Vigil-Villela v. Kijakazi

Opinion

ROSEMARIE V., Case No. 21-cv-02192-AGT

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Re: Dkt. No. 36 Defendant.

Plaintiff, the prevailing party in this social-security case, has moved for an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Dkt. 36. Defendant opposes the motion on the sole basis that the amount of fees requested, $27,752.97, is unreasonable. Dkt. 37. As explained below, the Court finds that the amount plaintiff seeks is reasonable and therefore grants her motion. * * * When awarding attorneys’ fees under the EAJA, a district court must determine the reasonableness of the fees sought. Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The appropriate number of hours includes “all time reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in the same manner that an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for all time reasonably expended on a matter.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431. The fee applicant “must exercise ‘billing judgment,’ i.e., the fees must be for services for which a private client would pay.” Valle v. Berryhill, 2018 WL properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.”)). Courts should generally “defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). An applicant may also be awarded fees for hours spent litigating an EAJA fee award. See I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 166 (1990). Here, plaintiff has submitted declarations from the two attorneys at Bay Area Legal Aid who worked on her appeal: Roselee Molloy, who billed 75.25 hours of time on this matter, and Joanna Parnes, who billed 45 hours of time. See Dkt. 36-4 (Molloy Decl.) & Dkt. 36-5 (Parnes Decl.). Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable under Ninth Circuit standards—$217.54 for 2021 and $231.49 for 2022.1 See Dkt. 36-1 at 7 & n.2; Statutory Maximum Rates Under the EAJA, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory- maximum-rates/ (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)). Instead, defendant objects to the requested fees as unreasonable and excessive because plaintiff’s counsel “are experienced social security practitioners who should not have needed so much more than the average time (30 hours) that a plaintiff’s attorney typically spends on a district court social security case to draft arguments for six issues commonly raised in such cases, none of which in this case was particularly unusual or complex.” Dkt. 37 at 3. Defendant maintains that awarding plaintiff “a third of [the requested] amount—$9,250.99—would be generous compensation in this case.” Id. at 5. The Court disagrees, and finds that plaintiff is entitled to the full amount of requested fees for the following reasons. First, it is “an abuse of discretion to apply a de facto policy limiting social security claimants to twenty to forty hours of attorney time in ‘routine’ cases.” Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012). Rather, the determination of “how much time an attorney can reasonably spend on a specific case . . . will always depend on case-specific factors including, among others, the complexity of the legal issues, the procedural history, the size

1 Plaintiff’s counsel billed 6 hours of time in 2021 (6 x $217.54 = $1,305.24) and 114.25 hours of of the record, and when counsel was retained.” Id. Although “a district court will always retain substantial discretion in fixing the amount of an EAJA award,” Jean, 496 U.S. at 163, a reduction of fees greater than 10 percent requires “specific” and “persuasive” reasons from opposing counsel. Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112, 1116 (holding that “the district court can impose a small reduction, no greater than 10 percent—a ‘haircut’—based on its exercise of discretion and without a more specific explanation”). Defendant’s request here would result in a more than 60 percent reduction in the amount of fees and the amount of hours for which plaintiff’s counsel is compensated. This, however, “is a clear contravention of Ninth Circuit precedent: ‘courts cannot drastically reduce awards simply because the attorney has requested compensation for more than forty hours or make reductions with a target number in mind. Instead, district courts must explain why the amount of time requested for a particular task is too high. Any other approach fails to give deference to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment.’” Valle, 2018 WL 1449414, at *2 (quoting Costa, 690 F.3d at 1136). Second, and contrary to defendant’s suggestions otherwise, “social security disability cases are often highly fact-intensive and require careful review of the administrative record, including complex medical evidence.” Costa, 690 F.3d at 1134 n.1; see also Elizabeth B. v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 3029261, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2023) (“Social security cases involve a myriad of complex legal issues as well as oftentimes a voluminous administrative record.”). This case was no exception. The administrative record exceeded 1,070 pages and included three sets of administrative hearing transcripts, two ALJ decisions, and over 650 pages of medical records and opinion evidence detailing plaintiff’s multiple physical and mental health conditions. And plaintiff’s counsel, who did not represent plaintiff at the administrative level and had to familiarize themselves with the record, prepared a comprehensive motion for summary judgment that raised seven substantive issues, each with multiple components—and nearly all warranted reversal of the ALJ’s decision. As plaintiff correctly notes, her disability claim “had been once remanded by the Social Security Appeals Council, there were three [administrative] hearings, and the issues were complex, involving the combination of mental and physical impairments as well as vocational at 2. That plaintiff’s counsel collectively spent 79 hours reviewing the record, researching the legal issues, and drafting the motion for summary judgment is not unreasonable or excessive given the extensive administrative record and the need to address the ALJ’s treatment of plaintiff’s credibility and the opinions of her numerous medical sources. The same is true for the 35.5 hours counsel spent on the reply brief. As the Court’s 26-page summary judgment order demonstrates, plaintiff’s case was factually and legally complex and required substantial analysis of numerous issues. See Dkt. 32. Under these circumstances, the Court finds the 114.5 hours counsel collectively spent preparing the summary judgment briefing which led to the reversal of the ALJ’s decision, and the 5.75 hours counsel spent preparing the present motion for attorneys’ fees, are reasonable. See Valle, 2018 WL 1449414, at *2 (awarding $25,092.19 in fees for the 116.9 hours counsel spent appealing the ALJ’s decision and the 9.75 additional hours they spent litigating the EAJA fee motion). Finally, the fact that plaintiff’s counsel are “experienced in social security law is not a basis to reduce [their] requested hours.” Mitford v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 6052006, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2021) (collecting cases holding same). Defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s counsel “should not have needed so much more than the average time (30 hours)” to litigate this case simply because they “are experienced social security practitioners” is rejected. See Bell v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 452110, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018) (rejecting similar argument and noting that plaintiff’s “case presented a voluminous record and numerous issues, and the Commissioner offers no more than her unsupported opinion that ‘experienced’ counsel should have spent less time on various aspects of the litigation”); Arik v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1576711, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011) (observing that defendant’s “arguments with regard to the amount of time spent on various tasks . . . appear to be based on defense counsel’s own opinion, and [defendant] does not provide any expert or other credible authority to suggest that the time billed is unreasonable”), adopted, 2011 WL 2470907 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2011). Nor does any of counsel’s requested time appear to be “unnecessarily duplicative.” See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1113 (explaining that “necessary duplication—based on the vicissitudes of the litigation process— ] unnecessarily duplicative work that the court may legitimately cut the hours’); see also Bell, 2018 2 } WL 452110, at *4 (recognizing that “representation by two attorneys in a social security case is 3 not automatically unreasonable” and finding that defendant “provided no evidentiary basis” to 4 support reducing counsel’s requested hours based on duplication) (citation omitted). 5 Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff’s request for $27,752.97 in attorneys’ fees is 6 reasonable. Because plaintiff assigned her EAJA fees to her counsel, see Dkt. 36-2, defendant 7 shall pay the amount requested, subject to any offset allowed under the Treasury Department’s 8 Offset Program, directly to counsel.” 9 te OK OK 10 The Court grants plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $27,752.97. 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. gq 12 Dated: November 30, 2023

ALEX. TSE 15 United States Magistrate Judge 16

Oo Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2 Defendant relies on Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 597 (2010), to argue that “if the Court awards 97 EAJA fees, it must specify that Plaintiff is the payee.” Dkt. 37 at 6. However, “courts in this district have concluded that Ratliff does not prevent payment of a fee award directly to the attorney 28 if there has been a valid assignment and the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the government.” Valle, 2018 WL 1449414, at *3 (citing cases).