Vignesh Murugesan, et al. v. Joseph B. Edlow, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 11, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-10558
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 VIGNESH MURUGESAN, et al., Case No. 25-cv-10558-SK

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS

10 JOSEPH B. EDLOW, et al., Regarding Docket No. 12-1 11 Defendants.

12 This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion to dismiss filed by 13 Joseph B. Edlow, in his official capacity as Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration 14 Services (“USCIS”), and the USCIS (collectively, “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 12-1.) All parties 15 consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 10.) Upon careful consideration of the 16 parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, case record, and oral argument, the Court GRANTS 17 Defendants’ motion for the reasons set forth below. 18 BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiffs Vignesh Murugesan (“Mr. Murugesan”) and Rekha Subramanian, Mr. 20 Murugesan’s wife, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek injunctive and mandamus relief ordering 21 Defendants to adjudicate their pending Form I-485 Applications to Register Permanent Residence 22 or Adjust Status (hereinafter “I-485 Application”). (Dkt. No. 1, (Complaint), ¶¶ 67–68.) An 23 individual may apply to adjust his or her status to lawful permanent resident using the Form I-485 24 based on a pending or approved immigrant petition. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 25 245.2(a)(2)(i)(B) (providing for the concurrent filing of an adjustment of status application with 26 certain employment-based immigrant petitions). The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 27 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., authorizes certain foreign nationals to seek immigrant visas or lawful 1 Employment-Based Fifth Preference (“EB-5”) program (hereinafter the “EB-5 Program”), 2 specifically, provides a path to obtaining a permanent residence visa for foreign national investors 3 who invest at least $800,000 into a commercial enterprise in a high unemployment or rural area 4 that will create full-time positions for at least ten qualifying employees. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 13); see 8 5 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5). 6 In 2022, Congress enacted significant reforms to the EB-5 Program through the EB-5 7 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 14.) As relevant here, Congress expressly 8 authorized foreign investors to simultaneously file, with their Form I-485 application, an 9 immigrant petition either as (1) a standalone investor (“Form I-526”), or (2) a regional center 10 investor (“Form I-526E”). (Id.) Investors may simultaneously file their Form I-485 and 11 immigration petition if the U.S. Department of State’s Visa Bulletin indicates that the investor’s 12 EB-5 category is not oversubscribed and visa numbers are immediately available to EB-5 13 applicants. (Id. ¶ 24.) Although both forms are filed concurrently, I-485 Forms are not processed 14 until USCIS approves the applicant’s I-526 or I-526E Form. (Id. ¶ 32.) 15 Mr. Murugesan, a citizen of India, invested $800,000 in a new commercial enterprise 16 located in a USCIS-designated rural area that would create jobs for at least ten qualifying 17 employees. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.) Plaintiffs filed Mr. Murugesan’s I-526E and I-485 Forms 18 concurrently on March 31, 2025. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs allege that EB-5 category visas were 19 immediately available at the time of Mr. Murugesan’s investment. (Id. ¶ 24.) On August 19, 20 2025, Defendants approved Mr. Murugesan’s I-526E Petition. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.)1 Approximately 21 eight months after filing Mr. Murugesan’s forms, on December 9, 2025, Plaintiffs commenced this 22 action against Defendants, alleging Defendants failed to timely process their I-485 Applications. 23 (Id.) 24 Plaintiffs bring three claims for Defendants’ alleged delay and failure to process their I-485 25 Applications: (1) violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); (2) relief under the 26 Mandamus Act; and (3) a violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights under the Due 27 1 Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 46–61.) As previously noted, Plaintiffs brought 2 this action seeking relief under the Mandamus Act and the APA to compel Defendants to 3 adjudicate their pending I-485 Applications.2 (Id. ¶¶ 67–68.) 4 On March 17, 2026, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint under Federal 5 Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 12-1.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition to 6 Defendants’ motion. (Dkt. No. 14.) Defendants filed a reply and Plaintiffs, with leave of Court, 7 filed a sur-reply. (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16-1.) The Court heard oral argument on June 8, 2026. (Dkt. No. 8 20.) 9 ANALYSIS 10 I. Legal Standards 11 A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 12 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests whether the 13 court has subject matter jurisdiction. Williams v. Apple, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 892, 900 (N.D. Cal. 14 2020). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and can only adjudicate cases which the 15 Constitution or Congress authorize them to adjudicate: cases involving diversity of citizenship and 16 an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, a federal question, or cases in which the United 17 States is a party. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A party 18 moving to dismiss on 12(b)(1) grounds may challenge a court’s jurisdiction on facial or factual 19 grounds. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a “facial” 20 challenge, as is presented here, the court assumes a plaintiff’s factual allegations to be true and 21 draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Oracle Corp. v.ORG Structure Innovations 22 LLC, No. 11-cv-3549 SBA, 2012 WL 12951187, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) (citing Doe v. 23 See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009)). 24 / / / 25 / / / 26

27 2 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the relief sought under the Mandamus Act and 1 B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 2 A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the 3 complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 4 dismiss, the court construes the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the 5 nonmoving party and takes as true all material allegations in the complaint. Sanders v. Kennedy, 6 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986). Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), “a 7 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of [their] entitle[ment] to relief requires more than 8 labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 9 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks 10 omitted, cleaned up). Rather, a plaintiff must instead allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief 11 that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 12 requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 13 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting id. at 556–57). If the complaint allegations 14 are insufficient to state a claim, a court should grant leave to amend, unless amendment is futile. 15 See, e.g., Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990); Cook, Perkiss & Lieche, 16 Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). 17 II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 18 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on two grounds. (Dkt. No. 12-1 at 5.) 19 First, Defendants argue that “the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to compel the adjudication 20 of I-485 adjustment applications under the [alleged] jurisdiction-stripping provision of the INA, 8 21 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” (Id.) Second, Defendants contend that, even if the Court has subject 22 matter jurisdiction over this action, Plaintiffs fail to state a due process claim. (Id.) The court 23 addresses each argument in turn. 24 A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 25 The crux of the parties’ dispute on this issue is whether, as Defendants contend, 8 U.S.C. § 26 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over pace-of-adjudication claims. 27 / / / 1 1. Relevant Statutory Frameworks 2 As noted above, the INA authorizes certain foreign nationals to seek immigrant visas or 3 lawful permanent residence through employment-based categories, such as the EB-5 Program. 4 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a)(2), 1153(b)(5). As relevant here, if certain threshold requirements are 5 met, an individual can apply to adjust his or her status to lawful permanent resident using Form I- 6 485 based on an approved immigrant petition. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 7 245.2(a)(2)(i)(B) (allowing the concurrent filing of an adjustment of status application with certain 8 employment-based immigrant petitions). 9 USCIS engages in a multi-step process when evaluating an application for adjustment of 10 status. Section 1255(a), specifically, provides: 11 The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted ... into the United States ... may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations 12 as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if 13 (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent 14 residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed. 15 16 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(a). 17 The disputed INA provision—8 U.S.C. § 1252—is entitled “Judicial review of orders of 18 removal” and provides, in relevant part: 19 (a) Applicable provisions ... 20 21 (2) Matters not subject to judicial review ... 22 (B) Denials of discretionary relief 23 Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including 24 section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of 25 whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review— 26

27 (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 1 Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the 2 discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title. 3 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 4

5 2. 8 U.S.C § 1252 (a)(2)(B)(ii) does not strip this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s “pace-of-adjudication” claim. 6 Defendants argue this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because 8 U.S.C § 7 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of the pace of adjudication of Form I-485 applications. 8 (Dkt. No. 12-1 at 8–11.) Consistent with the majority of district courts in the Ninth Circuit, the 9 Court disagrees. See Varniab v. Edlow, No. 25-CV-10602-SVK, 2026 WL 485490, at *9 (N.D. 10 Cal. Feb. 20, 2026) (noting that “the clear majority of district courts within the Ninth Circuit” and 11 “the majority of district courts nationwide” have concluded that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar 12 judicial review) (quoting Hong Wang v. Chertoff, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1256–57 (W.D. Wash. 13 2008)); see also Gao v. Mullin, No. 25-CV-01479-SVK, 2026 WL 948665 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 14 2026) (concluding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not strip the court of subject matter jurisdiction 15 over “pace-of-adjudication” claims because defendants have a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate 16 I-485 applications); Yousefisahi v. Edlow, No. 25-CV-09728-LJC, 2026 WL 1388704 (N.D. Cal. 17 May 18, 2026) (same); Komma v. Edlow, No. 2:25-CV-3702 DJC AC PS, 2026 WL 1113887 18 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2026) (same). 19 First, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not preclude judicial review of Defendants’ decision to 20 categorically act or withhold action. See Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *7 (noting that “numerous 21 courts have concluded that [§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)] only precludes judicial review of decisions 22 denying discretionary relief on individual applications and does not preclude judicial review of the 23 Government’s decision to categorically act or withhold action”). District courts in the Ninth 24 Circuit have rejected the argument that pace of adjudication is discretionary and instead have held 25 that “the government has a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate [petitions for adjustment of status] 26 within a reasonable period of time and that courts have jurisdiction to review the [g]overnment’s 27 failure to do so.” Gao, 2026 WL 948665, at *3–4 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); 1 Mugomoke v. Curda, No. 2:10-CV-02166 KJM DAD, 2012 WL 113800, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2 2012) (“While the Secretary has discretion to decide the outcome of an I–485 application, the 3 authority to not act on an application is not conferred by any statute. Thus[,] a failure to act on an 4 I–485 application falls within the APA’s default rule: ‘With due regard for the convenience and 5 necessity of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall 6 proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.’” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)). 7 Second, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ argument that 8 U.S.C.§ 1255(a)’s statutory 8 text triggers § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdictional bar. (Dkt. No. 12-1 at 8.) While the statutory 9 language authorizes USCIS to exercise discretion in its final determination, the language does not 10 extend to when or how applications are processed. See Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *9 11 (rejecting the argument that § 1255(a) confers broad discretion “to determine not only whether to 12 grant adjustment of status, but also how and when to adjudicate such applications” and noting that 13 many cases have held that § 1255(a) does not provide discretionary authority over the pace of 14 adjudicating applications) (citing cases) (emphasis in original). 15 Moreover, § 1255(a) does not apply because Plaintiffs are not challenging a USCIS 16 application denial or requesting the Court to order USCIS to approve their pending applications. 17 See Wang, 550 F. Supp. 2d. at 1256. Rather, Plaintiffs are challenging USCIS’s failure to act on 18 their applications within a reasonable time and asking this Court to order USCIS to render a 19 decision on their applications. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 54, 60, 68.) Because the requested relief is focused 20 on the lack of a decision rather than the review of a final decision on Plaintiffs’ I-485 21 Applications, judicial review is not precluded. 22 Lastly, Defendants’ proffered authority, (Dkt. No. 12-1 at 8–11), is distinguishable 23 because Plaintiffs’ claims rest on pending I-485 applications, rather than final immigration 24 application decisions. See Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *9 (explaining why Patel v. Garland, 25 596 U.S. 328 (2022), Garcia v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services, 146 F.4th 743 26 (9th Cir. 2025), and Zia v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1194 (9th Cir. 2024) do not extend to cases seeking 27 review of pending immigration applications); Behdin v. Edlow, No. 26-CV-00566-SVK, 2026 WL 1 Zia when the plaintiffs sought review of the defendants’ failure to decide the plaintiffs’ I-485 2 applications). 3 *** 4 In sum, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The Court’s conclusion is 5 consistent with the “well-settled” and “strong” presumption in favor of judicial review of 6 administrative action, Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 229 (2020), which courts 7 “consistently” apply to “legislation regarding immigration,” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251 8 (2010). 9 B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 10 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ combined delay and failure to act in processing their I- 11 485 Applications violates their procedural due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. (Dkt. 12 No. 1 ¶¶ 58–62.) In response, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to state a procedural due 13 process claim. (Dkt. No. 12-1 at 11–12.)3 The central issue before the Court is whether Plaintiffs 14 have sufficiently pled a protected property interest—a threshold requirement for a claim of 15 violation of due process. 16 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be 17 deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “The 18 ‘touchstone’ of due process is protecting people against arbitrary government action, whether from 19 ‘denial of fundamental procedural fairness, or in the exercise of power without any reasonable 20 justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.’ ” Garas v. Noem, No. 25-cv- 21 01756-FWS (JDE), 2025 WL 3650184, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (quoting Cty. of 22 Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). “A threshold requirement to a substantive or 23 procedural due process claim is the plaintiff’s showing of a liberty or property interest protected 24 by the Constitution.” Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 25 1994). 26 / / / 27 ] Plaintiffs claim that they have adequately alleged a protected property interest in receiving 2 || adetermination on their properly-filed immigration applications. (Dkt. No. 14 at 16-19.) The 3 Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ desire for “fundamental fairness in administrative adjudication,” (Dkt. 4 || No. 1 §.58) does not amount to a cognizable liberty or property interest that could support a 5 || procedural due process claim. “On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit has held that ‘[a] mere 6 || expectation of receiving a benefit is not enough to create a protected interest.’ ” Cost Saver 7 || Mgmt., LLC v. Napolitano, No. 10-cv-2105-JST (CWX), 2011 WL 13119439, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 8 || June 7, 2011) (quoting Roberts v. Spalding, 783 F.2d 867, 870-71 (9th Cir. 1986)). 9 Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with authority to support their 10 || proposition that they have a protected property interest in receiving I-485 application decisions 11 and how, specifically, this purported property interest is entitled to due process protections. Cf 12 || Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that because the “grant of an I- 13 130 petition for immediate relative status is a nondiscretionary decision,” it is a protected interest 14 || that “is entitled to the protections of due process.”) The Court thus concludes that Plaintiffs have 3 15 failed to state a procedural due process claim because they have not adequately pled a protected a 16 || property interest. 17 CONCLUSION Zz 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court 19 || DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ due process claim with LEAVE TO AMEND if, in good faith, they can 20 || allege additional facts to support such a claim. If Plaintiffs elect to file an amended complaint, 21 they shall do so by July 10, 2026. Defendants’ answer shall be due 14 days after Plaintiffs’ 22 || amended complaint is filed or by July 1, 2026, whichever is later. Because the Court grants 23 Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for costs and fees pursuant 24 || to the Equal Access to Justice Act. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 || Dated: June 10, 2026 f { ° la . 27 SALLIE KIM 28 United States Magistrate Judge