Victoria S. Savage v. Steven B. Savage

2017 ME 47, 157 A.3d 252, 2017 WL 931384, 2017 Me. LEXIS 44

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: March 9, 2017
• Status: Published

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 47 Docket: Han-16-208 Submitted On Briefs: February 23, 2017 Decided: March 9, 2017

Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

VICTORIA S. SAVAGE

v.

STEVEN B. SAVAGE

PER CURIAM

[¶1] Steven Savage appeals from a judgment of the District Court

(Ellsworth, Jordan, J.) granting Victoria Savage’s motion to modify spousal

support based on its determination that the modification was warranted by a

substantial change in circumstances after the divorce decree was issued. See

19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(4) (2016). We affirm.

[¶2] The divorce decree, issued in 2008 pursuant to the parties’

agreement, required Steven to pay Victoria monthly spousal support of $3,000

until he turned sixty years old, at which time support would be reduced to

$1 per year. Pursuant to a federal law that went into effect shortly before the

entry of the divorce judgment, Steven’s mandatory retirement age increased

from age sixty to sixty-five. Victoria testified that at the time of the divorce, 2

she believed that Steven was required to retire at age sixty, and did not learn

of the increased age limit until after the divorce. Steven continued working

after turning sixty and remained employed at the time of the motion hearing.

[¶3] “A party who seeks a modification of spousal support must prove

that the modification is justified based on a showing of a substantial change in

either the payor or payee spouse’s financial condition.” Voter v. Voter,

2015 ME 11, ¶ 18, 109 A.3d 626 (quotation marks omitted). Contrary to

Steven’s argument, the court did not err by admitting evidence of Victoria’s

expectation, at the time the divorce judgment was entered, that Steven would

not work beyond age sixty because of her understanding of the mandatory

retirement policy governing his employment. See id. (holding that to

determine whether there has been a change of circumstances sufficient to

warrant a modification of spousal support, the court must consider evidence

of what had been “foreseen and probably provided for” in the initial support

award).

[¶4] Additionally, based on the court’s resulting finding that at the time

of the divorce the parties had anticipated that Steven would retire at age sixty,

see Gordon v. Cheskin, 2013 ME 113, ¶ 12, 82 A.3d 1221 (stating that, on

appeal, we defer to the court’s determinations of witness credibility), and the 3

court’s consideration of the structure of the divorce judgment, which tied the

reduction of Steven’s support obligation to his sixtieth birthday, the court did

not err when it determined that Steven’s current mandatory retirement age is

a substantial change from the “baseline” of what the court and the parties

anticipated when the divorce judgment was issued. See Klopp v. Klopp,

598 A.2d 462, 464 (Me. 1991) (“On a subsequent motion for modification of

the divorce judgment, the court necessarily will apply a rule of objective

reasonableness in determining the baseline: What future circumstances of the

parties is it objectively reasonable to assume the divorce court both foresaw

and took into account in setting alimony?”).

[¶5] Finally, after having found that there had been a substantial

change in circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by modifying

the spousal support provisions in the divorce judgment so as to maintain the

previous amount of Steven’s spousal support obligation until he turns

sixty-five years old.1 See Voter, 2015 ME 11, ¶ 18, 109 A.3d 626.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

1 In its judgment granting Victoria’s motion to modify, the court eliminated altogether the award

of nominal support after Steven turns sixty-five years old. Victoria has not filed a cross-appeal from that part of the order. 4

Thomas L. Douglas, Esq., and Anne E. Schools, Esq., Douglas McDaniel Campo & Schools LLC, PA, Westbrook, for appellant Steven B. Savage

Daniel A. Pileggi, Esq., Acadia Law Group, LLC, Ellsworth, for appellee Victoria S. Savage

Ellsworth District Court docket number FM-2008-16 For Clerk Reference Only