Victor Machinery Exchange, Inc. v. United States

67 Cust. Ct. 231, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2265
United States Customs Court·Decided October 7, 1971·No. C.D. 4279·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Maletz, Judge:

The issue in this case concerns the proper rate of duty on certain “dial bore gauges” that were imported from Japan through the port of New York in 1966. The articles were classified upon liquidation under the provision in item 710.65 of the tariff schedules for calipers and micrometers and assessed duty at. the rate of 20 percent.

Plaintiff claims that the articles are not within the common meaning of the term “calipers” or “micrometers” as used in item 710:65 of the tariff schedules. Accordingly they are claimed to be properly dutiable [232] at the rate of 15 percent under item 710.80 which covers non-optical measuring or checking instruments, apparatus, and machines not specially provided for (including gauges). And on this aspect, the parties have agreed that should the court find item 710.65 inapplicable to the present importations, they are properly dutiable under the claimed item 710.80. Against this 'background, the basic question is whether or not the importations fall within the common meaning of the term “calipers” as used in item 710.65.

The relevant statutory provisions read as follows:

Schedule 7, Part 2, Subpart C:
Drafting machines * * * micrometers, calipers, gauges, balancing machines, and non-optical measuring or checking instruments, apparatus, and machines not specially provided for * * *
$ $ ‡ ‡ ‡
710.65 Calipers and micrometers, and parts thereof _ 20% ad val.
710.80 Other _ 15% ad val.

The imported dial bore gauge is used for comparing the diameter of the hole or bore of a cylinder in production with the diameter of a master cylinder in order to determine how much off norm the hole in the work piece is from the known standard. Essentially the import consists of (i) a dial gauge which has a clock-like face and several sweep hands; (ii) a spindle which resembles in appearance a small tack hammer; and (iii) various size pin and ring attachments.

In operation, the dial gauge is fastened into the spindle which has a fixed point and three movable points of contact. In turn, the end of the spindle containing the points of contact is placed in the master cylinder which has a diameter of known accuracy. At the point where the contacts in the Spindle meet the inside surface of the master cylinder, the indicator in the dial gauge is set at zero. The import is then ready for use — which consists of its being placed in the hole or bore of the cylinder desired to be tested to determine the extent (if any) that the hole varies in diameter from the diameter of the master cylinder. This procedure does not produce an absolute measurement of diameter but measures the difference in diameter between the master cylinder and the diameter of the hole being tested.1

As we have seen, the sole question before us is whether or not the importations are within the common meaning of the term “calipers.” [233] Arguing in the negative, plaintiff contends that to constitute a “caliper” within its common meaning, an article must possess two legs or jaws fastened together, with the distance between the points representing a measurement taken. Continuing, plaintiff states that the present importation does not fall within this common meaning since it does not have legs or jaws and does not produce a measurement but rather indicates on a dial the difference between the diameter of the master cylinder and the bore being tested. Defendant argues to the contrary that it is not necessary that a measuring instrument have conventional legs nr jaws to be considered a caliper. In addition, it urges that the court should give great weight to the testimony of its expert witnesses that the importation is a “caliper.”

Turning now to the law, it is basic that tariff laws are written in the language of commerce, and that the commercial meaning of a tariff term is presumed to be the same as the common meaning in the absence of a contrary commercial designation. Common meaning, it is equally clear, is a matter of law to be determined by the court for which purpose the court may consult dictionaries, receive evidence and rely upon its own knowledge of matters within its own understanding. E.g., United States v. O. Brager-Larsen, 36 CCPA 1, C.A.D. 388 (1948). And while testimony as to the common meaning of a term is not binding on the court, it frequently may be of great aid. E.g., United States v. J. J. Gavin & Co., 23 CCPA 288, T.D. 48164 (1936).

With these considerations in mind, we now examine the record which consists of the testimony of one witness for the plaintiff and two for the defendant. Plaintiff’s witness — Bert Freidus, the president of the plaintiff company — testified that his company was in the business of buying and selling precision tools and cutting tools. Pie described the operation of the importation and testified that it was used by manufacturers to determine the difference in inside diameter between a bore being produced and the bore of a master cylinder. The witness emphasized that the importation does not produce a measurement but merely reflects the difference from a known measurement. Pie testified that all calipers give measurements; that there are none which give comparisons only; and that the importation does not measure but rather performs the function of gauging. He said that he had always thought of the import as a gauge but did not know why. Gauging, he stated, meant the checking of material to obtain an absolute measurement or a comparison.

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Victor Machinery Exchange, Inc. v. United States, 67 Cust. Ct. 231, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2265 (cusc 1971).

67 Cust. Ct. 231 (Victor Machinery Exchange, Inc. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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