Victor Meza-Noyola v. Jefferson Sessions

687 F. App'x 612

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 19, 2017
• Docket: 13-74362
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Victor Manuel Meza-Noyola, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Meza-Noyola’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than six years after his final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Meza-Noyola failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline and has not established that any statutory or regulatory exception to the filing deadline applies. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (setting forth exceptions to the filing limitations for motions to reopen); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Meza-Noyola’s contentions that the BIA failed to consider facts or evidence, apply relevant precedent, or sufficiently explain its analysis are not supported by the record. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010).

We are not persuaded by Meza-Noyola’s contentions that the BIA was required to consider the immigration judge’s prior credibility determination or the government’s decision not to oppose his motion to reopen. Cf. 8 C.F.R, § 1003.2(e)(3)(iii) (providing for an exception to the filing deadline where the motion to reopen is “[ajgreed upon by all parties and jointly filed”); Konstantinova v. INS, 195 F.3d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1999).

To the extent Meza-Noyola challenges his bond determination, we do not consider this contention. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (immigration judge’s consideration of an alien’s application or request regarding custody or bond “shall be separate and apart from ... any deportation or removal hearing or proceeding”).

In light of our disposition, we do not reach Meza-Noyola’s remaining contentions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel or hardship.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.