Victor Diaz, an individual; and Jesus Rojas, an individual v. The City of Los Angeles; Alfredo Castillo, an individual; Juan Diaz, an individual; and Does 1-60

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJanuary 23, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-10233
StatusUnknown

This text of Victor Diaz, an individual; and Jesus Rojas, an individual v. The City of Los Angeles; Alfredo Castillo, an individual; Juan Diaz, an individual; and Does 1-60 (Victor Diaz, an individual; and Jesus Rojas, an individual v. The City of Los Angeles; Alfredo Castillo, an individual; Juan Diaz, an individual; and Does 1-60) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Victor Diaz, an individual; and Jesus Rojas, an individual v. The City of Los Angeles; Alfredo Castillo, an individual; Juan Diaz, an individual; and Does 1-60, (C.D. Cal. 2026).

Opinion

5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

8 VICTOR DIAZ, an individual; and JESUS Case No. 25-cv-10233-FLA (PVCx) 9 ROJAS, an individual, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER 10 Plaintiffs,

11 v. 12 THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES; ALFREDO 13 CASTILLO, an individual; JUAN DIAZ, an 14 individual; and DOES 1-60,

15 Defendants.

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 2 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private 3 information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other 4 than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and 5 petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this 6 Stipulated Protective Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to 7 discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited 8 information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. 9 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 10 This action involves the City of Los Angeles and members of the Los Angeles Police 11 Department. Plaintiffs are seeking materials and information that Defendant the City of Los Angeles 12 (“City”) contends are confidential, such as personnel files of the police officers involved in this 13 incident, Internal Affairs materials and information, video recordings, audio recordings, photographs, 14 Force Investigation Division materials and information and other administrative materials and 15 information currently in the possession of the City and which the City believes need special protection 16 from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation. Further 17 materials in possession of the City as sought by Plaintiffs may include sensitive law enforcement 18 reports and criminal records pertaining to individuals who are not parties to this action. Plaintiffs are 19 also seeking official information contained in the personnel files of the police officers involved in the 20 subject incident, which the City contends are strictly confidential and which the City believes need 21 special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this 22 litigation. 23 The City asserts that the confidentiality of the materials and information sought by Plaintiffs 24 are recognized by California and federal law, as evidenced inter alia by California Penal Code sections 25 832.5, 832.7, 832.8, 11105, Evidence Code section 1040, and Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for N.D. 26 Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 426 U.S. 394 (1976). The City contends that it has not 27 publicly released the materials and information referenced above except under protective order or 28 pursuant to a court order, if at all. These materials and information are of the type that has been used to 1 initiate disciplinary action against Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) officers, and has been 2 used as evidence in disciplinary proceedings, where the officers’ conduct was considered to be 3 contrary to LAPD policy. 4 The City contends that absent a protective order delineating the responsibilities of 5 nondisclosure on the part of the parties hereto, there is a specific risk of unnecessary and undue 6 disclosure by one or more of the many attorneys, secretaries, law clerks, paralegals and expert 7 witnesses involved in this case, as well as the corollary risk of embarrassment, harassment and 8 professional and legal harm on the part of the LAPD officers referenced in the materials and 9 information. 10 The City also contends that the unfettered disclosure of the materials and information, absent a 11 protective order, would allow the media to share this information with potential jurors in the area, 12 impacting the rights of the City herein to receive a fair trial. 13 Plaintiffs do not concur in the foregoing representations or the applicability of the foregoing 14 authorities but agree that a protective order is necessary to facilitate discovery in this case. 15 Defendants may seek information such as Plaintiffs’ medical records that Plaintiffs believe are 16 highly sensitive, confidential, and are legally protected from disclosure. See Wooden v. 17 Comprehensive Health Mgmt., No. 20-00053 LEK-WRP, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101889, at *3 (D. 18 Haw. May 28, 2021) (“[M]edical records are confidential, as recognized under the Health Insurance 19 Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.”); Pratt v. Gamboa, No. 17-CV-04375-LHK, 2020 U.S. 20 Dist. LEXIS 90913, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (same). Plaintiffs contend that the undue 21 disclosure of such information creates a specific risk of embarrassment, emotional harm, reputational 22 harm, and professional harm. 23 Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes 24 over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to 25 keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in 26 preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and 27 serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the 28 intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that 1 nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non- 2 public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. 3 The Parties agree that there is Good Cause for a Protective Order so as to preserve the 4 respective interests of the parties while streamlining the process of resolving any disagreements. 5 The parties therefore stipulate that there is Good Cause for, and hereby jointly request that the 6 honorable Court issue a Protective Order regarding confidential documents consistent with the terms 7 and provisions of this Stipulation. However, the entry of a Protective Order by the Court pursuant to 8 this Stipulation shall not be construed as any ruling by the Court on the aforementioned legal 9 statements or privilege claims in this section, no shall this section be construed as part of any such 10 Court Order. 11 C. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING UNDER SEAL 12 The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated 13 Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Civil Rule 79- 14 5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party 15 seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. 16 There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and 17 records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause must be shown to 18 support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th 19 Cir. 2006), Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. 20 Sony Electrics, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated protective orders require 21 good cause showing), and a specific showing of good cause or compelling reasons with proper 22 evidentiary support and legal justification, must be made with respect to Protected Material that a 23 party seeks to file under seal.

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Related

Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu
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187 F.R.D. 576 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1999)

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Victor Diaz, an individual; and Jesus Rojas, an individual v. The City of Los Angeles; Alfredo Castillo, an individual; Juan Diaz, an individual; and Does 1-60, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/victor-diaz-an-individual-and-jesus-rojas-an-individual-v-the-city-of-cacd-2026.