Villacampa v. Mungaho

2025 IL App (1st) 242214-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 30, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-2214
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 242214-U

FIRST DIVISION June 30, 2025

No. 1-24-2214

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

SHEILA VILLACAMPA, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court Plaintiff-Appellant, ) of Cook County. ) v. ) No. 2016 D 009974 ) CASMIR MUNGAHO, ) The Honorable ) Bradley Trowbridge, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

HELD: Judgment affirmed as appellant fails to show trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of real property pursuant to final dissolution, where two parcels had already been deeded to GAL and remaining property was awarded to appellant.

¶1 Plaintiff-appellant Sheila Villacampa (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment

for dissolution of marriage entered on November 1, 2024, which dissolved her marriage to

defendant-appellee Casmir Mungaho (appellee), incorporated an allocation judgment with No. 1-24-2214

respect to their three minor children, 1 and distributed property between the parties. In this

appeal, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly

consider statutory factors in its distribution of property, by adopting appellee’s proposed

order without conducting independent fact-finding and analysis, and by imposing an annual

financial reporting requirement on her. She asks that we reverse the trial court’s judgment

regarding the division of marital property and remand with directions to the court to

“properly consider the statutory factors” and “make independent findings of fact and

conclusions of law.” For the record, appellee has not filed an appearance or a brief in this

matter. We entered an order taking the case for consideration on the record and appellant’s

brief only, and we proceed with our review accordingly, pursuant to First Capitol Mortgage

Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). For the following reasons,

we affirm.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 In this appeal, appellant challenges only the trial court’s distribution of property,

specifically, three parcels of land. Aside from providing pertinent background, we limit our

discussion to facts in the record bearing on that topic as much as possible. In addition, we

1 The allocation judgment was the subject of a separate appeal instituted by appellant and a decision in that matter was entered via Summary Order issued by the present panel of this Court. See Villacampa v. Mungaho, No. 1-24-1215 (April 21, 2025) (unpublished summary order filed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(4), (5), (6) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023)). It, along with a Rule 23 decision in another prior appeal brought by appellant in 2021 also concerning the parties’ divorce (see In re Marriage of Villacampa, 2021 IL App (1st) 210073-U) will be noted where relevant. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Konow, 2016 IL App (2d) 150823, ¶ 5 (citing People v. Eubanks, 283 Ill. App. 3d 12, 24 (1996) to declare that appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records); accord People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 517-18 (1990) (appellate courts may take judicial notice of appellate court decisions). 2 No. 1-24-2214

note at the outset that, for reasons discussed below, the following facts were gathered by this

Court based on its thorough review of the record presented.

¶4 The parties were married in August 2013 and have three minor children. In 2014, during

the marriage, the parties purchased the three properties at issue, all of which are located in

Chicago: 6121 South Champlain Avenue, Unit 1 (the Champlain property); 1456 East 69th

Place (the 69th Place property); and 8747 South Burley Avenue (the Burley property). Title

for each of the properties was in both parties’ names.

¶5 The parties later separated, and in 2016, appellant, who has been represented by various

counsels throughout this matter and is currently represented on appeal, filed a petition for

dissolution of marriage. She also filed a separate petition for allocation of parental

responsibility and parenting time. Briefly, the matter proceeded over many years, during

which time the parties each sought several orders of protection, emergency orders of

protection, and no-contact orders against the other, asserting multiple allegations of theft,

aggression, harassment, intimidation, murder-for-hire, and different forms of abuse

(including sexual abuse) involving the parties and their children. The litigation became

severely contentious and involved local police, the Department of Children and Family

Services, and the Federal Bureau of Investigations.

¶6 Tangentially, but pertinent to this appeal, a guardian ad litem (GAL) was eventually

appointed for the children and, as is customary, the parties were ordered by the trial court to

pay the GAL’s fees, as apportioned by the court. Appellant, however, failed to pay her share

3 No. 1-24-2214

of the GAL’s fees. 2 She did not do so for a considerable amount of time and, eventually, the

GAL petitioned the court for payment. In response, appellant moved to have the GAL

discharged, alleging that the GAL’s suggestions of limiting her parenting time were

inappropriate, that the GAL’s reports to the court were untruthful, and that the GAL was

biased against her and purposefully stalling the divorce proceedings. In addition to removal,

appellant demanded the trial court order the GAL to reimburse her for costs, impose

sanctions on the GAL, and admonish the GAL and restrict her certification. The trial court

denied appellant’s motion. In addition, the court ordered that the 69th Place property was to

be listed for sale within 21 days, with the parties’ counsels selecting a realtor to facilitate the

sale. It further ordered that proceeds from the sale were to “be used to pay the entire

outstanding balance owed to the GAL,” that the parties were to continue paying their

previously-ordered monthly payments to the GAL until the sale of the property was

complete, and that any proceeds remaining from the sale were to be held in escrow.

¶7 Apparently, the 69th Place property was not immediately sold, as the record next shows

that in October 2019, the trial court ordered the parties to update their personal financial

affidavits and to have market value analyses performed on each of the three properties for the

purpose of selling one of them to satisfy the GAL’s fees. Presumably based on its review of

these, the court next entered an order redirecting the parties to sell the Champlain Avenue

property (rather than the 69th Place property), appointing a realtor, and ordering the parties to

For the record, it appears that appellee was also, at least at some point, in arrears in his 2

payments owed to the GAL. However, not much else is included in the record concerning appellee’s payment status and, as his portion of payment is not relevant here, we do not comment further in this regard. 4 No. 1-24-2214

cooperate and sell that property as soon as possible. However, in November 2019, rather

than selling the Champlain Avenue property, it appears that appellant sua sponte leased it to

a tenant. In light of this, the trial court ordered the parties to serve as co-lessors of the

property and to open a joint escrow account. The court further ordered appellant to deposit

therein any rents/monies already received as well as all future rent payments.

¶8 By June 2020, with none of the properties having been sold as ordered by the court and

with appellant continuing to fail to pay her court-ordered monthly GAL fees, the GAL filed

an “Emergency Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

Restraining.” In the motion, the GAL noted that appellant’s tenant at the Champlain property

was being evicted, appellant was being uncooperative with the eviction process, and

appellant’s conduct was interfering with and delaying the sale of that property. Additionally,

the GAL provided the court with records demonstrating that appellant had begun a

GoFundMe campaign online which she specified was to hire additional counsel for her

divorce and that she had already raised several thousands of dollars, yet was delinquent in her

financial obligation to the GAL in an amount well over $10,000. Over the next months, the

trial court entered orders requiring appellant to make partial lump sum payments and

monthly payments to the GAL, in accordance with its prior orders. Appellant did not do so.

Eventually, the court set a hearing date on all pending motions in the divorce proceedings.

¶9 On January 11, 2021, appellant filed an emergency motion to continue that date, and

within a few days, a motion to voluntarily dismiss her petitions for dissolution and allocation.

Thereafter, appellee moved to file a counter-petition for dissolution, and the GAL filed a

Rule to Show Cause against appellant for her failure to abide by the court’s payment orders.

5 No. 1-24-2214

¶ 10 While these motions were pending, appellant filed a pro se notice for “interlocutory

appeal” in our Court from an order of the trial court entered on November 8, 2018. However,

appellant’s pro se brief never discussed that November 8, 2018 order cited in her notice of

appeal. Instead, her brief challenged only a file-stamped unsigned document dated January

26, 2021 which she insisted was an “order,” but which the record revealed was merely a

proposed order that had been prepared by her own counsel taking open motions under

advisement and seeking additional parenting time. 3 However, as this document was never

prepared, signed, or entered by the trial court, this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. See In re Marriage of Villacampa, 2021 IL App (1st) 210073-U.

¶ 11 Meanwhile, in the trial court, appellant withdrew her petition to voluntarily dismiss her

petition for dissolution of marriage, filed a new petition for allocation of parental

responsibilities, and filed myriad subpoenas. In the midst of this, the GAL filed another

Petition for Rule to Show Cause. In a March 30, 2022 order, the trial court set a status

hearing date and, “[b]y agreement of the parties,” authorized the GAL to hire a listing agent

for the Champlain property and prepare it for sale.

¶ 12 Again, no sale occurred and no monies were provided to the GAL. Accordingly, the

GAL filed another Petition for Rule to Show Cause directed at appellant, and appellee filed

his own Petition for Rule to Show Cause against appellant as well, asserting child support

arrearages and unaccounted-for rents at the Champlain property.

¶ 13 On September 9, 2022, the trial court entered an order deeding both the Champlain

property and the 69th Place property to the GAL. The order granted the GAL the power to

3 Counsel who prepared that document on appellant’s behalf was not appellant’s current counsel. 6 No. 1-24-2214

hold the two properties in trust and gave the GAL “sole control over the properties,” with the

power to evict any tenants and list the properties for sale. Additionally, the order instructed

that the GAL was to sell the properties at fair market value, with the proceeds to, first, satisfy

all GAL fees; second, satisfy the considerable child support arrearages owed to appellee by

appellant; and then, any remainder to be held in trust pending further court order. By

February 2023, quitclaim deeds to the two properties were issued to the GAL, and the trial

court eventually released the GAL from the cause.

¶ 14 Of import to the instant appeal, the record next demonstrates that the parties were asked

to submit memoranda to the trial court regarding their “property, debts, division and

proceeds” and proposed judgments for dissolution. In her memorandum, as prepared by her

counsel, 4 appellant insisted that she had purchased the three properties utilizing her own

premarital property (an inheritance) and debts (loans/mortgages), “and [appellee] did not

contribute to the purchase, or maintenance of said real estate.” (Emphasis in original.) She

admitted, however, that the purchases took place during the marriage and that the titles were

in both parties’ names. In her proposed judgment, as prepared by her counsel, appellant

alleged she was entitled to an award of the three marital properties and that they should be

awarded to her as her “sole and separate property, free and clear of any claims by [appellee].”

For his part, appellee sought, and received, an extension of time from the trial court to file his

proposed judgment. The record does not contain anything further regarding a proposed

judgment from appellee.

4 Appellant’s counsel in this appeal represented her at this point in the underlying litigation and prepared her proposed judgment, submitted to the trial court. 7 No. 1-24-2214

¶ 15 Eleven hearings were held between January and early August 2024. In May 2024, the

trial court entered a “Parental Allocation Judgment: Parental Responsibilities and Parenting

Plan,” awarding appellee the majority of parenting time. Appellant, represented by current

counsel, appealed, and we dismissed her appeal due to her failure to comply with Illinois

Supreme Court Rules (Rules) 341 and 342 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); Ill. S. Ct.

R. 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019)), as her brief did not contain accurate and fairly-stated facts, any

references to page numbers in the record, a proper appendix, or any relevant case law in

support of her arguments. See Villacampa v. Mungaho, No. 1-24-1215 (April 21, 2025)

(unpublished summary order filed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(4), (5), (6)

(eff. Feb. 1, 2023)).

¶ 16 On November 1, 2024, the trial court entered a “Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage.”

In addition to terminating the marriage, this order incorporated the allocation judgment,

barred the parties from receiving maintenance, and discussed the parties’ financial

responsibilities toward their children. Pertinent to this appeal, Article IV was entitled

“Distribution of Property.” At the outset, the court assigned each party his/her personal

property. Then, beginning with section 4.5, the dissolution judgment stated, as follows:

“4.5 Real Property

A. During their marriage, the parties acquired and maintained marital

property, including but not limited to the following parcels of real estate: (a)

[the 69th Place property]; (b) [the Burley property]; and (c) [the Champlain

property].

B. The above-mentioned marital real estate carries substantial debt.

8 No. 1-24-2214

C. Additionally, pursuant to Order of Court entered September 9, 2022

(hereinafter “the September 9, 2022 Order”) [the 69th Place property] and [the

Champlain property] were assigned to * * * the former Guardian Ad Litem in

this matter by means of judicial deeds. The September 9, 2022[ Order]

remains in full force and effect and is incorporated herein as set forth

verbatim.”

Subsection 4.5D. stated that “[p]ursuant to and in accordance with the September 9, 2022

Order,” proceeds from the sale of the 69th Place property and the Champlain property were

to be applied first, to the GAL’s remaining balance; then, to appellant’s child support

arrearages owed to appellee; and finally, any remainder thereafter was to be divided between

the parties, 70% to appellant and 30% to appellee “based on the court’s finding [appellant]

purchased the property, in part, with non-marital funds, made contributions to the

maintenance of the property, and is obligated to maintain the property in the future.”

Subsection 4.5E. recognized that appellant was currently residing at the 69th Place property

and, thus, granted her exclusive possession of the same “subject to the rights of ownership

retained by [the GAL]” pursuant to the September 9, 2022 Order. With respect to the

Champlain property, subsection 4.5F. stated that “[u]ntil such time as [it] is sold,” appellant

was to be responsible for its management and all costs associated with it and, were she to rent

it out in the meantime, she would be responsible for collecting rents, depositing them in a

segregated bank account, and providing an annual accounting to appellee. Finally,

subsection 4.5G. awarded the Burley property to appellant “as her sole and separate property,

9 No. 1-24-2214

free of any right, title, interest, expectancy, beneficial interest, or claim of” appellee.

Ultimately, the trial court declared the dissolution judgment to be a final judgment.

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 On appeal, appellant asserts three errors on the part of the trial court with respect to its

distribution of the properties. She contends that the court abused its discretion in failing to

properly consider statutory factors under section 503(d) of the Illinois Marriage and

Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA) (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2024)); that the court

erred by adopting appellee’s “proposed order verbatim without independent analysis of the

evidence;” and that the court erred by imposing a reporting requirement on her to appellee.

For myriad reasons, there is no merit to any of these contentions.

¶ 19 First, and as an aside, we cannot ignore the improprieties of appellant’s brief. As we

have underscored herein, appellant is represented by counsel. This is the third time matters

related to this divorce have appeared in this Court. While the first was before a different

panel and was pursued by appellant pro se, the latter two—the instant appeal and appeal no.

1-24-1215 involving the allocation judgment—were both pursued by current counsel, almost

simultaneously, and were before this panel. As noted, we dismissed appeal no. 1-24-1215

pursuant to Rules 341 and 342, as appellant’s brief, submitted by her counsel, was severely

deficient. It did not contain accurate and fairly-stated facts, any references to page numbers

in the record, a proper appendix, or any relevant case law to support her arguments. See

Villacampa, No. 1-24-1215, ¶¶ 12-14 (April 21, 2025) (unpublished summary order filed

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(4), (5), (6) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023)). We further

noted that counsel continuously misstated the date of the order appealed from and, instead of

10 No. 1-24-2214

providing record citations to the trial court’s allocation order, cited a document counsel

herself had prepared and submitted to the court advocating for an award of the marital

property. However, not only was this document not a final order (as it was never signed or

file-stamped by the trial court) but, also, it had nothing to do with the issues presented in that

appeal. See Villacampa, No. 1-24-1215, ¶ 7 (April 21, 2025) (unpublished summary order

filed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(4), (5), (6) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023)).

¶ 20 We find ourselves in the same situation here. The day after our decision in appeal no. 1-

24-1215 was issued, counsel moved this Court in the instant appeal for leave to file a second

amended brief. 5 She stated in her motion she was “seek[ing] to amend the brief a second

time to ensure complete compliance” with Rules 341 and 342, “as well as to assist the Court

in efficiently reviewing [appellant’s] arguments.” We granted her motion, afforded her time,

and accepted her submission of a second amended brief.

¶ 21 However, counsel’s second amended brief, to put it mildly, hardly complies with Rules

341 and 342, nor does it “assist” us in reviewing appellant’s contentions, in form or

substance. In a formative sense, the brief suffers many of the same technical infirmities

present in the brief counsel filed in appeal no. 1-24-1215. The statement of facts is not

accurately and fairly stated but, rather, contains extraordinary amounts of biased argument

and commentary directed against appellee. None of these facilitate an understanding of the

decision appealed from, which, as we noted earlier, left this Court to sua sponte scour the

record to decipher what even occurred in this matter—particularly, appellant’s continued

5 We had granted a prior motion counsel presented seeking time to file a first amended brief, wherein she acknowledged she had not provided any record citations and stated she would do so via amendment. 11 No. 1-24-2214

failure to pay the GAL fees, the trial court’s September 9, 2022 order deeding the properties

to the GAL, and Article IV of the final judgment dealing with the properties, none of which

counsel ever mentioned in her brief. Moreover, counsel does not discuss any of the 11

hearings held in this matter nor the evidence presented during them in any real detail.

Furthermore, counsel again botches the date of the order appealed from. While she lists it

properly in the notice of appeal as November 1, 2024, she claims at least twice in her brief

that the court entered “thereafter” a “purported amended” dissolution judgment on November

12, 2024, and that it did so inappropriately, “without notice.” However, there is no such

order or amended order in the record dated November 12, 2024, and the trial court’s

dissolution judgment, which it specified was a final and appealable order in the cause, is

clearly stamped November 1, 2024.

¶ 22 Substantively, while counsel does provide some citations to the record and caselaw in her

fact and argument sections, there are severe problems with these. First, when citing the

record on appeal, counsel repeats the same two groupings of page numbers as supportive of

her facts and arguments. The first grouping is “(C1671-1678, R2-68, R454-465).” These

usually all appear together, but sometimes appear in varying combinations. However,

C1671-1678, or pages 1671-1678 of the common law record, are the pages of counsel’s own

memorandum she prepared upon the trial court’s request that the parties submit memoranda

regarding their “property, debts, division and proceeds.” These pages are not accurate, fair or

authoritative. Likewise, pages 2-68 of the record of proceedings comprise the entirety of the

first of the 11 hearings held by the trial court, on January 10, 2024. Each page cited is four

pages of hearing transcript, for a total of 139 pages, plus 31 pages of court reporter-prepared

12 No. 1-24-2214

index. Again, counsel never cites to a particular page therein (which, by the way, dealt with

allocation of parenting time), nor to any witness testimony or comment/determination by the

trial court. And, her citation to pages 454-465 of the report of proceedings is more of the

same: these pages comprise the entirety of the last hearing in this matter, held in August

2024, for a total of 45 pages of hearing transcript without mention of a particular page,

witness testimony, or comment by the court.

¶ 23 In the second grouping of citations, counsel repeatedly cites to “(A28-A44, C1729-31,

C1739-46),” again together and in varying combinations, when she discusses the trial court’s

judgment for dissolution and appellee’s proposed judgment submitted to the trial court.

However, these record citations are not what she asserts. That is, “A28-A44” is the trial

court’s judgment for dissolution; however, counsel cites to a copy of it from the appendix of

her brief and not to the decision as it appears in the record, which is improper. Additionally,

common law record pages C1729-31 and C1739-46 do not comprise appellee’s proposed

judgment submitted to the trial court. Rather, they comprise counsel’s own proposed

judgment, and amended proposed judgment, respectively. As mentioned earlier, we have

searched the record ad infinitum and cannot find appellee’s proposed judgment submitted to

the trial court anywhere therein, let alone on these pages appellant cites.

¶ 24 Appellant’s counsel also provides inadequate caselaw citations in her brief. Numerically,

she cites more cases in support of her standard of review and argument sections than she did

in her prior brief filed in appeal no. 1-24-1215. However, she does not provide any valid

pinpoint citations to any pages in those cases to support her contentions, with the exception

of one case: In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205. Even then, only two of her many

13 No. 1-24-2214

citations to that case contain a pinpoint citation. Additionally, counsel repeatedly relies on

and cites “In re Marriage of Polsky, 385 Ill. App. 3d 1066 (2008)” throughout her brief. Yet,

we have searched Westlaw and cannot find such a case with that citation. Rather, the citation

takes us to a random page within the case of In re Nathan A.C., 385 Ill. App. 3d 1063

(2008). 6 Moreover, counsel cites and relies upon two unpublished Rule 23 decisions for

black-letter divorce and property distribution law. This is most certainly improper. See Ill.

S. Ct. R. 23(e) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023) (unpublished orders filed pursuant to Rule 23(b) or (c) can

be cited for persuasive or precedential purposes only to support contentions of double

jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case doctrine); see also Midwest

Medical Records Ass’n, Inc. v. Brown, 2018 IL App (1st) 163230, ¶ 29 (parties are restricted

from citing unpublished orders of this court as binding authority); People v. Matous, 381 Ill.

App. 3d 918, 921 (2008) (it is a plain violation of Rule 23 for counsel to cite to an

unpublished order as precedential authority where counsel is not citing it in support of one of

the purposes specified in the Rule).

¶ 25 This Court is “ ‘ “not a depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of

argument and research” ’ ” for her cause on appeal. See In re Marriage of Petrik, 2012 IL

App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38 (quoting Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23 (quoting

Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1986))). That is

exactly what counsel has done here, now for a second time. Briefly, and as previously

dictated in appeal no. 1-24-1215, compliance with the Rules is not an inconsequential matter.

See Rodriguez v. Sheriff’s Merit Commission of Kane County, 218 Ill. 2d 342, 353 (2006)

6 There are multiple other cases that are not properly cited in counsel’s brief, as well. 14 No. 1-24-2214

(quoting Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d 490, 494 (2002) (quoting Bright

v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995))); see Voris v. Voris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103814, ¶ 8

(compliance with rules governing briefs on appeal is compulsory); accord Ryan v. Katz, 234

Ill. App. 3d 536, 537 (1992); see also In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 092636, ¶

57 (our supreme court rules are not merely advisory suggestions; rather, they are required to

be followed). This includes Rules 341 and 342 governing the form and content of appellate

briefs which, again, requires an accurately and fairly-written statement of facts, proper

citation to the pages of record relied on, and proper citation to authorities supporting the

arguments presented. See Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), 342 (eff. Oct 1, 2019). In

light of all the current violations, we have every right to strike counsel’s brief and dismiss

this appeal, as we did in appeal no. 1-24-1215. See McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st)

141291, ¶ 12; see also Petrik, 2012 IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38 (citing Kic, 2011 IL App (1st)

100622, ¶ 23 (failure to follow Rules may result in forfeiture of consideration of issues on

appeal)).

¶ 26 However, for the sake of finality in this underlying divorce, and because, despite the

violations, we can make out the bare-bones of the contentions raised on appeal, we chose to

address the issues presented. See North Community Bank v. 17011 South Park Ave., LLC,

2015 IL App (1st) 133672, ¶ 14 (reviewing merits of the appeal despite numerous violations

of Supreme Court Rules).

¶ 27 Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award her sole

possession of the three properties at issue, as she requested in her proposed judgment. She

asserts that, in failing to award her those properties, the court did not consider the statutory

15 No. 1-24-2214

factors of section 503(d) of the IMDMA as required, improperly adopted appellee’s proposed

judgment verbatim without conducting independent analysis of the facts presented, and

inappropriately created a “continuing post-dissolution entanglement” between the parties by

imposing a financial reporting requirement on her. These contentions wholly miss the mark

of what occurred in this cause as, once again, appellant’s counsel has inexplicably provided

argument that totally ignores the posture of this matter and the trial court’s ultimate decision.

¶ 28 First, in its September 9, 2022 order, the trial court deeded the Champlain and 69th Place

properties to the GAL. In that order, as contained in the record here, the court specified that

the GAL was being awarded “sole control over the properties,” so it could do what needed to

be done to sell them and recoup the monies owed her for her services, which appellant had

continuously refused to pay throughout the divorce litigation. By February 2023, the GAL

received quitclaim deeds to the two properties and the court released her from the matter.

Accordingly, at this point, the parties, including appellant, no longer had any right in these

two properties. Appellant’s counsel never once mentions the trial court’s September 9, 2022

order in her brief on appeal.

¶ 29 Next, the record reveals that in issuing its November 1, 2022 final judgment, the trial

court clearly incorporated its September 9, 2022 order deeding the Champlain and 69th Place

properties to the GAL. That is unmistakable, and counsel likewise fails to ever mention this

portion of the final judgment in her brief on appeal. As noted, Article IV of the final

dissolution judgment is entitled “Distribution of Property” and specifies that it is a full and

final adjudication of the marital property and estate rights and claims of each party. The first

few sections of this article assign and award each party their own personal property currently

16 No. 1-24-2214

in his/her possession. 7 In section 4.5, the court acknowledges the three parcels of real

property at issue and notes they were acquired and maintained as marital property, which

appellant admits on appeal. Then, in subsection 4.5C., the court reiterates that its September

9, 2022 order assigned the Champlain and 69th Place properties to the GAL via judicial

deeds, and that “[t]he September 9, 2022[ Order] remains in full force and effect and is

incorporated herein as set forth verbatim.”

¶ 30 Subsequently, subsection 4.5D. mandates that, again “[p]ursuant to and in accordance

with the September 9, 2022 Order,” upon the sale of the two properties, proceeds therefrom

“shall first be applied toward the satisfaction of any remaining balance due” to the GAL, and

thereafter, “[a]ny proceeds remaining after satisfaction of [the GAL]’s fees shall be applied

toward any remaining child support arrearage due and owing from [appellant] to [appellee].”

The court added the proviso that, “[i]n the event there is any money remaining from the sale

of either property, the money shall be divided 70% to [appellant] and 30% to [appellee]

based on the court’s finding [appellant] purchased the property, in part, with non-marital

funds, made contributions to the maintenance of the property, and is obligated to maintain the

[properties] in the future.”

¶ 31 Then, in subsections 4.5E. and F., the court discusses who would be responsible for the

costs associated with the Champlain and 69th Place properties before they were sold. In

subsection 4.5E., the court noted that, because appellant was currently residing at the 69th

Place property, she would be responsible for all costs associated with it “subject to the rights

of ownership retained by [the GAL]” until it was sold. In subsection 4.5F., the court

7 Appellant does not raise any issue in that respect. 17 No. 1-24-2214

assigned responsibility for all costs associated with the Champlain property to appellant

“[u]ntil such time” as it was sold, and were she to rent it out in the meantime, she would be

responsible for providing appellee with an annual accounting of all costs, fees and rents

collected.

¶ 32 Finally, section 4.5 ends with subsection G., wherein the court awarded the Burley

property, the only one of the three that had not been deeded to the GAL, to appellant “as her

sole and separate property, free of any right, title, interest, expectancy, beneficial interest, or

claim of [appellee].”

¶ 33 In light of these clear provisions in the trial court’s final judgment for dissolution, we

hold that appellant’s contentions on appeal are wholly meritless.

¶ 34 Contrary to appellant’s first assertion, the trial court did not fail to consider the statutory

factors of section 503(d) of the IMDMA in distributing these properties. This is because it

did not need to consider the factors at all. It had already deeded the properties to the GAL

via its September 9, 2022 order—an order appellant never challenged. Appellant had

continuously failed to pay the GAL (and later, court-ordered child support to appellee)

throughout the divorce proceedings. There were multiple rules to show cause filed by the

GAL detailing this, and multiple orders issued by the court requiring appellant to provide the

funds. She did not. This resulted in the September 9, 2022 order, and this order was

referenced throughout the final dissolution judgment and specifically incorporated therein.

Thus, the Champlain and 69th Place properties belonged to the GAL and not appellant at the

time of the final judgment, and appellant was more than aware of this.

18 No. 1-24-2214

¶ 35 Even were this untrue, which it is not, and even if the record could somehow be refuted,

which it cannot, we do not find any abuse of discretion here. That is, ultimately, decisions

pertaining to the distribution of marital assets will not be disturbed absent an abuse of

discretion and, while the IMDMA directs trial courts to consider all the statutory factors

listed in section 503, they are not required to make specific findings with reference to each of

the factors or include a written, serial, or separate explanation of each in their final

judgments. See In re Marriage of Walsh, 109 Ill. App. 3d 171, 176 (1982); In re Marriage of

Lipsch, 86 Ill. App. 3d 81, 83-84 (1980); accord In re Marriage of Guntren, 141 Ill. App. 3d

1, 5-6 (1986). Rather, trial courts have broad discretion in weighing all pertinent factors and

devising distributions of the property at issue. See In re Marriage of Demar, 385 Ill. App. 3d

837, 853 (2008).

¶ 36 Again, appellant failed to pay her GAL fees (and later, child support) throughout this

litigation, even when ordered by the trial court. Accordingly, the court deeded the

Champlain and 69th Place properties to the GAL via the September 9, 2022 order so the

GAL could sell them and recoup her fees. In section 4.5D. of the final dissolution judgment,

the court specified that, once those properties were sold by the GAL, any remaining proceeds

after satisfaction of the GAL’s remaining fees (and after satisfaction of appellant’s remaining

child support obligations owed to appellee) would be divided between the parties, with

appellant receiving 70% and appellee receiving 30%. Thus, the trial court clearly

acknowledged and accepted appellant’s continued assertions that, although these were

marital properties, she had purchased them, at least in part, with her own nonmarital funds

and made contributions to their maintenance. Additionally, in section 4.5G., the trial court

19 No. 1-24-2214

awarded the only property it had not awarded to the GAL, the Burley property, solely to

appellant, even though, again, this had been purchased during the marriage and title was held

by both parties.

¶ 37 We find no error here. Simply put, appellant was not entitled to the Champlain and 69th

Place properties. They belonged to the GAL. In the event proceeds remained from their

sale, the court apportioned them in a manner greatly favoring appellant: once the GAL’s fees

and appellant’s child support owed to appellee were satisfied, she would receive 70%. The

trial court did so, striking a balance between its recognition that appellant may have used

nonmarital funds to purchase and maintain the properties, as she insisted, against the

unchallenged reality that they had been purchased during the marriage and title had been held

in both parties’ names before deeded to the GAL. Additionally, the court also awarded

appellant the Burley property, in whole. Without more from appellant demonstrating how

this was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court or somehow against the IMDMA,

we will not disturb this distribution.

¶ 38 Appellant next contends that the trial court “abdicated its judicial responsibility by

adopting [appellee]’s proposed order verbatim without any independent analysis or

consideration of the evidence presented.” She also insists that even if the court did follow

statutory guidelines in distributing the properties, “it did not follow them equitably, or

judiciously” and, instead, is at fault for “ ‘rubber stamping’ ” proposed orders submitted by

parties.

¶ 39 We are beyond perplexed. First, none of appellant’s citations in her brief lead us to a

copy of the proposed order appellee submitted to the trial court so that we can make any sort

20 No. 1-24-2214

of comparison between it and the final judgment for dissolution entered by the court—the

entire crux of her argument here. Again, she cites only to the court’s final judgment in the

record, to her own prepared proposed order, to a portion of the report of proceedings

encompassing one of the hearings, and to a portion of her appendix on appeal which is a copy

of the court’s final judgment. Additionally, upon our own review of the record, we have

found therein only a motion filed by appellee asking the trial court for an extension of time to

file his proposed order, but not the proposed order itself. As appellant has failed to provide

appellee’s proposed order to the court, we cannot even begin to entertain an argument that

the trial court somehow disingenuously copied appellee’s proposed order verbatim in

entering its final judgment.

¶ 40 Moreover, we simply do not understand appellant’s assertion that the court distributed the

properties inequitably or non-judiciously, in light of the unmistakable facts presented.

Again, appellant was not entitled to the Champlain and 69th Place properties, as they had

been deeded to the GAL. Yet, the court did award her a majority 70% split of any remaining

proceeds from their sale, to appellee’s detriment, in recognition of money she had allegedly

spent to buy and maintain them; and, it awarded her full title to the Burley property, to

appellee’s complete exclusion. Appellant has wholly ignored these details throughout this

entire appeal and, as she cites nothing of substance from the record to support her contention

here, we find it has no merit.

¶ 41 Finally, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an annual

financial reporting requirement on her “that unnecessarily perpetuate[s] the parties’

relationship post-dissolution” in contravention of public policy that advocates for finality in

21 No. 1-24-2214

divorce proceedings. She claims that the court’s decision should be final, but that this

requirement has created an “entanglement” that is not in her “best interests,” particularly

because she is required to report financial information to appellee who, as she claims, has

never made any contributions to the properties.

¶ 42 However, appellant provides no caselaw to support this contention. To the contrary, the

majority of post-dissolution proceedings involve continued relations between the parties in

some form or another, such as with maintenance awards, child support payments, or dividing

or disposing of property the parties hold together. In the instant case, again, the three

properties were purchased in both parties’ names. As appellant admits, and despite any

assertions to the contrary for which she has provided no proof, they were marital assets. As

made clear in the final dissolution judgment, the court awarded her the Burley property. This

left the Champlain and 69th Place properties, which had been deeded to the GAL, but had not

yet been sold. Subsection 4.5E. gave appellant possession of the 69th Place property subject

to the ownership interests of the GAL, as appellant was currently living there and the parties

had used it as the marital home; because the court allowed appellant to continue to live there,

it made her responsible for all costs associated with that property until its sale. Similarly,

subsection 4.5F. made appellant responsible for all costs associated with the Champlain

property until its sale. It added the proviso that, “[i]n the event” she were to rent out that

property in the meantime, she would need to provide an accounting of rents collected to

appellee, and she would be able to retain a 10% management fee from the rents collected.

We fail to see how this is an abuse of discretion. Notably, appellant is seeking reversal of the

trial court’s judgment with the goal of receiving complete and sole control of the three

22 No. 1-24-2214

properties. As we have described, and in light of the facts presented, we have no basis to do

that. Ultimately, if appellant does not want the “entanglement” of the annual reporting duty

with appellee as to the Champlain property, she can very well choose not to rent it out (and

thus not collect a management fee), thereby absolving her of that requirement. Apart from

this, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to impose a reporting

requirement on a parcel of property in appellant’s charge until its sale that was, undisputably,

marital property held by both parties.

¶ 43 CONCLUSION

¶ 44 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 45 Affirmed.