Viggens Guerrier v. United States

2013 DNH 011

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: January 28, 2013
• Docket: 12-CV-153-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Case 1:12-cv-00153-SM Document 6 Filed 01/28/13 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Viggens Guerrier, Petitioner

v. Case N o . 12-cv-153-SM Opinion N o . 2013 DNH 011 United States of America, Government

O R D E R

Viggens Guerrier seeks relief from his conviction and

sentence under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. His petition

is timely, but, for the reasons given in the government’s

opposition, presents no issues of merit.

Guerrier’s sole complaint is that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to move for dismissal of his

federal indictment on grounds that Guerrier’s rights under the

anti-shuttling provision of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers

Act (“IADA”), 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2 , Art. IV(e), were violated.

He says that, while he was being held in state custody, a federal

detainer was lodged against him in connection with an indictment

charging him with a Hobbs Act (robbery) crime. He was taken into

federal custody several times (for arraignment, a suppression

hearing, e t c . ) , and returned to state custody without obtaining a

trial. Case 1:12-cv-00153-SM Document 6 Filed 01/28/13 Page 2 of 4

As the government points out, however, the IADA only comes

into play when a detainer is lodged against prisoners who are

actually serving incarcerative sentences.

The terms of the [IADA] apply exclusively to prisoners who are actually serving their sentences and not to pretrial detainees. . . . Nor does it apply to those who have been convicted but not sentenced. . . . As this court recently noted: “[t]he basic purpose of the [IADA] is to prevent interference with institutional care and rehabilitation, and one cannot interrupt that which has not yet started.”

United States v . Currier, 836 F.2d 1 1 , 16 (1st Cir. 1987)

(citation omitted).

Here, Guerrier was initially taken into custody by the State

of New Hampshire on a state parole violation charge. He was

being detained by the state pending adjudication of that charge.

Guerrier concedes in his petition that “no violation sentence was

imposed,” but argues that his original state sentence of one to

three years — the one from which he was paroled — must have been

being “served” while he was detained on the violation charges.

He does not claim that his parole was actually revoked and the

unserved term of imprisonment was reinstated at any point before

he was “shuttled” between state and federal custody.

Accordingly, Guerrier was in state custody in essentially a

pretrial, or pre-revocation, status — detained pending resolution

of the parole violation charge. Given that status, the IADA

2 Case 1:12-cv-00153-SM Document 6 Filed 01/28/13 Page 3 of 4

afforded him no rights, because it did not apply. See United

States v . Paige, 332 F. Supp. 2d 4 6 7 , 473 (D.R.I. 2004) (even if

IADA claims were not waived, defendant, who was detained pending

parole revocation, was not a prisoner serving a sentence of

imprisonment within the meaning of the IADA; citing cases).

In addition, the petition fails for another reason. To show

ineffective assistance of counsel, Guerrier must demonstrate not

only that defense counsel’s performance (in failing to move for

dismissal under the IADA) fell below the accepted standard of

practice, but also that he was prejudiced by that failure.

Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S. 6 6 8 , 691-92 (1984). He can

show neither. First, it was not incumbent upon defense counsel

to file a motion to dismiss under the anti-shuttling provisions

since the IADA’s provisions didn’t apply to petitioner. And,

even if counsel should have filed the motion, petitioner was not

prejudiced by that failure. This is so because when the

receiving party under the IADA is the federal government, any

dismissal of an indictment for violations of the IADA “may be

with or without prejudice.” 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 9 ( 1 ) .

As the government correctly points out, petitioner was

charged with a serious and violent robbery offense involving

firearms and drug trafficking. If defense counsel had filed a

3 Case 1:12-cv-00153-SM Document 6 Filed 01/28/13 Page 4 of 4

motion to dismiss the indictment, and if it had been found to

have merit, dismissal would unarguably have been without

prejudice and petitioner would unquestionably have been promptly

re-indicted on the same charges, and the outcome would have been

the same. That is not the stuff of prejudice under Strickland.

As the petition, and the files and records of the case

conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief,

the petition (document n o . 1 ) is denied. The court declines to

issue a certificate of appealability, but petitioner may seek a

certificate from the Court of Appeals under Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure 2 2 . See Rule 1 1 , Federal Rules Governing

Section 2255 Proceedings. The Clerk of Court shall enter

judgment in accordance with this order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

____________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

January 2 8 , 2013

cc: Viggens Guerrier, pro se Seth R. Aframe, AUSA