Viking Petroleum, Inc. v. Oil Conservation Commission

672 P.2d 280, 100 N.M. 451
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 17, 1983
Docket14632
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 672 P.2d 280 (Viking Petroleum, Inc. v. Oil Conservation Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Mexico Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Viking Petroleum, Inc. v. Oil Conservation Commission, 672 P.2d 280, 100 N.M. 451 (N.M. 1983).

Opinion

OPINION

FEDERICI, Justice.

Viking Petroleum, Inc., petitioner-appellee (Viking), is the holder of an oil and gas leasehold estate on the E lh, NW lA, Section 18, Township 9 South, Range 27 East, NMPM, Chaves County, New Mexico. Harvey E. Yates Company, respondent-appellant (HEYCO), is the operator of the oil and gas leasehold estate on the W V2, NW lk and SW V4 of Section 18, Township 9 South, Range 27 East, NMPM, Chaves County, New Mexico. Viking controls 25%, and HEYCO controls 75% of the underlying mineral interests. HEYCO applied for a permit to drill to the Ordovician formation. Viking agreed to participate in the drilling costs to the base of the shallower Abo formation, but declined to participate in the drilling of a well to the deeper Ordovician formation.

The Oil Conservation Commission of the State of New Mexico, respondent-appellant (Commission), denied Viking’s request for partial participation. After a hearing, the Commission issued Order R-6873 (Order), which required all mineral interests pooled through the Ordovician formation to form a standard 320-acre gas spacing and prorationing unit to be dedicated to a well to be drilled at a standard location on the tract. The Order also provided that there should be withheld from any nonconsenting working interest owner’s share of production his share of reasonable well costs plus 200% as a reasonable charge for the risk in drilling the well. The Order authorized HEYCO to withhold a pro rata share of all drilling costs as a means of collecting the penalty from Viking as a nonparticipating working interest owner. Viking’s application for rehearing was automatically denied by failure of the Commission to act on the application within ten days.

Viking filed a Petition for Review of the Order and a Motion for Stay or Suspension of Order in the District Court of Chaves County. After a hearing on the motion, the district judge entered a decision suspending the Order. The district court’s decision was conditional upon Viking’s tender of $90,000 to HEYCO as Viking’s estimated share of the cost of drilling and completing the well to the base of the Abo formation.

There was a dispute at the hearing as to whether Viking was willing and able to assume its share of the risk of the proposed well through the Abo by advancing to HEYCO Viking’s share of those particular costs. Concerning the share of the risk and drilling costs for the well to formations below the Abo, Viking presented the concept of “partial participation,” which ultimately became the central issue on appeal to the district court. Viking contended that as a correlative right owner it was entitled to participate partially in the subject well by paying in advance for its share of costs to the Abo. Concerning the drilling and completion costs below the Abo, Viking wished to proceed on a “carried basis.” HEYCO, as operator, would be entitled to full reimbursement for Viking’s share of the drilling and completion costs carried by HEYCO below the Abo. The payment was to be made out of Viking’s share of the production from formations below the Abo until those costs were fully recouped by HEYCO.

Viking further contended that if a risk penalty under NMSA 1978, Section 70-2-17(C) would be appropriate at all in this case, it could only be applied to the drilling and completion costs being carried on behalf of Viking below the Abo formation. In other words, since HEYCO would not be required to advance any drilling or completion costs on behalf of Viking from the surface through the Abo formation, HEY-CO would not be assuming any risk as to Viking’s share of those costs and would not be entitled to risk compensation. With regard to the imposition of a risk penalty for the carried costs below the Abo, Viking argued that it was within the discretion of the Commission not to permit any risk penalty at all because the lack of production history in the deeper formations rendered the drilling venture below the Abo an extreme and unjustified risk for correlative right owners.

Following submission of briefs and without further hearing or oral arguments the district court held that Viking’s application for rehearing preserved its right to object to the Commission’s denial of partial participation. The district court also held that as a matter of law the Commission must provide partial participation by Viking unless there is substantial evidence in the record that such participation is clearly unreasonable. After reviewing the record of the Commission hearing, the district court concluded that the Order was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the Order was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. We reverse.

We are limited to the same review of administrative actions as the district court. Reynolds v. Wiggins, 74 N.M. 670, 397 P.2d 469 (1964). This standard was applied to review of Commission orders in El Paso Natural Gas Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 76 N.M. 268, 414 P.2d 496 (1966).

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Rinker v. State Corporation Commission, 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973). We must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to support the findings, and any evidence unfavorable will not be considered. Martinez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 81 N.M. 371, 467 P.2d 37 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 425, 467 P.2d 997 (1970). Special weight will be given to the experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge of the Commission. Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation v. Oil Conservation Commission, 87 N.M. 286, 532 P.2d 582 (1975); Grace v. Oil Conservation Commission, 87 N.M. 205, 531 P.2d 939 (1975). Our review is limited to the evidence presented to the Commission, and the administrative findings by the Commission should be sufficiently extensive to show the basis of the order. Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962). The findings must disclose the reasoning of the Commission in reaching its conclusion. Fasken v. Oil Conservation Commission, 87 N.M. 292, 532 P.2d 588 (1975).

Pooling.

Forced pooling of multiple zones with an election to participate in less than all zones is a question of first impression in New Mexico.

The Legislature, in an apparent desire to encourage the exploration and development of oil and gas in situations similar to the one before us, adopted NMSA 1978, Section 70-2-17(C), which provides in part as follows:

C.

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Bluebook (online)
672 P.2d 280, 100 N.M. 451, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/viking-petroleum-inc-v-oil-conservation-commission-nm-1983.