Victor Diaz, an individual; and Jesus Rojas, an individual v. The City of Los Angeles; Alfredo Castillo, an individual; Juan Diaz, an individual; and Does 1-60

District Court, C.D. California·Decided January 23, 2026·No. 2:25-cv-10233·Unknown

Opinion

VICTOR DIAZ, an individual; and JESUS Case No. 25-cv-10233-FLA (PVCx) ROJAS, an individual, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER Plaintiffs,

v. THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES; ALFREDO CASTILLO, an individual; JUAN DIAZ, an individual; and DOES 1-60,

Defendants.

1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Stipulated Protective Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. This action involves the City of Los Angeles and members of the Los Angeles Police Department. Plaintiffs are seeking materials and information that Defendant the City of Los Angeles (“City”) contends are confidential, such as personnel files of the police officers involved in this incident, Internal Affairs materials and information, video recordings, audio recordings, photographs, Force Investigation Division materials and information and other administrative materials and information currently in the possession of the City and which the City believes need special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation. Further materials in possession of the City as sought by Plaintiffs may include sensitive law enforcement reports and criminal records pertaining to individuals who are not parties to this action. Plaintiffs are also seeking official information contained in the personnel files of the police officers involved in the subject incident, which the City contends are strictly confidential and which the City believes need special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation. The City asserts that the confidentiality of the materials and information sought by Plaintiffs are recognized by California and federal law, as evidenced inter alia by California Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, 832.8, 11105, Evidence Code section 1040, and Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for N.D. Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 426 U.S. 394 (1976). The City contends that it has not publicly released the materials and information referenced above except under protective order or pursuant to a court order, if at all. These materials and information are of the type that has been used to initiate disciplinary action against Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) officers, and has been used as evidence in disciplinary proceedings, where the officers’ conduct was considered to be contrary to LAPD policy. The City contends that absent a protective order delineating the responsibilities of nondisclosure on the part of the parties hereto, there is a specific risk of unnecessary and undue disclosure by one or more of the many attorneys, secretaries, law clerks, paralegals and expert witnesses involved in this case, as well as the corollary risk of embarrassment, harassment and professional and legal harm on the part of the LAPD officers referenced in the materials and information. The City also contends that the unfettered disclosure of the materials and information, absent a protective order, would allow the media to share this information with potential jurors in the area, impacting the rights of the City herein to receive a fair trial. Plaintiffs do not concur in the foregoing representations or the applicability of the foregoing authorities but agree that a protective order is necessary to facilitate discovery in this case. Defendants may seek information such as Plaintiffs’ medical records that Plaintiffs believe are highly sensitive, confidential, and are legally protected from disclosure. See Wooden v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt., No. 20-00053 LEK-WRP, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101889, at *3 (D. Haw. May 28, 2021) (“[M]edical records are confidential, as recognized under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.”); Pratt v. Gamboa, No. 17-CV-04375-LHK, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90913, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (same). Plaintiffs contend that the undue disclosure of such information creates a specific risk of embarrassment, emotional harm, reputational harm, and professional harm. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non- public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. The Parties agree that there is Good Cause for a Protective Order so as to preserve the respective interests of the parties while streamlining the process of resolving any disagreements. The parties therefore stipulate that there is Good Cause for, and hereby jointly request that the honorable Court issue a Protective Order regarding confidential documents consistent with the terms and provisions of this Stipulation. However, the entry of a Protective Order by the Court pursuant to this Stipulation shall not be construed as any ruling by the Court on the aforementioned legal statements or privilege claims in this section, no shall this section be construed as part of any such Court Order. C. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING UNDER SEAL The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Civil Rule 79- 5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. Sony Electrics, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated protective orders require good cause showing), and a specific showing of good cause or compelling reasons with proper evidentiary support and legal justification, must be made with respect to Protected Material that a party seeks to file under seal. The parties’ mere designation of Disclosure or Discovery Material as CONFIDENTIAL does not—without the submission of competent evidence by declaration, establishing that the material sought to be filed under seal qualifies as confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable—constitute good cause. Further, if a party requests sealing related to a dispositive motion or trial, then compelling reasons, not only good cause, for the sealing must be shown, an

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Victor Diaz, an individual; and Jesus Rojas, an individual v. The City of Los Angeles; Alfredo Castillo, an individual; Juan Diaz, an individual; and Does 1-60, (C.D. Cal. 2026).

Victor Diaz, an individual; and Jesus Rojas, an individual v. The City of Los Angeles; Alfredo Castillo, an individual; Juan Diaz, an individual; and Does 1-60 (Victor Diaz, an individual; and Jesus Rojas, an individual v. The City of Los Angeles; Alfredo Castillo, an individual; Juan Diaz, an individual; and Does 1-60) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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