criminal laws being violated. I didn’t believe there was, but I wanted to see
if there was a possibility of something there.
So for those reasons, I contacted the [Kane County SAO] and was directed to
[Mahoney] to review the information.”
¶ 17 Pann met with Mahoney on January 10, 2023. She told him that, in January 2022, the Kane
County SAO had received the same anonymous letter that the police department had received. She
said she asked Thompson to investigate the letter and advise her of his findings, but she never
heard back from him. Pann and Mahoney then reviewed Palomares’s personnel file, which
included the documents related to the suspension, administrative leave, and voluntary separation.
After reviewing the documents, Mahoney told Pann that she was concerned about using Palomares
as a witness in any criminal prosecution.
¶ 18 Pann testified as follows:
“Q. After [Mahoney] informed you that she sought a response from [the] previous
administration, what was the rest of your discussion?
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A. *** At the end of the conversation, she sat back in her chair and said, ‘I will never call
him as a witness in Kane County.’ I said, ‘well, that’s significant because I can’t have an
officer not deployable that can’t testify in court.’ ***.
Q. Are you summarizing what she said or were those her exact words, that she will not call
him as a witness in Kane [C]ounty?
A. *** I’m summarizing, but when I left the office that day, my understanding is they will
not call him. Now, she had not reviewed with her peers and she had not issued anything
official at that point. ***.”
Pann asked Mahoney to confer with her colleagues at the Kane County SAO to see if they shared
her concerns about Palomares.
¶ 19 Mahoney testified that, after the reviewing the documentation pertaining to Palomares, she
was concerned about using him as a witness because, under Brady and its progeny, anytime
Palomares was a witness in a case, the Kane County SAO would need to disclose the fact that
Palomares was suspended from the Wheeling Police Department for altering the disposition of a
traffic stop in 2014. Mahoney stated that she would need to place Palomares on a “disclosure list”
(or “Brady list”) based on his conduct while he was employed as a police officer in Wheeling.
Mahoney further testified that this disclosure would put Palomares’s credibility at issue, which
could make prosecution of a case difficult if Palomares were the material witness. Mahoney also
testified that, after she met with Pann, she consulted with the first assistant state’s attorney and the
head of the criminal division of the Kane County SAO. The three concluded that the Kane County
SAO would try not to call Palomares as a witness in any case. Pann subsequently spoke to
Mahoney on the phone. Immediately following that conversation, Pann placed Palomares on paid
administrative leave.
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¶ 20 The notice provided to Palomares stated, in part:
“[Palomares] effective immediately, I am placing you on paid temporary administrative
leave pending investigation of the matter described below:
In the morning hours of January 12, 2023, I received verbal notice from [Mahoney] that
the [Kane County SAO] does not intend to utilize you as a material witness in any
misdemeanor or felony court proceedings based on incidents that occurred prior to your
appointment as a Hampshire Police Officer.”
¶ 21 As part of his investigation into the matter, Pann sent a Freedom of Information Act request
to the Cook County SAO, asking for “all records related to Wheeling Police Officer [Palomares],
both in his capacity as a police officer and a dispatcher, that reflect his ability to testify[,] from
2013 until 2021.” Pann also emailed Christine Bayer, first assistant state’s attorney for Kane
County, to request that she confirm in writing that the Kane County SAO would no longer call
Palomares to testify in Kane County.
¶ 22 In response, Bayer sent Pann a letter dated February 15, 2023, which stated:
“Based on documents received by the [Kane County SAO] in relation to Brady/Giglio
disclosures, we have determined that we would no longer want to call [Palomares] to testify
in any [m]isdemeanor or [f]elony case in Kane County. We believe if he were called to
testify, it would have a major impact on the success of the prosecution of our cases and
would cast doubt on the integrity of the investigation and procedures for the case. We
would employ every strategy in the prosecution of the case in order to avoid [Palomares’s]
testimony. We would request that for any investigation to which he may be assigned that
he would have another officer with him at all times so that we could call that officer instead
of [Palomares].”
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¶ 23 On February 21, 2023, Pann provided a copy of Bayer’s letter and a notice of potential
discipline to Palomares and defendant’s representative. The notice explained that, because the
Kane County SAO had decided that it “will no longer call [Palomares] to testify in any
[m]isdemeanor or [f]elony case,” Palomares could no longer serve effectively as a police officer
for plaintiff. The letter further explained that, due to its size and staffing level,
“the [d]epartment cannot have another officer with [Palomares] at all times in the field, and
there is no assignment in our [d]epartment that do [sic] not require officers to go in the
field. Continuing to deploy you to active patrol assignment would bring undo exposure to
risk for you, the [d]epartment, the Village and the citizens of Hampshire.”
In response to the notice, Palomares told Pann that he did not intend to resign. On February 24,
2023, Pann terminated Palomares’s employment.
¶ 24 Kruger testified that, based on his experience as a police chief with various departments,
“deploying a patrol officer who is unable to credibly testify in prosecutions [would] cause potential
liability to [plaintiff].”
¶ 25 In the arbitrator’s opinion and award dated August 1, 2024, he addressed the issue of
whether plaintiff had just cause under the CBA to discharge Palomares. In coming to his
conclusion that plaintiff did not have just cause, the arbitrator noted that, in its February 15, 2023,
letter, the Kane County SAO did not say it “barred [Palomares] from testifying” but, rather, that it
“would no longer want to call” Palomares as a witness. Because Palomares could still testify in
court, “albeit with greater scrutiny from the defense,” he could still fulfill the requirements of his
position as a police officer. Throughout his opinion, the arbitrator also highlighted (1) that plaintiff
had the documents related to Palomares’s suspension when plaintiff considered his application and
conducted his pre-employment background investigation; (2) that, according to plaintiff,
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Palomares’s termination had nothing to do with his performance while plaintiff employed him;
and (3) that plaintiff’s police leadership viewed Palomares as an exemplary police officer. Having
determined that plaintiff lacked just cause under the CBA to terminate plaintiff, the arbitrator
sustained the grievance and ordered that Palomares be reinstated and made whole.
¶ 26 Plaintiff appealed the arbitration award by filing a motion in the trial court to vacate the
arbitration award. The court heard oral arguments before denying the motion and confirming the
award. This appeal followed.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 In this case, the only issue before the arbitrator was whether plaintiff had just cause under
the CBA to terminate the employment of Palomares. The arbitrator found that plaintiff did not
have just cause. On appeal, plaintiff does not dispute the arbitrator’s finding as it concerns the
CBA and its criteria for termination; instead, plaintiff asserts that the arbitration award violates
Illinois public policy against reinstating police officers found to be untruthful. 1 In response,
1 Plaintiff offers several iterations of the public policy allegedly violated by the arbitration award,
some of which seem to imply that Illinois public policy prohibits reinstatement of police officers whom a
state’s attorney’s office has placed on a disclosure list or “Brady” list. However, plaintiff offers the
following clarification in its reply brief:
“[Defendant] *** misleadingly argues that: ‘[t]here is no established public policy that an officer’s
placement on a Brady-Giglio disclosure list mandates termination.’ ***.
However, that is not the holding in [City of Country Club Hills v. Charles, 2020 IL App
(1st) 200546], and [plaintiff] never made such an argument. What the Country Club Hills court
actually determined was that ‘[t]here is a robust and uniform body of case law establishing a public
policy in Illinois that police officers be absolutely honest.’ Charles, 2020 IL App (1st) 200546,
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defendant argues that no issues of untruthfulness came before the arbitrator, that Palomares’s
employment was terminated solely because the Kane County SAO added him to a disclosure list,
and that plaintiff has failed to establish that reinstating Palomares would violate a public policy.
Therefore, defendant asks us to affirm the arbitrator’s award.
¶ 29 Our supreme court “has consistently recognized that the judicial review of an arbitral award
is extremely limited.” American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 304 (1996) (AFSCME). Because
the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by
a judge, the parties must accept the arbitrator’s view of the facts as well as the arbitrator’s
interpretation of the contract. Griggsville-Perry Community Unit School District No. 4 v. Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Board, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 18. As such, it is not the role of a reviewing
court to reweigh the evidence presented to the arbitrator or the credibility of the witnesses. See
City of Country Club Hills v. Charles, 2020 IL App (1st) 200546, ¶¶ 27-28.
¶ 30 However, “[a]s with any contract, a court will not enforce a collective bargaining
agreement that is repugnant to established norms of public policy.” Illinois State Toll Highway
Authority v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 700, 2015 IL App (2d) 141060, ¶ 44.
This public-policy exception, however, is very narrow and can “be invoked only when a party
clearly shows enforcement of the contract, as interpreted by the arbitrator, contravenes some
explicit public policy.” City of Chicago v. Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, 2020
IL 124831, ¶ 25. Applying the public-policy exception to an “arbitration award [that] is derived
¶ 23.”
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from the essence of the collective bargaining agreement” requires a two-step analysis. Id. Under
the first prong of the analysis, we determine “whether a well-defined and dominant public policy
can be identified through a review of our constitution, statutes, and relevant judicial opinions.” Id.
¶ 26. Under the second prong of the analysis, we determine “whether the arbitrator’s award, as
reflected in his interpretation of the agreement, violated the public policy.” Id. “This inquiry ‘is
necessarily fact dependent’ [citation]; however, the question of whether an award violates public
policy is one of law, which we review de novo.” City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Alliance of
Police, Chapter No. 240, 2015 IL App (1st) 140957, ¶ 20 (quoting AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 311).
¶ 31 When, as here, a party asserts that reinstatement of an employee would violate public
policy, there must be either “an explicit legal prohibition against the reinstatement” or “some well-
defined and dominant policy, not merely a value judgment or notion of the public interest, that
implicitly forbids the employee’s reinstatement.” City of Highland Park v. Teamster Local Union
No. 714, 357 Ill. App. 3d 453, 462 (2005). Where there is neither an explicit nor implicit
prohibition against the reinstatement, “the reinstatement of an employee who has violated an
important public policy does not necessarily itself violate public policy.” Id.
¶ 32 We begin our analysis by considering plaintiff’s argument, which relies on case law to
assert that Illinois has a public policy against reinstating police officers found to be untruthful. We
next look to Illinois statutes for evidence of the public policy proposed by plaintiff. If we determine
that such a policy exists, we decide whether plaintiff has clearly shown that enforcement of the
CBA, as interpreted by the arbitrator, contravenes that policy.
¶ 33 Plaintiff primarily relies on Charles to assert that Illinois has a public policy against
reinstating police officers found to be untruthful. In Charles, the police chief for the City of
Country Club Hills (the City) terminated the employment of a police officer based, in part, on the
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allegation that the officer had filed an incomplete and untruthful report during an investigation into
the escape of a detainee from a booking room after the officer arrested him. Charles, 2020 IL App
(1st) 200546, ¶¶ 3-4, 10, 12. With respect to that accusation of untruthfulness, the arbitrator found
that, although “some of [the officer’s] statements ‘could be viewed as somewhat self-serving and
self-exonerating,’ *** there was insufficient evidence to find they were made with the intent to
deceive ‘through omission of material fact.’ ” Id. ¶ 13. The arbitrator also found that the officer’s
report regarding another incident concerning a patrol issue “lacked candor.” Id. ¶ 14. However,
the arbitration award ordered the City to reinstate the officer and allowed for no discipline beyond
a written warning for procedural failures that contributed to the detainee’s escape. Id.
¶ 34 The City then filed a complaint in the trial court, asking the court to vacate the arbitration
award on the basis that it violated public policy by not upholding the termination. Id. ¶ 15. The
trial court confirmed the award, and the City appealed. Id. ¶ 16. On appeal, the City argued that,
“under the facts presented, any award imposing a penalty of less than discharge violates public
policy.” In contrast, the officer argued that “public policy does not specifically require that [he] be
discharged for his conduct.” Id. ¶ 18. In its analysis, the First District (citing several of its own
opinions and one from the Second District) found that “[t]here is a robust and uniform body of
case law establishing a public policy in Illinois that police officers be absolutely honest,” and
therefore held that “there is a recognized public policy in Illinois that a police officer must be
honest and not provide false, misleading, or incomplete statements in connection with his duties.”
Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. Having found the first prong of the test satisfied, the court moved on to the second
prong. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
¶ 35 In considering whether the arbitrator’s award violated the public policy identified, the
Charles court acknowledged that, because the arbitrator was the finder of fact, the court’s “role
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[was] not to reweigh the evidence presented to the arbitrator.” Id. ¶ 27. With that limitation in
mind, the court examined the record as well as the award and found that, despite the arbitrator’s
contrary determination, the officer had acted dishonestly in omitting key details about the
prisoner’s escape and in lying about his patrol activities. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. After finding the second
prong of the test satisfied, the Charles court ultimately concluded that the arbitral decision to
impose only a written warning violated public policy. Id. ¶ 33. Based upon “the cumulative mosaic
of facts regarding the two incidents” (id. ¶ 36), the court held that termination was “the only
remedy consistent with public policy for [the officer’s] misconduct [].” Id. But to be clear, Charles
avoided stating that, under Illinois public policy, termination is the only discipline for all officer
dishonesty. In fact, the court said, “we do not find, from our review of the case law, there is an
absolute rule that any instance of police dishonesty must result in termination from service.
Obviously, each case presents unique facts which must take into account the officer's prior record,
the benefits of progressive discipline, the culpability of the officer, and the potential peril to the
municipality created by the particular dishonesty at issue.” Id. ¶ 35.
¶ 36 In her dissent, Justice Cunningham argued that the majority erred by relying “solely on the
cold record” to overturn the decision of the arbitrator, who had “ample opportunity to observe the
witnesses and determine their credibility and the visual nuances that give the trier of fact an
impression of the witnesses and their testimony.” Id. ¶ 46 (Cunningham, J., dissenting). Justice
Cunningham disagreed with the majority’s ruling stating, “I can find no support for the position
that termination is the only acceptable sanction for the lack of candor which the arbitrator found
[the officer] to have committed.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 52. Justice Cunningham did not take
issue with the existence of the public policy established under the first prong of the analysis. She
instead looked to the second prong of the analysis and asserted that “the arbitrator’s decision did
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not run afoul of public policy” because “there was no clear-cut evidence that the totality of facts
and circumstances were so egregious that termination was the only and obvious conclusion at the
end of the arbitration process.” Id. ¶¶ 42, 54.
¶ 37 Thus, whether we consider the majority opinion or the dissenting opinion, Charles does
not support the proposition that Illinois public policy places a blanket prohibition on the
employment of any police officer found to be dishonest. Instead, Charles underscores the fact that
our analysis under the second prong is “necessarily fact dependent.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) See Des Plaines, 2015 IL App (1st) 140957, ¶ 20.
¶ 38 We turn next to the Illinois Police Training Act (Act) (50 ILCS 705/1 et seq. (West 2022)).
The Act provides for the creation of the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board
(Board). Id. § 1. We look to the Act for the sole purpose of ascertaining Illinois public policy
regarding the employment and termination of police officers. Under the Act, no one can serve as
a police officer in Illinois without being certified by the Board. Id. § 8.1(a). The Act also provides
for the decertification of officers. For instance, the Act provides for the “[a]utomatic decertification
of full-time and part-time law enforcement officers” found guilty of (1) a felony, or (2) on or after
January 1, 2022, any misdemeanor specified in that section. Id. § 6.1(a), (e). We conclude from
the Act that Illinois has an explicit legal prohibition against the employment of police officers with
certain criminal backgrounds. See id. § 6.1(a).
¶ 39 In contrast, the Act provides for the “[d]iscretionary decertification of full-time and part-
time law enforcement officers” (id. § 6.3) who have, inter alia, made a “false statement” “relating
to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime” or engaged in “deceptive *** conduct
*** harmful to the public.” Id. § 6.3(b)(5), (6). We hasten to note that the Act narrowly defines a
“ ‘[f]alse statement’ ” as “(1) any knowingly false statement provided on a form or report, (2) that
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the writer does not believe to be true, and (3) that the writer includes to mislead a public servant
in performing the public servant’s official functions.” Id. § 6.3(a). We also note that the Board
may decline to investigate further when it finds there is insufficient information to support an
allegation. Id. § 6.3(e)(4). Because the Act provides for only discretionary decertification, even
when it has been determined that a police officer made a false statement or engaged in deceptive
conduct included to mislead (see id. § 6.3(h)(9)), we conclude that Illinois does not have an explicit
legal prohibition against the employment of such officers.
¶ 40 Based upon our review of both the Act and case law, we disagree with the plaintiff that
Illinois has a well-defined and dominant public policy against reinstatement of police officers
found to be untruthful. Plaintiff’s articulation of the alleged policy conflates the two-pronged test
into a single inquiry. See City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Alliance of Police, 2015 IL App
(1st)140957, ¶ 23 (“The issue is not whether the public policy itself requires that the employee be
terminated. Rather, we [] determine whether the arbitrator's award reinstating the employee, under
the circumstances of the particular case, violates that identified public policy.” Emphasis added.).
However, we do agree with the conclusion of the Charles court: “there is a recognized public
policy in Illinois that a police officer must be honest and not provide false, misleading, or
incomplete statements in connection with his duties.” Charles, 2020 IL App (1st )200546, ¶ 25.
Thus, the first prong of the public-policy exception has been satisfied.
¶ 41 The second step of our analysis requires us to examine whether the arbitrator’s award
violated the public policy. City of Aurora v. Association of Professional Police Officers, 2019 IL
App (2d) 180375, ¶ 54. This is the fact dependent inquiry necessary for “ultimate applicability of
the exception.” American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of
Central Management Services (DuBose), 173 Ill. 2d 299, 311 (1996) (holding that arbitral award
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reinstating–without any discipline–DCFS case worker who fabricated report concerning children
in foster care violated public policy, where reinstatement was based on clause in CBA that required
any discipline to be commenced within 45 days of alleged wrongdoing, and where the fabrication
was not discovered until seven months later). To accomplish this, we review the evidence
presented to the arbitrator. Charles, 2020 IL App (1st) 200546, ¶26. As Charles put it, “each case
presents unique facts which must take into account the officer's prior record, the benefits of
progressive discipline, the culpability of the officer, and the potential peril to the municipality
created by the particular dishonesty at issue.” Id. ¶ 35.
¶ 42 Based on the record before us, we hold that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the
arbitrator’s ruling violated public policy. Not much is known of the incident in 2014. Any
additional Wheeling Police Department records associated with Palomares’s suspension and
resignation were destroyed in accordance with Illinois law at that time. We know that Chief
Benson’s Order of Suspension stated that Officer Palomares “altered the disposition of a traffic
stop” and referred to department procedures concerning warning tickets and department rules
about truthfulness and integrity. In January 2022, Palomares described his conduct at the request
of his superiors in Hampshire, writing, “In reference to the incident involving the altering of a
traffic stop from a verbal warning to a written warning, I did not lie and presented investigatory
records to the Hampshire Police [D]epartment regarding the incident.” The record also shows
Officer Palomares was disciplined by Wheeling with a suspension of four days, of which two days
held in abeyance. According to the arbitrator, he was forthcoming about his disciplinary history at
Wheeling during his onboarding at Hampshire Police Department in the fall of 2021, and his
performance thereafter was, according to witness testimony, “exemplary.”
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¶ 43 And when the arbitrator quoted Hampshire Police Lt. Jones’s memo dated October 14,
2021, he highlighted the fact that it was unclear what Palomares was supposed to have lied about:
“Chief Dunne [the current Wheeling Police Chief and successor to Chief Benson of
Wheeling (who originally imposed the discipline)] tried to look further into the Cook
County ASA Office on whether this was a lie during [an] internal [investigation] or
something misspoken that would not rise to the level of a ‘Brady Officer’ ***.
He could not get an answer. I asked if he had anything that would list him as a ‘Brady’
Officer at the [p]olice department and he stated there was nothing in the police department
that would put him in the ‘Brady’ category. Chief Dunne stated [Palomares] is an excellent
officer.”
¶ 44 The public-policy exception is very narrow and can “be invoked only when a party clearly
shows enforcement of the contract, as interpreted by the arbitrator, contravenes some explicit
public policy” City of Chicago, 2020 IL 124831, ¶ 25. Where there is neither an explicit nor
implicit prohibition against the reinstatement, “the reinstatement of an employee who has violated
an important public policy does not necessarily itself violate public policy.” City of Highland Park,
357 Ill. App. 3d at 462. If we accept that Palomares conduct violated the important public policy
requiring police officers to be honest and truthful, we must still examine these “unique facts [][and]
take into account the officer's prior record, the benefits of progressive discipline, the culpability of
the officer, and the potential peril to the municipality created by the particular dishonesty at issue.”
Charles, 2020 IL App (1st) 200546, ¶ 35.
¶ 45 Palomares’s culpability for untruthfulness is based only on the 2014 incident where he
apparently changed a verbal warning to a written warning. The facts and circumstances
surrounding this action are not clear, but we do know that contemporaneous discipline was meted
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out, and in the decade-plus since the incident, the officer’s record of service to the municipalities
for which he worked has been praised as “excellent,” “a very good job,” and “exemplary.”
Therefore, we find that plaintiff has failed to clearly show that the enforcement of the contract, as
interpreted by the arbitrator, contravened explicit public policy. See City of Chicago, 2020 IL
124831, ¶ 25.
¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County and
confirm the arbitrator’s award.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
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