Viengkhone Sikeo v. Sergio Albarran, Acting Field Office Director of San Francisco Office of Detention and Removal; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMarch 4, 2026
Docket1:25-cv-01505
StatusUnknown

This text of Viengkhone Sikeo v. Sergio Albarran, Acting Field Office Director of San Francisco Office of Detention and Removal; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States (Viengkhone Sikeo v. Sergio Albarran, Acting Field Office Director of San Francisco Office of Detention and Removal; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Viengkhone Sikeo v. Sergio Albarran, Acting Field Office Director of San Francisco Office of Detention and Removal; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States, (E.D. Cal. 2026).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 VIENGKHONE SIKEO, No. 1:25-cv-01505-KES-HBK (HC) 10 Petitioner, ORDER CLARIFYING PRELIMINARY 11 v. INJUNCTION AND FINDING A SIGNIFICANT LIKELIHOOD OF REMOVAL 12 SERGIO ALBARRAN, Acting Field Office IN THE REASONABLY FORESEEABLE Director of San Francisco Office of FUTURE 13 Detention and Removal; TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director of United States Docs. 13, 17, 24 14 Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the United 15 States Department of Homeland Security; PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the 16 United States, 17 Respondents. 18 19 The Court previously enjoined respondents from re-detaining petitioner Viengkhone Sikeo 20 unless they demonstrated that there was a significant likelihood of petitioner’s removal in the 21 reasonably foreseeable future or that petitioner was a flight risk or danger to the community such 22 that his physical custody was legally justified. Viengkhone S. v. Albarran, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 23 No. 1:25-CV-01505-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3521302, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025) 24 (Doc. 13). On February 11, 2026, petitioner filed an emergency motion requesting that this Court 25 determine whether there is a significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable 26 future. Respondents joined in petitioner’s request. For the reasons explained below, the Court 27 finds that there is a significant likelihood of petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable 28 future, and respondents may re-detain him for that purpose. 1 I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1 2 Petitioner was born in a refugee camp in Thailand in 1983 and was admitted to the United 3 States as a refugee when he was six years old. Doc. 2 at ¶¶ 3, 31; see Doc. 10-1, Ex. 3. In 2005, 4 petitioner was ordered removed to Laos, detained by immigration authorities pending his 5 removal, and then released when immigration authorities were unable to remove him. Doc. 2 at 6 ¶ 4. Nearly twenty years later, in 2025, petitioner was detained and released by Immigration and 7 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on two separate occasions. After his second release in 2025, the 8 Court granted a preliminary injunction and ordered: “[r]espondents are enjoined and restrained 9 from re-detaining petitioner unless a neutral decisionmaker determines that there is a significant 10 likelihood of petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or respondents 11 demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral 12 decisionmaker that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical 13 custody is legally justified.” Viengkhone S., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2025 WL 3521302, at *10. 14 On February 11, 2026, petitioner filed an emergency motion to clarify in part and modify 15 in part the preliminary injunction. Doc. 17. Petitioner requests that the Court clarify that the 16 “neutral decisionmaker” referred to in the Court’s prior order is this Court and that the “pre- 17 deprivation bond hearing” required by the Court’s prior order must include an in-person hearing. 18 See id. On February 19, 2026, respondents filed a response to petitioner’s emergency motion and 19 “join[ed] petitioner’s request” that “the Court determine whether there is a significant likelihood 20 that Petitioner will be removed from the United States in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 21 Doc. 24. Respondents argue that there is a significant likelihood of removal because they 22 obtained a travel document from Laos that enables them to remove petitioner. Id. That travel 23 document expires on March 8, 2026. Doc. 24-1, Jager Decl. at ¶ 29. 24 Petitioner filed a reply on February 27, 2026. Doc. 25. Petitioner does not dispute that 25 the travel document would enable respondents to remove him to Laos. See id. Instead, he argues 26 that the travel document should be excluded because he speculates that the government must have 27

28 1 The factual background is recounted more fully in the Court’s prior order. See Doc. 13. 1 provided incorrect information to the embassy of Laos when requesting the travel document. See 2 id. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 As the parties agree that this Court should determine whether respondents have 5 established a significant likelihood of petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, 6 the Court has considered the evidence presented by the parties and will decide that issue. But to 7 the extent petitioner argues that this Court’s prior order requires an in-person hearing for such 8 determination, petitioner is incorrect. There is no need for an in-person hearing. The parties do 9 not dispute the relevant facts necessary to decide whether there is a significant likelihood of 10 removal. Specifically, the parties do not dispute that petitioner has a final order of removal to 11 Laos and that respondents have obtained a travel document which would enable them to remove 12 petitioner to Laos. 13 a. Evidence of the Travel Document is not Excludable 14 Although the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not generally apply to 15 immigration proceedings, see I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984), the Ninth 16 Circuit has recognized “two critical exceptions to this rule.” Sanchez v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 643, 17 649 (9th Cir. 2018). Only one exception is relevant here. Under this exception, “evidence may 18 be excluded” from removal proceedings “for a regulatory violation as long as three conditions are 19 satisfied: (1) the agency violated one of its regulations; (2) the subject regulation serves a 20 ‘purpose of benefit to the alien’; and (3) the violation ‘prejudiced interests of the alien which 21 were protected by the regulation.’” Id. at 650 (quoting Matter of Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 22 325, 328 (BIA 1980)). 23 Petitioner argues that this exception should apply here, but he acknowledges that no court 24 has addressed whether this exception should extend to a noncitizen’s bond hearing. See Doc. 25 25 at 7 n.7. The Court need not decide that issue for purposes of this Order because, even assuming 26 that this exception would extend to this proceeding, petitioner fails to identify any regulation that 27 ICE violated in obtaining the travel document. Petitioner speculates that, in a letter dated 2005 28 from ICE to the embassy of Laos, ICE must have falsely stated that petitioner was born in Laos, 1 even though the letter states (albeit in a different font from the rest of the letter) that petitioner 2 was born in Thailand.2 See Doc. 25 at 4–13; Doc. 25-3, Phinney Decl. Petitioner further alleges 3 that Laos would not have issued a travel document for petitioner if the government had truthfully 4 informed Laos that petitioner was born in a refugee camp in Thailand. See Doc. 25 at 4–13; Doc. 5 25-2, Ha Decl. But while petitioner speculates about the information federal authorities presented 6 to the government of Laos to obtain the travel document, he fails to establish any violation by 7 federal authorities of any regulation or of any duty as to petitioner.3 And, importantly, petitioner 8 does not dispute that the government of Laos has issued a valid travel document for him. 9 Regardless of whatever intergovernmental discussions took place between federal authorities and 10 the government of Laos, the outcome is that Laos has now issued a valid travel document for 11 petitioner. Petitioner has not made a shown that exclusion of that valid travel document is 12 warranted. 13 b. There is a Significant Likelihood of Petitioner’s Removal in the Reasonably 14 Foreseeable Future.

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HEALY AND GOODCHILD
17 I. & N. Dec. 22 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 1979)
Sanchez v. Sessions
904 F.3d 643 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)

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Viengkhone Sikeo v. Sergio Albarran, Acting Field Office Director of San Francisco Office of Detention and Removal; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/viengkhone-sikeo-v-sergio-albarran-acting-field-office-director-of-san-caed-2026.