Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2025-1422 _____________
VICTOR TONY JONES, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
____________
No. SC2025-1423 ____________
VICTOR TONY JONES, Petitioner,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
September 24, 2025
PER CURIAM.
Victor Tony Jones, a prisoner under sentence of death for
whom a warrant has been signed and an execution set for
September 30, 2025, appeals the circuit court’s orders summarily denying his sixth successive motion for postconviction relief, which
was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and
denying several post-warrant demands for public records under
rule 3.852. He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus
and moves for a stay of execution. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
Jones’s appeal and habeas petition raise two principal
arguments: (1) that he probably could obtain a reduced sentence
based on “newly discovered” evidence that the State has
acknowledged abuse Jones suffered in the 1970s as a teenager in
the Okeechobee School for Boys; and (2) that this Court should
reconsider its previous decisions rejecting Jones’s claim that he is
constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty due to intellectual
disability. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the denials of
postconviction relief and of Jones’s demands for public records,
deny the habeas petition, and deny the motion for a stay filed on
September 16, 2025, the renewed motion for a stay, filed on
September 18, 2025, and the second renewed motion for a stay and
to relinquish jurisdiction, filed on September 22, 2025.
-2- I. BACKGROUND
On December 19, 1990, on his second day of work, Jones
fatally stabbed his employers, Jacob and Matilda Nestor, inside
their business. Mrs. Nestor was stabbed in the back of the neck,
severing her aorta. Mr. Nestor was stabbed in the chest,
puncturing his heart. Before succumbing to his injury, Mr. Nestor
was able to retrieve his pistol and shoot Jones in the forehead.
Police found Jones locked inside the building with the Nestors’
wallets, keys, and other belongings in his pockets. At the hospital,
Jones admitted to a nurse that he killed the couple because they
owed him money. Jones v. State, 652 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 1995).
A jury convicted Jones of two counts of first-degree murder
and two counts of armed robbery. Consistent with the jury’s
recommendations, the trial court imposed death sentences for both
murders, based on three aggravating factors and no mitigation. Id.
at 348-49. This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on
direct appeal, id. at 353, which became final when the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari review in 1995, Jones v.
Florida, 516 U.S. 875 (1995); see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(B)
(“For the purposes of this rule, a judgment is final . . . on the
-3- disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court, if filed.”).
In the decades since, Jones has repeatedly and unsuccessfully
challenged his convictions and sentences in state and federal
courts. See Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2003) (affirming
denial of initial motion for postconviction relief and denying his
state petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d
319 (Fla. 2007) (affirming denial of first successive motion for
postconviction relief); Jones v. McNeil, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D.
Fla. 2011) (denying federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus);
Jones v. State, 93 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 2012) (mem.) (affirming denial of
second successive motion for postconviction relief); Jones v. State,
135 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 2014) (table) (voluntary dismissal of appeal of
denial of third successive motion for postconviction relief); Jones v.
State, 231 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 2017) (affirming denial of fourth
successive motion for postconviction relief); Jones v. State, 241 So.
3d 65 (Fla. 2018) (affirming denial of fifth successive motion for
postconviction relief).
Governor Ron DeSantis signed Jones’s death warrant on
August 29, 2025. Jones then filed his sixth successive motion for
-4- postconviction relief under rule 3.851, raising three claims: (1) that
newly discovered evidence of his eligibility for compensation under
the Dozier School for Boys and Okeechobee School Victim
Compensation Program provides significant mitigation; (2) that
newly discovered evidence establishes that the prosecution of
capital cases in Miami-Dade County results in an unconstitutional
application of the death penalty in which the system
disproportionately punishes defendants convicted of murdering
white victims; and (3) that the unreasonably truncated and surprise
nature of the warrant process in Florida has denied Jones due
process. The circuit court summarily denied all three claims, as
well as Jones’s post-warrant public records demands. This appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sixth Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief
1. Claim That Jones’s Eligibility for Compensation Under the Okeechobee School Victim Compensation Program Constitutes Newly Discovered Evidence That He Was Abused at the School
In 2024, the Florida Legislature passed, and the Governor
signed, Committee Substitute for House Bill 21, establishing the
Dozier School for Boys and Okeechobee School Victim
-5- Compensation Program. See ch. 24-254, Laws of Fla. (creating
§ 16.63(1), Fla. Stat. (2024)) (providing for compensation to living
persons confined to either school between 1940 and 1975 who were
subjected to mental, physical, or sexual abuse by school personnel).
Jones, who had four placements at the Okeechobee School between
1975 and 1978, applied for compensation under the program.1 On
January 6, 2025, the Office of the Attorney General mailed Jones a
letter recognizing his eligibility for compensation under the
program.
Relying on this letter, Jones argued below that “Newly
Discovered Evidence That Jones Is A Member Of The Okeechobee
Victim Compensation Class Establishes That Jones Experienced
Trauma And Abuse At The Hands Of The State Which The State
1. The statute required that an applicant submit with his application “[r]easonable proof submitted as attachments establishing that the applicant was both: 1. Confined to the Dozier School for Boys or the Okeechobee School between 1940 and 1975, which proof may include school records submitted with a notarized certificate of authenticity signed by the records custodian or certified court records[, and] 2. A victim of mental, physical, or sexual abuse perpetrated by school personnel during the applicant’s confinement, which proof may include a notarized statement signed by the applicant attesting to the abuse the applicant suffered.” § 16.63(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2024).
-6- Cannot Now In Good Faith Minimize Or Assert As Not Credible And
Which Establishes Significant Mitigation In His Case, Which Would
Probably Yield A Less Severe Sentence On Retrial.” 2 In other words,
Jones claimed that recognition of his eligibility for compensation
under the program constituted newly discovered evidence
establishing that he was abused at the Okeechobee School, which is
significantly mitigating such that he would probably receive a life
sentence at a retrial. The circuit court summarily denied the claim
as untimely, procedurally barred, and meritless. Jones now argues
that the denial was erroneous.
We review a decision to summarily deny a successive rule
3.851 motion de novo, and we accept a movant’s factual allegations
as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record. Zakrzewski
v. State, 415 So. 3d 203, 208 (Fla.), cert. denied, No. 25-5194, 2025
2. Jones has attempted to reframe this claim on appeal. He now states that “Newly Discovered Evidence Of The State Of Florida’s Recognition Of Jones’s Abuse At The Okeechobee And His Entitlement To Compensation As A Victim Of A Crime Is Material Evidence Which Renders His Death Sentence Unreliable And Would Likely Lead To A Life Sentence On Retrial.” Initial Brief of Appellant at 35. This reframing has no bearing on our analysis of the denial of the claim he raised below.
-7- WL 2155601 (U.S. July 30, 2025). “As we have recently reiterated,
we will affirm the denial of successive claims that are procedurally
barred, untimely, legally insufficient, or refuted by the record.”
Bates v. State, No. SC2025-1127, 2025 WL 2319001, at *3 (Fla.
Aug. 12), cert. denied, No. 25-5370, 2025 WL 2396797 (U.S. Aug.
19, 2025).
The circuit court correctly determined that Jones’s claim is
procedurally barred. The alleged abuse occurred nearly fifty years
ago—and roughly fifteen years before his trial—yet Jones did not
raise it at trial or in any prior postconviction proceeding. Because
Jones’s claim about any abuse he suffered at the Okeechobee
School could have and should have been raised earlier, it is
procedurally barred. See Rogers v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257, 1263
(Fla.) (“[I]n an active warrant case, a postconviction claim that could
have been raised in a prior proceeding is procedurally barred.”),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (2025).
Attempting to avoid this procedural bar, Jones now claims
that his “argument was not that the evidence of abuse was new, but
that the State’s long-standing cover up of the conditions at . . .
Dozier and Okeechobee, and the State’s January 6, 2025[,]
-8- admission that Jones suffered severe abuse[3] warranting financial
compensation, was new evidence . . . .” Initial Brief of Appellant at
18. But this differs from the argument raised below, which was
that “the extent of the abuse Jones suffered at Okeechobee, and the
State of Florida’s cover up of that abuse and continuing denial or
diminution of the abuse through 2020 and beyond, is evidence of
such a nature as to probably yield a life sentence on retrial.”
Regardless, any mitigation that Jones might offer at a retrial
regarding the Okeechobee School would derive from the abuse
itself—known to him since the 1970s—not from the 2025 eligibility
letter. The letter merely recognizes Jones’s eligibility under the
statutory criteria; it does not admit any specific abuse of Jones.
The circuit court also properly rejected the claim as meritless.
Even assuming that Jones’s eligibility for compensation under the
program constitutes newly discovered evidence, Jones cannot
establish that his eligibility for compensation or even a credible
claim of abuse at the Okeechobee School is of such a nature that it
3. The record refutes Jones’s claim that the State admitted in the January 6, 2025, letter “that Jones suffered severe abuse.” The letter does not acknowledge any specific abuse of Jones.
-9- would probably yield a life sentence on retrial. See Dillbeck v. State,
357 So. 3d 94, 100 (Fla. 2023) (stating that to obtain relief based on
a claim of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must establish
“(1) that the newly discovered evidence was unknown by the trial
court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial and it could
not have been discovered through due diligence, and (2) that the
evidence is of such a nature that it would probably . . . yield a less
severe sentence on retrial.” (omission in original) (quoting Dailey v.
State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1285 (Fla. 2021))).
Jones brutally murdered two people for pecuniary gain. The
trial court found three strong aggravating factors were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Jones was under a sentence of
imprisonment; (2) Jones was convicted of a prior violent felony; and
(3) the murders were committed during the course of robbery.4 See
Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d 695, 726 (Fla. 2021) (“The prior violent
felony is one of ‘the weightiest aggravators in Florida’s statutory
scheme.’ ” (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1167 (Fla.
4. The trial court also found that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, which it merged with the “during the commission of a robbery” aggravating factor.
- 10 - 2014))); Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 802, 806 (Fla. 1992)
(identifying under sentence of imprisonment, prior violent felony,
and during the commission of a felony as strong aggravating
factors). And Jones failed to establish the existence of any
mitigating circumstances to weigh against these strong aggravating
factors. Even if Jones presented credible evidence of his abuse at
the Okeechobee School, it cannot be said that he would probably
receive a life sentence on retrial. The circuit court therefore did not
err in summarily denying this claim.
2. Claim That the Nature of the Death Warrant Proceedings Violates Due Process Guarantees
Jones next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily
denying his claim that the unreasonably truncated and surprise
nature of the death warrant process in Florida violates “the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments.” 5
5. While the Eighth Amendment’s “prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments . . . is a particular aspect of due process,” Yacob v. State, 136 So. 3d 539, 562 (Fla. 2014) (Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), because it is “made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53 (2010)), it does not contain its own due process clause, and
- 11 - This Court has repeatedly rejected similar claims. E.g., Windom v.
State, No. SC2025-1179, 2025 WL 2414205, at *6 (Fla. Aug. 21),
cert. denied, No. 25-5440, 2025 WL 2460118 (U.S. Aug. 27, 2025);
Bates, No. 2025 WL 2319001, at *5; Zakrzewski, 415 So. 3d at 211;
Bell v. State, 415 So. 3d 85, 106-07 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.
2872 (2025); Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0517, 2025 WL
1198037, at *4 (Fla. Apr. 25), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1980 (2025);
Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385, 390-91 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.
1914 (2025); Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 789 (Fla. 2023). “A
thirty-day warrant period does not, in and of itself, deprive a capital
defendant of [due process]. In post-warrant litigation, due process
requires a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be
heard.” Bates, 2025 WL 2319001, at *5. Jones has not identified
any matter on which he was denied notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
The record refutes Jones’s claim that the issuance of his
warrant was a “surprise.” Jones’s death sentences were imposed
the thirty-day warrant period does not otherwise violate the Eighth Amendment.
- 12 - thirty-two years ago and have been final for thirty years. As
required by section 922.052(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), the Clerk
of this Court certified to the Governor on October 4, 2013, that
Jones had completed his direct appeal and initial postconviction
proceedings in state court and his habeas corpus proceedings and
appeal therefrom in federal court. Thus, in addition to the thirty-
two years of notice since the imposition of his death sentences,
Jones has been on notice for nearly twelve years that he is
“warrant-eligible,” meaning “the [G]overnor could sign a warrant for
his execution,” Silvia v. State, 228 So. 3d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 2013).
This claim lacks merit, and its summary denial was proper.
B. Public Records Claims
Jones also challenges the circuit court’s denial of several post-
warrant demands for public records, which, he claims, violated his
rights to due process and equal protection under the Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
the corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution. Relevant
to this appeal are his demands made under Florida Rule of Criminal
- 13 - Procedure 3.852(i) 6 for records of reports, memos, notes, or
communications relating to the investigation of the Okeechobee
School or prosecution of any cases originating from acts that
occurred at the Okeechobee School. Jones made the demands to
the Okeechobee County Sheriff’s Office (OCSO), the Office of the
Attorney General (OAG), the Office of the State Attorney for the
Nineteenth Judicial Circuit (SAO19), and the Department of
Children and Families (DCF).7 The demands to OCSO were denied
6. Rule 3.852(i)(1) provides that collateral counsel may obtain public records “in addition to those provided under subdivisions (e), (f), (g), and (h) of this rule” if counsel files an affidavit in the trial court which:
(A) attests that collateral counsel has made a timely and diligent search of the records repository; and
(B) identifies with specificity those public records not at the records repository; and
(C) establishes that the additional public records are either relevant to the subject matter of the postconviction proceeding or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and
(D) shall be served in accord with subdivision (c)(1) of this rule.
7. Although Jones mentions other agencies and rule 3.852(h)(3) in his initial brief, he specifically states: “Jones focuses his appeal on the lower court’s wrongful denial of his demands pursuant to Rule 3.852(i) concerning records relating to the Okeechobee School for Boys, made to four agencies: [OCSO, OAG,
- 14 - as improper under rule 3.852(h), untimely, lacking a showing of
good cause as to why they were not requested before the warrant
was signed, and not related to a colorable claim for postconviction
relief under rule 3.852(i). The demands to OAG were denied as
untimely, lacking a showing of good cause as to why they were not
requested before the warrant was signed, and not related to a
colorable claim for postconviction relief; those relating to victims
and compensation were determined to be exempt from disclosure.
The demands to SAO19 and DCF were denied as moot based on
responses from the agencies that they did not possess any of the
records demanded. We review the denial of demands for public
records for abuse of discretion, Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d
176, 200 (Fla. 2013), and find none.
Jones’s first subargument, titled “The Lower Court Erred In
Determining Rule 3.852([i]) Was The Improper Vehicle,” appears to
relate to his demands for records from OCSO titled “Defendant’s
Demand for Additional Public Records Pursuant to Florida Rule of
SAO19, and DCF].” Initial Brief of Appellant at 51-52 (footnote omitted). We reject any argument that the denial of access to Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) records constituted a violation of due process.
- 15 - Criminal Procedure 3.852(i)” and “Defendant’s Renewed Demand for
Additional Public Records Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.852(i).”
The circuit court denied the initial demand to OCSO, in part,
because while rule “3.852(h)(3)[8] clearly contemplates that requests
of this nature are for ‘updated’ records from a person or agency to
which a previous public records request was made,” “no such
request was ever previously made to [OCSO]. Consequently, this is
not an ‘update’ or ‘additional’ records request as allowed by the
Rule, but a completely new request, not permitted by the Rule.”
The circuit court also found that Jones’s argument that he was
entitled to these records under rule 3.852(i) was without merit and
untimely, that Jones had failed to show good cause as to why the
records request was not made until after the death warrant was
8. Rule 3.852(h)(3) provides that within ten days after the signing of a death warrant, a records request may be made to “a person or agency from which collateral counsel has previously requested public records.” The rule provides that upon such request, “[a] person or agency shall copy, index, and deliver to the [records] repository any public record: (A) that was not previously the subject of an objection; (B) that was received or produced since the previous request; or (C) that was, for any reason, not produced previously.”
- 16 - signed, that the request was not related to any colorable
postconviction claim, and that the requests were overly broad and
unduly burdensome.
The circuit court also denied the renewed demand, finding
“[t]he title of the Renewed Demand as well as the initial Demand are
confusing in that it leads one to believe that the Defendant has
requested documents from this agency in the past,” and rule
“3.852(h)(3) clearly contemplates that requests of this nature are for
‘updated’ records from a person or agency to which a previous
public records request was made.” The court again found that
under rule 3.852(i), the demands to OCSO were untimely, that
Jones had failed to show good cause as to why the records request
was not made until after the death warrant was signed, that the
request was not related to any colorable postconviction claim, and
that the requests were overly broad and unduly burdensome.
Putting aside the circuit court’s possible (and justified)
confusion over the rule provisions under which Jones demanded
public records, the court ultimately made rulings denying the
demands under both subdivisions (h) and (i). We find no abuse of
discretion in the circuit court’s conclusions that Jones failed to
- 17 - show why he did not request the records from OCSO until after the
death warrant was signed, that the records requests did not relate
to a colorable claim for postconviction relief, and that the requests
were overly broad and unduly burdensome. 9
“Rule 3.852 is ‘not intended to be a procedure authorizing a
fishing expedition for records.’ ” Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782,
792 (Fla. 2019) (quoting Bowles v. State, 276 So. 3d 791, 795 (Fla.
2019)). “For this reason . . . records requests under Rule 3.852(i)
must ‘show how the requested records relate to a colorable claim for
postconviction relief and good cause as to why the public records
9. Jones’s argument here with respect to OCSO is as confusing as his demands to OCSO below seeking “additional” records under rule 3.852(i). Although the title of this subargument is, “The Lower Court Erred In Determining Rule 3.852([i]) Was The Improper Vehicle,” Initial Brief of Appellant at 62, Jones provides no citation to such a determination in the record, and he concludes this subargument by stating that “the lower court’s rulings that the requests were improper because they did not meet Rule [3.852](h)(3) are [sic] must be reversed,” Initial Brief of Appellant at 64. Based on Jones’s assertion that he “focuses his appeal on the lower court’s wrongful denial of his demands pursuant to Rule 3.852(i)”, Initial Brief of Appellant at 51, we will presume that he is arguing only that his demands to OCSO were improperly denied under rule 3.852(i). If Jones were arguing that the demands to OCSO were improperly denied under rule 3.852(h), we would find no abuse of discretion because no demands were made to OCSO before the warrant was signed.
- 18 - request was not made until after the death warrant was signed.’ ”
Id. (quoting Bowles, 276 So. 3d at 795). “[W]here a defendant
cannot demonstrate that he or she is entitled to relief on a claim or
that records are relevant or may reasonably lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence, the trial court may properly deny a records
request.” Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 700 (Fla. 2017).
Jones asserted that his demand was “filed within a reasonable
time after the fund was established and Mr. Jones was recognized
as a member of the class of individuals entitled to compensation by
the State of Florida for the abuse he suffered by the State of Florida
while confined at the Okeechobee School.” In finding the demands
untimely, the circuit court noted that the bill creating the
compensation fund was signed into law in 2024, and Jones was
notified that he has been recognized as a member of the class in a
letter dated January 6, 2025, yet Jones provided no justification for
the delay in seeking the records until September 2025, after the
warrant was signed. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that Jones failed to establish good cause for failing to
request these records prior to the signing of his death warrant.
- 19 - Nor did the circuit court abuse its discretion in concluding
that the records did not relate to a colorable claim for
postconviction relief. As we have already explained, any abuse that
occurred at the Okeechobee School in the 1970s does not provide
Jones with a basis for a colorable claim of relief. We also find no
error in the circuit court’s determination that Jones’s demands
were overly broad and unduly burdensome. For the same reasons,
we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the demands made to
OAG. And we find no abuse of discretion of the denial of the
demands made to SAO19 and DCF based on their assertions that
they are not in possession of any of the records demanded.
Jones also argues that the circuit court erred in failing to
conduct in camera inspections of records the agencies claimed were
irrelevant or statutorily exempt from disclosure and that the circuit
court erred in denying demands based on agency objections without
conducting an evidentiary hearing. Jones speculates that in
camera inspection might have uncovered Brady 10 material. But
Jones has not identified any reason to believe that Brady material
10. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
- 20 - has been withheld, nor has he identified any authority requiring an
in camera inspection or evidentiary hearing under these
circumstances. We cannot find that the circuit court abused its
discretion here.
Jones has failed to establish that the circuit court abused its
discretion in denying any of his post-warrant public records
demands. He has also failed to establish that the denial of records
violated his rights to due process and equal protection. He is not
entitled to relief on this claim.
C. Habeas Petition
Jones’s habeas petition urges this Court to reconsider its 2017
decision affirming the denial of Jones’s fourth successive motion for
postconviction relief, in which he sought a new determination of his
claim that he is ineligible for the death penalty due to intellectual
disability in light of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014). See Jones, 231 So. 3d
374. But habeas corpus is not a vehicle to relitigate issues already
decided. See Gaskin v. State, 361 So. 3d 300, 309 (Fla. 2023)
(“Habeas corpus is not to be used to litigate or relitigate issues
which could have been, should have been, or were previously
- 21 - raised.”); Knight v. State, 923 So. 2d 387, 395 (Fla. 2005) (“[C]laims
[that] were raised in [a] postconviction motion . . . cannot be
relitigated in a habeas petition.”). Because Jones’s habeas petition
seeks only to relitigate an issue that was previously decided, we
deny the petition.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court’s
orders summarily denying Jones’s sixth successive motion for
postconviction relief and denying his post-warrant demands for
public records. We deny Jones’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and deny his motion for a stay of execution, his renewed
motion for a stay of execution, and his second renewed motion for a
stay and to relinquish jurisdiction.
No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court. The
mandate shall issue immediately.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., dissents. CANADY, J., recused.
- 22 - An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Lody Jean, Judge – Case No. 131990CF0501430001XX And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer, Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Brittney N. Lacy, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Jeanine L. Cohen, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Leslie T. Campbell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, Lisa-Marie Lerner, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, and Jennifer A. Davis, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent
Melanie C. Kalmanson of Quarles & Brady LLP, Tampa, Florida,
for Amici Curiae Troy Rafferty of Rafferty Domnick Cunningham & Yaffa, Advancing Real Change, Inc., Conservatives Concerned, Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Florida Justice Institute, Florida Public Defenders Association, and Witness to Innocence
- 23 -