Victor Sims v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 2017-M-01379
• Status: Published

Opinion

Electronic Document Aug 21 2025 16:37:57 2017-M-01379 Pages: 5

Serial: 258333 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

No. 2017-M-01379

VICTOR SIMS Petitioner

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI Respondent

EN BANC ORDER

Before the Court, en banc, is the Application for Leave to Proceed in Trial Court filed by Victor Sims. The Court of Appeals affirmed Sims’s convictions of four counts of armed robbery. Sims v. State, 213 So. 3d 90 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). This is Sims’s third application for leave to file a motion for post-conviction relief. It is time-barred and barred as a successive writ. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-5(2); -27(9) (Rev. 2020). The Court finds that the application should be denied. The Court finds that the instant filing is frivolous. Sims hereby is warned that future filings deemed frivolous may result not only in monetary sanctions but also in restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction collateral relief (or pleadings in that nature) in forma pauperis. Order, Dunn v. State, No. 2016-M-01514 (Miss. Nov. 15, 2018). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application for Leave to Proceed in Trial Court filed by Victor Sims is denied. SO ORDERED.

TO DENY WITH SANCTIONS WARNING: RANDOLPH, C.J., COLEMAN, P.J., MAXWELL, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN AND BRANNING, JJ.

TO DENY: KING, P.J.

KING, P.J. OBJECTS TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT.

2 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

Victor Sims

State of Mississippi

KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT:

¶1. Although I agree that Victor Sims’s application for leave to proceed in trial court

lacks merit, I disagree with the Court’s finding that the application is frivolous and with its

warning that future filings deemed frivolous may result in monetary sanctions or restrictions

on filing applications for post-conviction collateral relief in forma pauperis.1

¶2. This Court previously has defined a frivolous motion to mean one filed in which the

movant has “no hope of success.” Roland v. State, 666 So. 2d 747, 751 (Miss. 1995).

However, “though a case may be weak or ‘light-headed,’ that is not sufficient to label it

frivolous.” Calhoun v. State, 849 So. 2d 892, 897 (Miss. 2003). In his application for post-

conviction relief, Sims made reasonable arguments. As such, I disagree with the Court’s

determination that Sims’s application is frivolous.

¶3. Additionally, I disagree with this Court’s warning that future filings may result in

monetary sanctions or restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction collateral relief

in forma pauperis. The imposition of monetary sanctions on a criminal defendant proceeding

1 See Order, Dunn v. State, No. 2016-M-01514 (Miss. Nov. 15, 2018). in forma pauperis only serves to punish or preclude that defendant from his lawful right to

appeal. Black’s Law Dictionary defines sanction as “[a] provision that gives force to a legal

imperative by either rewarding obedience or punishing disobedience.” Sanction, Black’s Law

Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). Instead of punishing the defendant for filing

a motion, I believe that this Court should simply deny or dismiss motions that lack merit. As

Justice Brennan wisely stated,

The Court’s order purports to be motivated by this litigant’s disproportionate consumption of the Court’s time and resources. Yet if his filings are truly as repetitious as it appears, it hardly takes much time to identify them as such. I find it difficult to see how the amount of time and resources required to deal properly with McDonald’s petitions could be so great as to justify the step we now take. Indeed, the time that has been consumed in the preparation of the present order barring the door to Mr. McDonald far exceeds that which would have been necessary to process his petitions for the next several years at least. I continue to find puzzling the Court’s fervor in ensuring that rights granted to the poor are not abused, even when so doing actually increases the drain on our limited resources.

In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186–87, 109 S. Ct. 993, 997, 103 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1989)

(Brennan, J., dissenting).2

¶4. The same logic applies to the restriction on filing subsequent applications for post-

conviction relief. To cut off an indigent defendant’s right to proceed in forma pauperis is to

cut off his access to the courts. This, in itself, violates a defendant’s constitutional rights, for

2 See also In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 19, 111 S. Ct. 1569, 1571, 114 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In closing its doors today to another indigent litigant, the Court moves ever closer to the day when it leaves an indigent litigant with a meritorious claim out in the cold. And with each barrier that it places in the way of indigent litigants, and with each instance in which it castigates such litigants for having ‘abused the system,’ . . . the Court can only reinforce in the hearts and minds of our society’s less fortunate members the unsettling message that their pleas are not welcome here.”).

2 Among the rights recognized by the Court as being fundamental are the rights to be free from invidious racial discrimination, to marry, to practice their religion, to communicate with free persons, to have due process in disciplinary proceedings, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. As a result of the recognition of these and other rights, the right of access to courts, which is necessary to vindicate all constitutional rights, also became a fundamental right.

Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You’re Out of

Court-It May Be Effective, but Is It Constitutional?, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 471, 474–75 (1997).

This Court must not discourage convicted defendants from exercising their right to appeal.

Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1986). Novel arguments that might remove

a criminal defendant from confinement should not be discouraged by the threat of monetary

sanctions and restrictions on filings. Id.

¶5. Therefore, although I find no merit in Sims’s application for leave to proceed in the

trial court, I disagree with this Court’s contention that the application merits the classification

of frivolous and with its warning of future sanctions and restrictions.