NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3657-20
VICTORIA GOETHALS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JEFFREY J. GOETHALS,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted May 18, 2022 – Decided June 29, 2022
Before Judges Gilson and Gummer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FM-14-0109-15.
DeTommaso Law Group, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Joseph M. Freda, III, of counsel and on the briefs).
Townsend, Tomaio & Newmark, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Jessica S. Swenson, of counsel and on the brief; Paul H. Townsend, of counsel).
PER CURIAM In this post-divorce-judgment matter, defendant, the former husband,
appeals from a June 11, 2021 order denying his motion to enforce an alleged
settlement agreement or, alternatively, to hold a plenary hearing to determine if
the parties had settled their disputes. Defendant also appeals from a July 29,
2021 order denying his motion for reconsideration. Defendant contends that the
essential terms of a settlement agreement were reached at mediation. Because
it is undisputed that plaintiff never signed a written settlement agreement, we
reject defendant's contention and affirm both orders.
I.
After fifteen years of marriage, the parties divorced in 2016. Following
their divorce, the parties have filed numerous post-judgment motions and
several appeals. This appeal concerns financial issues that were discussed at
mediation.
The record establishes the following facts. On September 21, 2020, the
parties and their counsel met with a mediator to try to resolve issues concerning
alimony, child support, and school expenses for their two sons. Following the
mediation, the mediator prepared a memorandum setting forth terms of "a
tentative agreement as to all the post judgment issues." That memorandum was
not signed by the parties or their counsel; instead, it was sent to the parties'
A-3657-20 2 counsel via an email that stated, in part: "Here is a memo of the tentative
resolution reached. As we discussed[,] if you have comments or changes let me
know – and I can convert it into a Consent order."
Defense counsel converted the terms of the memorandum into a proposed
consent order. On October 14, 2020, defense counsel sent the proposed consent
order to plaintiff's counsel. In the email forwarding the proposed consent order,
defense counsel acknowledged that he had added issues not addressed in the
mediator's memorandum or discussed at the mediation. Defense counsel asked
plaintiff's counsel to "[t]ake a look [at the proposed consent order] and perhaps
we can schedule a follow-up mediation with [the mediator] to put this to bed if
needed."
Plaintiff did not agree to or sign the proposed consent order. Instead, over
the next three months, counsel for the parties discussed various unresolved
issues and possible modifications to the proposed consent order. In December
2020 and January 2021, defense counsel sent plaintiff's counsel several versions
of a proposed consent order.
On January 20, 2021, defense counsel sent plaintiff's counsel another
"updated Consent Order" that defendant had signed. In his email, defense
counsel stated, in part: "Attached is a signed final Consent Order signed by our
A-3657-20 3 client. Kindly have your client sign so we can forward to Susan and resolve this
matter once and for all." It is undisputed that plaintiff did not sign the proposed
consent order forwarded on January 20, 2021.
On March 17, 2021, defendant filed a motion to compel plaintiff to comply
with the terms of the proposed consent order sent on January 20, 2021.
Alternatively, defendant requested a plenary hearing to determine whether the
parties had agreed to settle their disputes. Plaintiff opposed that motion.
Plaintiff also cross-moved to compel discovery and a hearing on a previously-
remanded stock-option issue. See Goethals v. Goethals, No. A-0881-19 (App.
Div. Jan. 20, 2021).
On June 11, 2021, the family court issued a written opinion and order
denying defendant's motion to enforce the proposed consent order. In a
thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the family judge, Judge Frank J.
DeAngelis, J.S.C., found that the record established that plaintiff had never
signed the mediator's memorandum or any of the proposed consent orders.
Instead, the parties, through their counsel, had continued to negotiate various
issues, and no final binding settlement agreement had been reached. Relying on
the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242
Franklin Avenue, LLC, 215 N.J. 242, 262-63 (2013), Judge DeAngelis ruled that
A-3657-20 4 without a signed settlement agreement following mediation, there was no
enforceable settlement agreement. The judge also denied both parties' requests
for attorneys' fees. In addition, the judge scheduled a management conference
to comply with our remand directives concerning the stock-option issue.
Defendant moved for reconsideration, but Judge DeAngelis denied that
motion in an order issued on July 29, 2021. The judge explained the reasons for
that denial in a written statement of reasons. Defendant now appeals from the
orders entered on June 11, 2021, and July 29, 2021.
II.
On appeal, defendant argues that the family court erred in failing to
enforce what he contended was a binding settlement agreement set forth in the
proposed consent order his counsel sent on January 20, 2021. Alternatively, he
argues that the court should have held a hearing to determine whether the parties
had reached an agreement on the essential terms of their disputes.
"Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because
of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433
N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
412 (1998)). "We do 'not disturb the "factual findings and legal conclusions of
the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by
A-3657-20 5 or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence
as to offend the interests of justice."'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)
(alteration in original) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). Consequently, "'[o]nly
when the trial court's conclusions are so "clearly mistaken" or "wide of the
mark"' should we interfere." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). Nevertheless, "legal issues are reviewed de
novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese
v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).
Defendant contends that the parties agreed to the essential terms of the
settlement at mediation. Our Supreme Court has held that terms of an agreement
that are reached at mediation, but which are not reduced to a signed written
agreement, will not be enforceable. Willingboro Mall, 215 N.J. at 263.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3657-20
VICTORIA GOETHALS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JEFFREY J. GOETHALS,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted May 18, 2022 – Decided June 29, 2022
Before Judges Gilson and Gummer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FM-14-0109-15.
DeTommaso Law Group, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Joseph M. Freda, III, of counsel and on the briefs).
Townsend, Tomaio & Newmark, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Jessica S. Swenson, of counsel and on the brief; Paul H. Townsend, of counsel).
PER CURIAM In this post-divorce-judgment matter, defendant, the former husband,
appeals from a June 11, 2021 order denying his motion to enforce an alleged
settlement agreement or, alternatively, to hold a plenary hearing to determine if
the parties had settled their disputes. Defendant also appeals from a July 29,
2021 order denying his motion for reconsideration. Defendant contends that the
essential terms of a settlement agreement were reached at mediation. Because
it is undisputed that plaintiff never signed a written settlement agreement, we
reject defendant's contention and affirm both orders.
I.
After fifteen years of marriage, the parties divorced in 2016. Following
their divorce, the parties have filed numerous post-judgment motions and
several appeals. This appeal concerns financial issues that were discussed at
mediation.
The record establishes the following facts. On September 21, 2020, the
parties and their counsel met with a mediator to try to resolve issues concerning
alimony, child support, and school expenses for their two sons. Following the
mediation, the mediator prepared a memorandum setting forth terms of "a
tentative agreement as to all the post judgment issues." That memorandum was
not signed by the parties or their counsel; instead, it was sent to the parties'
A-3657-20 2 counsel via an email that stated, in part: "Here is a memo of the tentative
resolution reached. As we discussed[,] if you have comments or changes let me
know – and I can convert it into a Consent order."
Defense counsel converted the terms of the memorandum into a proposed
consent order. On October 14, 2020, defense counsel sent the proposed consent
order to plaintiff's counsel. In the email forwarding the proposed consent order,
defense counsel acknowledged that he had added issues not addressed in the
mediator's memorandum or discussed at the mediation. Defense counsel asked
plaintiff's counsel to "[t]ake a look [at the proposed consent order] and perhaps
we can schedule a follow-up mediation with [the mediator] to put this to bed if
needed."
Plaintiff did not agree to or sign the proposed consent order. Instead, over
the next three months, counsel for the parties discussed various unresolved
issues and possible modifications to the proposed consent order. In December
2020 and January 2021, defense counsel sent plaintiff's counsel several versions
of a proposed consent order.
On January 20, 2021, defense counsel sent plaintiff's counsel another
"updated Consent Order" that defendant had signed. In his email, defense
counsel stated, in part: "Attached is a signed final Consent Order signed by our
A-3657-20 3 client. Kindly have your client sign so we can forward to Susan and resolve this
matter once and for all." It is undisputed that plaintiff did not sign the proposed
consent order forwarded on January 20, 2021.
On March 17, 2021, defendant filed a motion to compel plaintiff to comply
with the terms of the proposed consent order sent on January 20, 2021.
Alternatively, defendant requested a plenary hearing to determine whether the
parties had agreed to settle their disputes. Plaintiff opposed that motion.
Plaintiff also cross-moved to compel discovery and a hearing on a previously-
remanded stock-option issue. See Goethals v. Goethals, No. A-0881-19 (App.
Div. Jan. 20, 2021).
On June 11, 2021, the family court issued a written opinion and order
denying defendant's motion to enforce the proposed consent order. In a
thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the family judge, Judge Frank J.
DeAngelis, J.S.C., found that the record established that plaintiff had never
signed the mediator's memorandum or any of the proposed consent orders.
Instead, the parties, through their counsel, had continued to negotiate various
issues, and no final binding settlement agreement had been reached. Relying on
the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242
Franklin Avenue, LLC, 215 N.J. 242, 262-63 (2013), Judge DeAngelis ruled that
A-3657-20 4 without a signed settlement agreement following mediation, there was no
enforceable settlement agreement. The judge also denied both parties' requests
for attorneys' fees. In addition, the judge scheduled a management conference
to comply with our remand directives concerning the stock-option issue.
Defendant moved for reconsideration, but Judge DeAngelis denied that
motion in an order issued on July 29, 2021. The judge explained the reasons for
that denial in a written statement of reasons. Defendant now appeals from the
orders entered on June 11, 2021, and July 29, 2021.
II.
On appeal, defendant argues that the family court erred in failing to
enforce what he contended was a binding settlement agreement set forth in the
proposed consent order his counsel sent on January 20, 2021. Alternatively, he
argues that the court should have held a hearing to determine whether the parties
had reached an agreement on the essential terms of their disputes.
"Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because
of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433
N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
412 (1998)). "We do 'not disturb the "factual findings and legal conclusions of
the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by
A-3657-20 5 or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence
as to offend the interests of justice."'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)
(alteration in original) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). Consequently, "'[o]nly
when the trial court's conclusions are so "clearly mistaken" or "wide of the
mark"' should we interfere." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). Nevertheless, "legal issues are reviewed de
novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese
v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).
Defendant contends that the parties agreed to the essential terms of the
settlement at mediation. Our Supreme Court has held that terms of an agreement
that are reached at mediation, but which are not reduced to a signed written
agreement, will not be enforceable. Willingboro Mall, 215 N.J. at 263. In that
regard, the Court has explained:
In summary, if the parties to mediation reach an agreement to resolve their dispute, the terms of that settlement must be reduced to writing and signed by the parties before the mediation comes to a close. In those cases in which the complexity of the settlement terms cannot be drafted by the time the mediation session was expected to have ended, the mediation session should be continued for a brief but reasonable period of time to allow for the signing of the settlement. We also see no reason why an audio- or video-recorded agreement would not meet the test of "an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement" under
A-3657-20 6 N.J.S.A. 2A:23C-6(a)(1) and N.J.R.E. 519(c)(a)(1). To be clear, going forward, a settlement that is reached at mediation but not reduced to a signed written agreement will not be enforceable.
[Id. at 262-63 (internal citation omitted).]
There is no dispute that plaintiff did not sign the memorandum prepared
by the mediator or any of the proposed consent orders prepared by defendant's
counsel. Instead, as Judge DeAngelis found, the parties, through their counsel,
never came to a final agreement on all the terms and continued to discuss various
issues. That finding by Judge DeAngelis is amply supported by the written
record and, in particular, the emails accompanying and responding to the various
proposed consent orders.
Defendant argues that this case is distinguishable from the facts in
Willingboro Mall because, after the mediation, he complied with the terms of
the mediator's memorandum. Therefore, he argues that the parties reached a
settlement as to all essential issues at the mediation held on September 21, 2020.
The flaw with that argument is that it is rebutted by the written record.
The mediator characterized her memorandum as a "tentative resolution" and
acknowledged that there may be "changes." In the emails sent by defendant's
counsel, he acknowledged that not all issues were agreed to at the mediation.
Accordingly, in the numerous emails exchanged by the parties' counsel over the
A-3657-20 7 next three months, various issues were discussed, and the consent order was
revised at least three times. Those written communications established that no
final binding and enforceable agreement had been reached. Indeed, the facts of
this case highlight why the Supreme Court established a bright-line rule
requiring a written and signed settlement agreement following mediation. The
Court explained that requiring a written and signed agreement "will greatly
minimize the potential for litigation." Id. at 263. In contrast, entertaining
argument over an unsigned settlement agreement will only "spawn more
litigation" and cause "the mediation [to become] the dispute," as has occurred in
this matter. Id. at 245.
The communications between the parties' counsel also demonstrate that
there was no need for a plenary hearing. Defendant cannot dispute his counsel's
written communication. Those communications consistently establish that
defendant was proposing a consent order. The responding communications from
plaintiff's counsel establish that no final agreement was reached. Most
importantly, it is indisputable that plaintiff never signed any of the proposed
consent orders. Given those facts, there was no basis for a plenary hearing. See
Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 217 (App. Div. 2015) (finding no
A-3657-20 8 basis for a plenary hearing because relevant material submitted to the motion
judge did not present a material factual dispute).
Affirmed.
A-3657-20 9