Village of Hampshire v. Freeman

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 7, 2026
• Docket: 2-25-0178
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (2d) 250178-U No. 2-25-0178 Order filed April 7, 2026

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

THE VILLAGE OF HAMPSHIRE, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CLARENCE E. FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. Honorable Rene Cruz, Judge, Presiding. No. 22-DT-448

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Birkett and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction of driving under the influence was supported by sufficient evidence to prove that defendant was under the influence of alcohol.

¶2 Defendant, Clarence E. Freeman, was charged with one count of driving under the

influence of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2020). Following a bench trial, he was

convicted and sentenced to 24 months of court supervision. Defendant appeals, arguing that the

evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was under the influence of

alcohol. We affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 21, 2022, police officers for the Village of Hampshire (the Village) responded to

a call regarding a smoking vehicle in the parking lot of a McDonald’s restaurant. Defendant, who

was asleep in the vehicle with the engine running when the first officer arrived, was subsequently

charged with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West

2020). Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial.

¶5 At trial, the Village presented the testimony of three witnesses: McDonald’s manager

Niqitia Smith Garcia, Officer Joshua Marshall, and Sergeant Ryan Edwardson. Niqitia Smith

Garcia testified that, on May 21, 2022, at around 5:30 p.m., she was working at the McDonald’s

in Hampshire. A customer came inside and said that someone in the parking lot had passed out in

his vehicle, and that the vehicle was “smoking.” Garcia went outside and saw a “guy in his car

passed out, and the car as smoking.” She attempted to wake the man, later identified as defendant,

by tapping on the window and calling to him, but he did not respond, so she contacted the police.

Garcia said that, while the police were on the way, defendant “ended up waking up on his own.”

When asked what happened after he awoke, Garcia said, “I just remember him yelling and that he

got out [of the driver’s seat] and got into the passenger side.” Garcia stayed with the vehicle until

the police arrived. In response to the Village’s questions, Garcia confirmed that she never saw a

second person in the vehicle, the engine was running, and there was smoke coming from the front

of the vehicle.

¶6 Joshua Marshall testified that he worked as a patrol officer for the Hampshire Police

Department on the day in question. On May 21, 2022, he was finishing a twelve-hour shift that

ended at 6:00 p.m. when he responded to the call placed by Garcia. He said that, when he arrived

on the scene, he saw a McDonald’s employee pointing at a vehicle. Marshall noticed that the

-2- engine was running, “and there was smoke coming from underneath the hood.” He saw defendant

sleeping in the front passenger seat. Marshall first tapped on the window to wake defendant. When

he got no response, he banged his fist on the window. After defendant awoke, Marshall tried to

alert him to the smoke. Marshall then “opened up the door because at first [he] didn’t get a

response.”

¶7 Marshall suggested that defendant get out of the vehicle, and defendant agreed. Before

exiting the vehicle, defendant turned off the engine. Marshall said that defendant struggled to turn

off the ignition, succeeding “after a couple attempts” to do so. Marshall then talked to defendant

about the smoke coming from the vehicle and told defendant that his breath smelled like alcohol.

Marshall asked defendant for identification, but defendant stated that he was in the passenger seat

and did not need to provide identification. Marshall noted that, during the conversation, defendant

leaned against the vehicle for support and swayed from side to side. Marshall asked defendant if

he had been drinking, and he said yes. Marshall also stated that, when he first approached the

vehicle, he saw a Stella Artois beer can on the ground outside of the vehicle. He did not recall

seeing anything inside the vehicle. Marshall said that, based on his observations at the scene, he

concluded that defendant was unfit to operate a motor vehicle. When asked whether defendant

was cooperative or uncooperative, Marshall said, “He wanted to debate. *** I can’t say he was

completely uncooperative, but I’m not going to say he was cooperative.”

¶8 On cross-examination, Marshall confirmed that he did not photograph the beer can or

collect it as evidence. He had never met defendant before and did not know how he typically

walked and talked. He did not conduct or observe any field sobriety tests. Marshall said that,

according to his recollection, defendant turned off the engine and exited the vehicle before

Sergeant Edwardson arrived.

-3- ¶9 Sergeant Ryan Edwardson testified that, on May 21, 2022, he was on patrol duty while also

managing patrol officers. He responded to the call about a smoking vehicle in the McDonald’s

parking lot at around 5:40 p.m. When he arrived, he saw Marshall speaking to defendant next to

the vehicle. Edwardson said that the police department did not have any video cameras or body

cameras at that time. In response to a question about whether he asked defendant for identification,

Edwardson said, “Initially, he told me that he wasn’t going to provide it, and he told me that he

was going run us [through a database].” Defendant ultimately provided a state ID card. Edwardson

then identified defendant in the courtroom.

¶ 10 Edwardson recalled making the following observations of the vehicle: there was one can

of Stella Artois beer outside the vehicle and another can inside the vehicle, on the floor of the

passenger side; he saw “what appeared to be vomit on the driver’s side on the floorboard and on

the inside of the car”; and “[t]here was a whitish-color smoke coming out from underneath the

hood.” When asked whether the vehicle was running when he arrived, Edwardson said yes.

¶ 11 Asked what he observed about defendant at the time, Edwardson said that he saw defendant

leaning against his vehicle for support; defendant’s eyes were “bloodshot and glassy”; he had “the

odor of alcohol emanating from his breath”; and when the officers asked him to step away from

the vehicle for safety, his looked unsteady when he walked. Edwardson said that, when asked who

had been driving the vehicle, defendant informed the officers that his cousin was the driver and

that he was inside the McDonald’s. Defendant refused to go inside with the officers to identify the

cousin.

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Edwardson confirmed that defendant was not the registered owner

of the vehicle and that he never saw anyone drive the vehicle. He said that the fire department

-4- responded to the scene and “poured a bunch of water” on the smoking vehicle. The vehicle was

later towed from the scene.

¶ 13 Both Marshall and Edwardson testified that they had responded to numerous incidents

involving intoxication and that they had been trained in driving under the influence enforcement

and field sobriety testing. Edwardson originally testified that he offered defendant a breathalyzer

test. However, after reviewing his report, he conceded that he made no mention of offering

defendant a breathalyzer. Neither officer asked defendant to perform field sobriety tests.

¶ 14 Upon the conclusion of the Village’s presentation of its case, defendant made a motion for

a directed finding. Defendant argued that the Village failed to prove he was under the influence

of alcohol, “given the fact that there’s no allegation of bad driving, there are no fields, no blows,

no opportunity to do those, and there’s just really a total lack of direct evidence of impairment in

this case.” Defendant also asserted that there were “some discrepancies” in the testimony provided

by the police officers and specifically pointed to the fact that Marshall said the vehicle’s engine

had been turned off before Edwardson arrived, while Edwardson testified that the engine was still

running when he arrived. In response, the Village asserted that the testimony of the officers

sufficiently established that defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle while under the

influence of alcohol. The court denied the motion.

¶ 15 After hearing closing arguments, the court found defendant guilty. The court recounted the

evidence and then explained its decision as follows:

“The standard here, as the charge is a DUI under the 501(a)(2) [sic]. To prove a

violation of subsection (a)(2), the state—city in this case—must show the defendant was

actually impaired by the consumption of alcohol. A person is under the influence of alcohol

when, as a result of drinking any amount of alcohol, his mental or physical faculties are so

-5- impaired as to reduce his ability to think and act with ordinary care. That’s citing to People

v. Nunez, which is 143 Ill. App. 3d [1072], a [S]econd [D]istrict case from 1986.

It’s highly unusual. In most DUI arrests we would have the three phases, which

would be the vehicle in motion phase, the interaction with the individual phase, and then

the performance on any tests.

In this particular case, we don’t have any vehicle in motion. However, what we do

have is we do have operation and control of the vehicle. We have a vehicle that’s in a

dangerous condition as well.

Secondly, we have the interaction with the arrestee, the odor, the eyes, the balance

issues, the desire to debate, but more importantly, the inability to recognize the

circumstances under which [defendant] was in.

He’s in a vehicle that’s basically smoking. Sergeant Edmundson [sic] described

that the fire department had to come and extinguish what was happening with this particular

vehicle. After waking up in the driver’s seat, the only response to being in basically a

burning vehicle was to get out of the driver’s seat and make a motion to get into the

passenger seat and then fall back asleep to the point where, when the officer arrived, he

was already back asleep at that time.

The third phase would be the field sobriety tests. Again, the officer is unclear

whether he asked for it or not. There obviously are no field sobriety tests, so it’s as if they

were never—they were refused or not done. Those would be the appropriate steps to take.

It’s unclear whether it was offered or not.

The question for the court is whether [defendant’s] mental and physical faculties

were so impaired as to reduce his ability to think and act with ordinary care.

-6- Based on the evidence that’s been provided, most importantly the failure to

recognize the seriousness of the situation he was in, inside of a burning vehicle, just to

wake up and move to another chair, and the admission to drinking alcohol, the odor of

alcohol, the [c]ourt does believe it’s been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that

[defendant] was driving under the influence as defined in the statute on May 21st of 2022.

There will be a finding of guilty with respect to the only count.”

¶ 16 On April 25, 2025, the trial court heard argument on defendant’s motion for a new trial. In

denying the motion, the court stated that defendant failed to act with ordinary care and highlighted

the fact that, in response to being alerted to the smoking engine that was ultimately extinguished

by the fire department, he merely moved from the driver’s seat to the passenger’s seat of the

vehicle. The court also noted that sobriety tests “are preferable, but they are not necessarily

required.” The court went on to sentence defendant to 24 months of court supervision. Defendant

timely appealed.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he was under the influence of alcohol. He therefore asks this court

to reverse his conviction for driving under the influence. In response, the Village argues that the

evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. We agree with the Village.

¶ 19 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the relevant question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”

(Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The critical inquiry is whether the evidence could reasonably support

-7- a guilty finding, regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. People v. Lissade,

403 Ill. App. 3d 609, 612 (2010). The fact finder is responsible for determining the witnesses’

credibility, weighing their testimony, and deciding on the reasonable inferences to be drawn from

the evidence. See People v. Hill, 272 Ill. App. 3d 597, 603-04 (1995). “Because the trier of fact

is best positioned to judge the credibility of the witnesses and resolve disputes in the evidence, its

decision is entitled to great deference.” Lissade, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 612. We will reverse the

defendant’s conviction only where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory

that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Id.

¶ 20 Here, the Village needed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of the offense

detailed in Section 11-501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West

2020)):

“(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within

this State while:

***

(2) under the influence of alcohol[.]”

On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court’s finding that he was in actual physical

control of the vehicle; he only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether he was

under the influence of alcohol.

¶ 21 As the First District has explained:

“A defendant is under the influence of alcohol when, as a result of consuming alcohol or

any other intoxicating substance, the defendant’s ‘ “mental or physical faculties are so

impaired as to reduce [the] ability to think and act with ordinary care.” ’ [Citation.] To be

under the influence of alcohol, a defendant must be under the influence to a degree that

-8- renders her incapable of driving safely. [Citation.] Whether a defendant was intoxicated

is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court. [Citation.]

To establish intoxication, the State is not required to present scientific proof, such

as a breath or blood alcohol test; it may rely solely on circumstantial evidence, such as the

credible testimony of the arresting officer. [Citations.] The trier of fact may consider the

officer’s observations, such as the defendant’s conduct, speech, or appearance; the odor of

alcohol on the defendant’s breath; and testimony that the defendant failed a field sobriety

test. Any evidence of alcohol consumption is relevant to the issue of impairment.” People

v. Groebe, 2019 IL App (1st) 180503, ¶¶ 57-58.

¶ 22 Factors supporting a finding that a motorist was under the influence include (1) the odor of

alcohol on his or her breath (People v. Tatera, 2018 IL App (2d) 160207, ¶ 31); (2) “glossy” eyes

(People v. Hewitt, 212 Ill. App. 3d 496, 504 (1991)); and (3) the motorist’s admission to consuming

alcohol (People v. Jophlin, 2018 IL App (4th) 150802, ¶ 50). All of these factors were present

here. In addition, the officers observed open beer cans and vomit, defendant used his vehicle to

support himself while standing, and he was unsteady when he walked. The trial court further found

that defendant’s conduct proved that his impairment reduced his ability to think and act with

ordinary care because, when alerted to the fact that his vehicle’s engine was smoking, defendant

merely moved from the driver’s seat to the passenger’s seat and fell asleep again while the engine

continued running and smoking. In light of these facts and circumstances, we conclude that a

rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of being under

the influence of alcohol while in actual physical control of the vehicle.

¶ 23 Defendant argues that the testimony of the police officers lacked credibility because their

testimony was uncorroborated by physical or video evidence, they could not recall some details

-9- while on the stand, and they differed on some points, such as whether the engine was still running

when Edwardson arrived. We cannot agree. The trial court clearly found the witnesses to be

credible and—as the Village points out in response—any minor discrepancies are immaterial

where the testimony of all three witnesses fully supported the essential facts relied on by the trial

court.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 26 Affirmed.

- 10 -