Villafane v. Maradona

253 So. 3d 708
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedAugust 8, 2018
Docket17-0040
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 253 So. 3d 708 (Villafane v. Maradona) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Villafane v. Maradona, 253 So. 3d 708 (Fla. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed August 8, 2018. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D17-0040 Lower Tribunal No. 15-29014 ________________

Claudia Rosana Villafañe, et al., Appellants,

vs.

Diego Armando Maradona, Appellee.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Antonio Marin, Judge.

Barakat Law, PA and Brian Barakat, for appellants.

EFR Law Firm and Eduardo F. Rodriguez, for appellee.

Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SALTER and LUCK, JJ.

LUCK, J.

Claudia Rosana Villafane and five companies she controls appeal the trial

court’s order denying their motion to dismiss Diego Armando Maradona’s (Villafane’s ex-husband) complaint for fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment

based on forum non conveniens. We affirm.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Villafane and Maradona are both citizens of Argentina, where they married

in 1989, separated in 1999, and were divorced in 2003. Although divorced in

2003, the parties did not agree to a division of their marital property until August

2013. In their property settlement agreement, the parties acknowledged that the

property listed in the agreement was the entire marital estate.

On December 15, 2015, Maradona sued Villafane and her shell companies in

Miami-Dade County. Maradona alleged that while married to Villafane he trusted

her to manage his financial affairs. According to Maradona, while managing his

finances and without his knowledge, Villafane misappropriated some of his money

and used it to purchase six condominium units in South Florida. Maradona alleged

that although the properties were purchased before the property settlement,

Villafane did not disclose them as marital property during the extended decade-

long property settlement proceedings in Argentina. The complaint set forth counts

for unjust enrichment and constructive trust against Villafane and the shell

companies, and breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and constructive fraud

against Villafane.

2 Villafane moved to dismiss the complaint based on forum non conveniens,

arguing that Argentina was the proper venue. Villafane alleged that any

misappropriation would have occurred in Argentina where both parties resided and

maintained their financial affairs. Moreover, she claimed all witnesses, including

those most familiar with the parties’ finances and the divorce proceedings, may be

found in Argentina. In support of the motion, Villafane filed her own affidavit and

the legal opinion of an Argentinian lawyer. Maradona responded to the motion

with his own affidavit and that of an Argentinian legal expert.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss because Villafane “d[id] not

satisfy the adequate alternative forum factor since Argentina’s statute of limitations

bars [Maradona’s] causes of action for damages.” Villafane appeals the denial of

her motion to dismiss.1

Discussion

Villafane contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss

based on forum non conveniens because there was no evidence that the

Argentinian statute of limitations expired, and even if it had, Argentina still was an

adequate alternate forum. We disagree, and find no abuse of discretion by the trial

court.2

1 We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ix) (“Appeals to the district courts of appeal of non-final orders are limited to those that . . . determine . . . the issue of forum non conveniens.”). 2 Denials of motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens are reviewed for an

3 “The forum non conveniens inquiry currently conducted by Florida courts is

. . . a four-step process and is set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure

1.061(a).” Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc., 123 So. 3d 1085, 1091 (Fla. 2013). This

case involves the first step that, “[a]s a prerequisite, the court must establish

whether an adequate alternative forum exists which possesses jurisdiction over the

whole case.” Id. (quoting Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d

86, 90 (Fla. 1996)).

“The first prong of the forum non conveniens analysis entails two separate

considerations: whether the alternative forum is available and whether it is

adequate. An alternative forum is available when that forum can assert jurisdiction

over the litigation sought to be transferred.” Abeid-Saba v. Carnival Corp., 184

So. 3d 593, 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (quotation omitted). “With respect to

adequacy, an alternative forum does not have to be equivalent to the chosen forum

to be adequate, but we have recognized that dismissal would not be appropriate

where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the

dispute.” Cortez, 123 So. 3d at 1092 (quotation omitted).

“The defendant attempting to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens

grounds bears the burden of proof on each element of the . . . analysis.” Abeid-

abuse of discretion. See GLF Constr. Corp. v. Credinform Int’l, S.A., 225 So. 3d 377, 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“The decision to grant or deny the motion for dismissal rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.061(a)).

4 Saba, 184 So. 3d at 599 (quotation omitted). Because showing an adequate

alternative forum is a prerequisite to dismissing based on forum non conveniens,

where the defendant does not carry her burden to show that the alternate forum is

adequate and available, we need not address the other Rule 1.061(a) factors. See

Cortez, 123 So. 3d at 1091 (“As a prerequisite, the court must establish whether an

adequate alternative forum exists which possesses jurisdiction over the whole

case.” (quotation omitted)); Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC v. Garcia,

991 So. 2d 912, 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“Because we determine that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in finding Argentina an unavailable and

inadequate alternative forum, we affirm without consideration of the remaining

Kinney factors.”).

The trial court found that Argentina’s statute of limitations barred

Maradona’s causes of action, and that finding was supported by the expert

affidavits submitted by the parties. Maradona’s expert swore that “Argentine Law

may in no way have venue and jurisdiction to deal with the claim made by Mr.

Maradona before the United States courts.” Villafane’s expert opined that:

The prescription term [the expert’s terminology for the Argentine statute of limitations] applicable to [Maradona’s] complaint – if the same were understood as a Claim for Nullity or Review of the Acts Performed denounced therein – is two (2) years, which have objectively expired. Should the claim be understood as a demand for compensation for a hypothetically inappropriate use of his funds – the term would amount to ten (10) years. In both cases, this means to say that the terms have expired and there would be no chance whatsoever

5 for any kind of legal action.

Although Villafane’s Argentine legal expert backtracked some in later-filed letters,

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Related

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