NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WEVERTON RONAN VIDAL DA SILVA; No. 25-2492 L. K. A. V.; L. S. A. V.; LARISSA DA SILVA ARAUJO, Agency Nos. A245-392-218 Petitioners, A245-392-221 A245-392-224 v. A245-392-226
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent. MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 2, 2026** San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS, Chief District Judge.***
Weverton Ronan Vidal Da Silva, collectively with his wife and minor
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Brian Morris, United States Chief District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation. 1 children, natives and citizens of Brazil, petition for review of a decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing Vidal Da Silva’s appeal of an
order by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum and withholding of
removal.1
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s findings, agreeing that Vidal Da Silva’s testimony
and statements were not credible. The BIA noted that the record lacked
corroborating evidence of Vidal Da Silva’s claims. The BIA further concluded that
Vidal Da Silva failed to qualify for asylum or withholding of removal because
Vidal Da Silva failed to establish a nexus between his feared harm and a protected
ground and that the Brazilian government was unable or unwilling to protect him.
The BIA particularly noted that the person of whom Vidal Da Silva feared had
been arrested, charged, and convicted for killing Vidal Da Silva’s brother.
Vidal Da Silva petitions for review of the BIA’s decision. Vidal Da Silva
argues that substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s denial of his
applications for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and deny the petition for review. Because the parties are
familiar with the history of the case, we need not recount anything additional here.
1 The Immigration Judge determined that Vidal Da Silva was not eligible for protection under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner has not challenged that determination on appeal to the BIA nor on petition to this Court. 2 We apply the highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard to the
agency’s findings of fact. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.
2014). The agency’s findings of fact are considered “conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). When “the BIA issues its own decision but relies in part
on the [IJ’s] reasoning, we review both decisions.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland,
32 F.4th 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 857,
861 (9th Cir. 2012)).
1. To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, Vidal Da
Silva must show a nexus between past or feared future persecution and a statutorily
protected ground of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i),
1231(b)(3)(A); Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2003). The
nexus requirement for eligibility of asylum and withholding of removal requires
Vidal Da Silva to establish that his protected ground was or would be “a reason”
for the harm. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F. 3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017).
Although Petitioner argued he was targeted on account of his political
opinion or status as a member of a particular social group, substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s decision that Vidal Da Silva failed to establish that a nexus
existed between any past or future harm and his proposed particular social groups
3 of “relatives of Welberth Rodrigo,” and “individuals who were
informant/witnesses with the authorities in the investigation and arrest of a member
of the Red Command.” Vidal Da Silva testified that he left Brazil out of tiredness
from the retaliation that he faced for allegedly supporting the investigation of his
brother’s murder. Vidal Da Silva declared that the men who stole his motorcycle
warned him about future retaliation from the criminal group Comando Vermelho.
Vidal Da Silva similarly declared that he faced constant threats to his life as
reprisal for his involvement in apprehending his brother’s murderer. Id.
Furthermore, Vidal Da Silva never testified to a political opinion of which the
Comando Vermelho targeted him for maintaining. The record fails to support the
conclusion that Vidal Da Silva was targeted “on the account of” his membership in
a proposed particular social group or that his membership was “a reason” for the
harm he experienced. Barajas-Romero, 846 F. 3d at 360. Asylum and withholding
of removal remain unavailable for claims involving personal retribution or
animosity. See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“[M]istreatment motivated purely by personal retribution will not give rise to a
valid asylum claim.”).
The record supports the conclusion that the Comando Vermelho targeted
Vidal Da Silva out of retaliation for his alleged participation in identifying his
brother’s murderer. Vidal Da Silva fails to meet his burden to establish eligibility
4 either for asylum or withholding of removal because the record demonstrates that
the Comando Vermelho member’s “death threats are grounded only in personal
animosity” against Vidal Da Silva. Zayas-Marini v. INS, 785 F.2d 801, 806 (9th
Cir. 1986). This conclusion is dispositive to Vidal Da Silva’s claims for asylum
and withholding of removal. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 551
(9th Cir. 2023) (as amended) (“A nexus between the harm and a protected ground
is a necessary element of asylum and withholding of removal.”).
2. Substantial evidence further supports the BIA’s decision that Vidal Da
Silva failed to show that the Brazilian government was unable or unwilling to
protect him from the person who murdered his brother. Vidal Da Silva has the
burden of establishing that his alleged “persecution was [or would be] committed. .
. by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.” Bringas-
Rodriguez v.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WEVERTON RONAN VIDAL DA SILVA; No. 25-2492 L. K. A. V.; L. S. A. V.; LARISSA DA SILVA ARAUJO, Agency Nos. A245-392-218 Petitioners, A245-392-221 A245-392-224 v. A245-392-226
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent. MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 2, 2026** San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS, Chief District Judge.***
Weverton Ronan Vidal Da Silva, collectively with his wife and minor
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Brian Morris, United States Chief District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation. 1 children, natives and citizens of Brazil, petition for review of a decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing Vidal Da Silva’s appeal of an
order by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum and withholding of
removal.1
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s findings, agreeing that Vidal Da Silva’s testimony
and statements were not credible. The BIA noted that the record lacked
corroborating evidence of Vidal Da Silva’s claims. The BIA further concluded that
Vidal Da Silva failed to qualify for asylum or withholding of removal because
Vidal Da Silva failed to establish a nexus between his feared harm and a protected
ground and that the Brazilian government was unable or unwilling to protect him.
The BIA particularly noted that the person of whom Vidal Da Silva feared had
been arrested, charged, and convicted for killing Vidal Da Silva’s brother.
Vidal Da Silva petitions for review of the BIA’s decision. Vidal Da Silva
argues that substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s denial of his
applications for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and deny the petition for review. Because the parties are
familiar with the history of the case, we need not recount anything additional here.
1 The Immigration Judge determined that Vidal Da Silva was not eligible for protection under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner has not challenged that determination on appeal to the BIA nor on petition to this Court. 2 We apply the highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard to the
agency’s findings of fact. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.
2014). The agency’s findings of fact are considered “conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). When “the BIA issues its own decision but relies in part
on the [IJ’s] reasoning, we review both decisions.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland,
32 F.4th 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 857,
861 (9th Cir. 2012)).
1. To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, Vidal Da
Silva must show a nexus between past or feared future persecution and a statutorily
protected ground of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i),
1231(b)(3)(A); Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2003). The
nexus requirement for eligibility of asylum and withholding of removal requires
Vidal Da Silva to establish that his protected ground was or would be “a reason”
for the harm. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F. 3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017).
Although Petitioner argued he was targeted on account of his political
opinion or status as a member of a particular social group, substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s decision that Vidal Da Silva failed to establish that a nexus
existed between any past or future harm and his proposed particular social groups
3 of “relatives of Welberth Rodrigo,” and “individuals who were
informant/witnesses with the authorities in the investigation and arrest of a member
of the Red Command.” Vidal Da Silva testified that he left Brazil out of tiredness
from the retaliation that he faced for allegedly supporting the investigation of his
brother’s murder. Vidal Da Silva declared that the men who stole his motorcycle
warned him about future retaliation from the criminal group Comando Vermelho.
Vidal Da Silva similarly declared that he faced constant threats to his life as
reprisal for his involvement in apprehending his brother’s murderer. Id.
Furthermore, Vidal Da Silva never testified to a political opinion of which the
Comando Vermelho targeted him for maintaining. The record fails to support the
conclusion that Vidal Da Silva was targeted “on the account of” his membership in
a proposed particular social group or that his membership was “a reason” for the
harm he experienced. Barajas-Romero, 846 F. 3d at 360. Asylum and withholding
of removal remain unavailable for claims involving personal retribution or
animosity. See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“[M]istreatment motivated purely by personal retribution will not give rise to a
valid asylum claim.”).
The record supports the conclusion that the Comando Vermelho targeted
Vidal Da Silva out of retaliation for his alleged participation in identifying his
brother’s murderer. Vidal Da Silva fails to meet his burden to establish eligibility
4 either for asylum or withholding of removal because the record demonstrates that
the Comando Vermelho member’s “death threats are grounded only in personal
animosity” against Vidal Da Silva. Zayas-Marini v. INS, 785 F.2d 801, 806 (9th
Cir. 1986). This conclusion is dispositive to Vidal Da Silva’s claims for asylum
and withholding of removal. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 551
(9th Cir. 2023) (as amended) (“A nexus between the harm and a protected ground
is a necessary element of asylum and withholding of removal.”).
2. Substantial evidence further supports the BIA’s decision that Vidal Da
Silva failed to show that the Brazilian government was unable or unwilling to
protect him from the person who murdered his brother. Vidal Da Silva has the
burden of establishing that his alleged “persecution was [or would be] committed. .
. by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.” Bringas-
Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting
Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010). The inquiry does
not require a government to “prevent all risk of harm.” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d
634, 648 (9th Cir. 2021). A court must consider “all relevant evidence in the
record, including country reports,” when assessing “whether private persecutors
are individuals whom the government is unable or unwilling to control.” Bringas-
Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1069 (citation modified).
5 Vidal Da Silva fails to establish that he would be harmed by a Brazilian
government actor or persons the Brazilian government was unable or unwilling to
control. Vidal Da Silva feared the person he allegedly identified as killing his
brother. The Brazilian government has charged and convicted that person for the
murder of Vidal Da Silva’s brother. The record shows that that person is still in
custody. Vidal Da Silva reported the threats he received after two men stole his
motorcycle. The Brazilian police acknowledged Vidal Da Silva’s concerns for his
safety by taking his reports even if the reports failed to lead to any arrests.
Vidal Da Silva further fails to satisfy his burden of showing that the
Brazilian police were unable or unwilling to protect him. A petitioner cannot
satisfy his burden by “simply” demonstrating that “the police ultimately were
unable to solve a crime or arrest the perpetrators, where the [petitioner] failed to
provide the police with sufficiently specific information to permit an investigation
or an arrest.” Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Vidal Da Silva had
informed the Brazilian police that he could not identify the men who stole his
motorcycle as their heads were “covered.” Vidal Da Silva later reported a robbery
of his home, but he had not been present for the robbery. Based on the record,
Vidal Da Silva cannot demonstrate that the Brazilian government was unable or
unwilling to protect him because the Brazilian police lacked sufficient information
to execute an arrest for the crimes. See id.
6 The record fails to compel the conclusion that the government was unwilling
or unable to protect Vidal Da Silva when his brother’s assailant was arrested,
charged, and convicted by the Brazilian government. The Court similarly
concluded in Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr that a petitioner failed to meet her burden
of proof where country reports proved mixed on the country’s effectiveness in
addressing the petitioner’s harm while her friends encouraged her to seek police
protection. 976 F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2020). The facts here also “suggest”
that Vidal Da Silva “could have obtained help” from Brazilian authorities. Id. This
conclusion also proves independently dispositive to Vidal Da Silva’s claims for
asylum and withholding of removal. See Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th
824, 832 (9th Cir. 2022) (as amended); see also Meza-Vazquez v. Garland, 993
F.3d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 2021).
3. The Court need not reach a conclusion on whether substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s adverse credibility determination. Vidal Da Silva has failed to
demonstrate “a nexus between the harm and a protected ground,” see Umana-
Escobar, 69 F.4th at 551, and that the Brazilian government was unable or
unwilling to protect him. Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1062; see also INS v.
Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25–26 (1976).
7 PETITION DENIED.2
2 The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 3) is denied. The temporary stay of removal is lifted. 8