Victor Daniels v. Arizona Department of Veterans Services, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 15, 2026
• Docket: 2:23-cv-02359
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Victor Daniels, No. CV-23-02359-PHX-ROS

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Arizona Department of Veterans Services, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court are Defendant’s1 Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 43), and 16 Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 41). For the reasons below, 17 Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied, and Defendant’s Motion will be granted in part and 18 denied in part. 19 I. Background2 20 Plaintiff began working for the Arizona Department of Veterans Services 21 (“ADVS”) in January 2013 and was promoted to Facilities Project Manager in September 22 2013. (Doc. 42-2 at 2). About two years later, Luis Marquez was designated the Assistant 23 Deputy Director of ADVS and became Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. (Doc 42 ¶ 4). Though 24 the exact timing and content are disputed, Marquez engaged in abusive behavior toward 25 Plaintiff and other employees. (Docs. 42 ¶ 6-10; 44 at 29-32). Plaintiff alleges Marquez’ 26 1 Plaintiff originally brought these claims against Arizona Department of Veterans’ 27 Services and the State of Arizona. AZDVS has since been dismissed from the action; thus, the State of Arizona is the only remaining defendant. 28 2 Unless otherwise noted, all facts set forth below are undisputed or not subject to reasonable dispute based on proffered admissible evidence. 1 conduct included sexually and racially harassing comments to and about Plaintiff, 2 including repeatedly telling Plaintiff he had a “tight ass,” stating that Plaintiff’s work with 3 other employees must be going well because they “like big black dick,” and commenting 4 in front of others that Plaintiff and another employee had been “getting it on.” (Docs. 42-1 5 at 2; 42-2 at 12). Marquez allegedly also once referred to a Jonas Brothers’ song while 6 talking to Plaintiff, stating that it sounded like the lyrics said, “I want you to suck me.” 7 Marquez also threatened, swore, and yelled at Plaintiff and other employees. Plaintiff 8 alleges these instances continued at least through 2021 and worsened when Plaintiff 9 “pushed back” against Marquez’ mistreatment. (Doc. 42-1 at 3). 10 Plaintiff’s performance evaluations from 2019 state that he “meets expectations” in 11 the areas of customer service and teamwork and cooperation, and that he “could show more 12 patience and respect towards others,” and that he “needs to understand” leadership needs 13 and others’ differences in priorities. (Doc. 42-2 at 8). In November 2021, HR officials 14 began an inquiry3 into complaints they had received regarding Plaintiff’s behavior and 15 recorded other employees’ statements describing Plaintiff as “unprofessional and brusque,” 16 “abrupt, aggressive and domineering” and “insubordinate and disrespectful,” and stating 17 that he “regularly bad-mouthed other employees, and especially talked poorly about 18 Executive Leadership; claiming that they didn’t know what they were doing.” (Doc. 51-4 19 at 4). 20 Plaintiff’s evaluation from 2021, conducted by Luis Marquez and delivered to 21 Plaintiff in January 2022, stated that Plaintiff “does not treat [other staff he is assisting] 22 with courtesy and respect,” is “easily upset, does not listen, and jumps to conclusions,” and 23 his “behavior toward [other staff] is unacceptable and he needs to completely change his 24 attitude,” which “causes conflicts that prevent an effective collaboration.” (Doc. 42-2 at 9). 25 Plaintiff alleges Marquez refused to give Plaintiff a bonus or raise in March 2022, but 26 Defendant states Plaintiff was not offered a raise due to his behavioral issues noted in the 27 3 The results of this inquiry were provided to Mr. Marquez to be addressed in Plaintiff’s 28 next performance evaluation, but Marquez was not involved in the investigation. (Doc. 42- 2 at 22). 1 performance evaluation, and he refused the offered merit incentive because he objected to 2 the amount. (Doc. 51-4 at 4). 3 Plaintiff filed an internal complaint with HR about Marquez in May 2022. (Doc. 42- 4 2 at 12). On review, Defendant’s Office of Equal Opportunity concluded that the specific 5 sexual comments Plaintiff referenced occurred in 2020, allegedly beyond the statute of 6 limitations for reporting discrimination based on sex, and declined to investigate them 7 further, (Doc. 44 at 29), but did investigate “unprofessional behavior, including yelling and 8 the use of profanities.” (Id.) Several other employees were interviewed and stated they had 9 been subjected to Marquez’ bad behavior and received no support from HR or ADVS 10 Director Colonel Wanda Wright. Ms. Elena Adame said that she had been yelled and sworn 11 at by Marquez in the presence of Director Colonel Wanda Wright and CFO Amy Besco, 12 and that Besco laughed and Wright said nothing; Ms. Leanna DeKing said there appeared 13 to be “a group of individuals known as the mean girls, and it included an HR person”; Ms. 14 Nicole Sullivan alleged Wright and Assistant Director John Scott “were both aware of Mr. 15 Marquez’ behavior but chose not to get involved,”; Ms. Wendy Bevilacqua recalled 16 witnessing Marquez make “derogatory—almost condescending—statements to people”; 17 Mr. Bryan Durham described “an uncomfortable exit interview with the Director” in which 18 he felt she was “condescending and rude”; Ms. Tera Shere recounted Marquez’ promotion 19 to Assistant Deputy Director despite previous complaints, and that when she spoke to 20 Wright about concerns regarding Marquez’ behavior, Wright “told her, in essence, that she 21 was weak” and “told her she was the problem because she was unable to accept other 22 people’s behaviors”; Marquez himself stated profanity “is part of the culture”; and Chief 23 Human Resources Officer Danielle Salomon recalled complaints regarding Marquez and 24 his team and that she had personally found that Marquez, Daniels, Besco, and Accounting 25 Manager Elizabeth Rominger “can come across very strong.” (Doc. 42-2 at 17-22). 26 The allegations of unprofessional behavior by Marquez were substantiated, and 27 ultimately, he was given the option to either resign or be terminated. He resigned effective 28 July 11, 2022. 1 Shortly after Plaintiff filed his complaint with HR in May 2022 regarding Marquez, 2 a white employee, Derek Large, began recording phone calls with Plaintiff. Large recorded 3 calls on May 18, 2022, June 3, 2022, and June 9, 2022. (Doc 42-2 at 6). One of the calls 4 recorded Plaintiff saying, in regards to Director Wanda Wright and Deputy Director John 5 Scott, 6 “…and its all lack of leadership, because she was not qualified for that job, and they, and it was like a fucking affirmative 7 action bullshit. They wanted, you know, oh they got pressure from some of the black vets to hire her, and I like, ‘fine, you 8 want to hire a black person, make sure they’re fucking qualified!’ I said ‘that’s why people don’t like affirmative 9 action, because you just grab the first minority you see on the street corner with a whiskey bottle in their hand and you give 10 them a fucking job . . . . You know, and then John Scott, same way. He has no, uh, business in his position. He doesn’t know 11 what he’s doing either.” 12 (Doc. 44 at 50). Large gave these recordings to his supervisor Kim Trotta on June 13, 2022, 13 the month after Plaintiff had filed his complaint against Marquez and while the 14 investigation into Marquez was still underway. Based on the recordings, Defendant began 15 another inquiry into Plaintiff’s behavior. (Doc. 44 ¶18-19). At the conclusion of the 16 investigation, Plaintiff was given the option to resign or be terminated. When he refused to 17 resign, Plaintiff was terminated effective July 11, 2022, the same day as Marquez. 18 Plaintiff’s termination paperwork stated: “employee has engaged in insubordinate 19 behavior and made unprofessional, profane, racially charged, and derogatory statements to 20 a co-worker while on duty” and, 21 “Mr. Daniel’s supervisory chain has been working with him 22 since 2019 to address concerns related to impatience, disrespect, and lack of courtesy that has led to confrontational 23 interactions with customers and coworkers. Executive leadership does not believe further corrective action will be 24 effective in light of Mr. Daniels’ failure to respond to the coaching and correction he has previously received, coupled 25 with his articulated disdain and lack of respect for his chain of command that would administer corrective action.” 26 27 (Doc 44 at 67). Mr. Large then was offered and he accepted Plaintiff’s position. 28 Plaintiff alleges Mr. Large acted at Defendant’s behest in an attempt to find a pretext 1 to terminate Plaintiff. Defendant and Mr. Large claim Large acted alone and of his own 2 volition “for the purpose of providing proof to ADVS of Danels’ inappropriate behavior 3 and comments toward coworkers” and out of “concern[] that Daniels would say one thing 4 in private conversations with [Large] and then another contradictory thing in the workplace 5 to put [Large] in a negative light.” (Doc. 53 ¶ 18). 6 Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC in January 2023, alleging 7 discrimination on the basis of race and sex and retaliation. In the Charge, Plaintiff (1) 8 described two of Marquez’ alleged comments from 2021, (2) alleged Marquez had refused 9 to give him a bonus or raise in March 2022, (3) described his complaint, Marquez’ 10 resignation, and Plaintiff’s termination, and (4) stated he believed his termination was in 11 retaliation for filing the complaint with HR. 12 Plaintiff then brought this action for discrimination on the basis of sex, race, and 13 age, and for retaliation. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims. 14 Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability for all claims. 15 II. Legal Standard 16 A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, 17 viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine 18 issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 19 of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 20 The moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and 21 identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrates the absence of a 22 genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party must then 23 point to specific facts establishing there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. 24 At summary judgment, the Court considers only admissible evidence. See Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court should not 26 weigh the evidence or assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be 27 believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty 28 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the 1 [admissible] evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non- 2 moving party.” Id. at 248. In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Court will 3 construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barlow v. 4 Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991). 5 III. Discussion 6 a. Administrative Exhaustion 7 Noting that “[e]xhausting administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with 8 the EEOC or the appropriate state agency is a statutory pre-requisite for an employee to 9 pursue litigation under Title VII,” (Doc. 43 at 2), Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims for 10 sex, race, and age discrimination were not timely exhausted administratively. The Court 11 addresses each claim in turn. 12 Plaintiff brings claims for discrimination on the base of sex and race under Title VII 13 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and a claim for age discrimination under the Arizona Civil 14 Rights Act (“ACRA”). A Title VII plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 15 days of the alleged discriminatory act, and the failure to do so “will usually operate to bar 16 that person from bringing a lawsuit.” Arizona ex rel. Horne v. Geo Group, Inc., 816 F.3d 17 1189, 1202 (9th Cir. 2016). The ACRA “requires an employee to file a charge with the 18 Arizona Civil Rights Division within 180 days of an alleged violation.” Peterson v. City of 19 Surprise, 418 P.3d 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018). For discrete discriminatory acts, such as 20 termination, each act “starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Morgan, 536 21 U.S. at 113. Prior acts outside the statutory period may be used “as background evidence 22 in support of a timely claim.” Id. In the context of a hostile work environment claim, 23 conduct occurring outside the statutory time period may be considered “so long as an act 24 contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time period.” 25 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 104 (2002). 26 Plaintiff filed his Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) with the EEOC and the Civil 27 Rights Division of the Arizona Attorney General’s Office on January 5, 2023, so only 28 discrete acts that occurred within the 300 days before January 5, 2023, are actionable. See 1 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. Plaintiff checked the boxes for discrimination based on race, sex, 2 and retaliation, but not age. The Charge alleged Marquez had commented in 2021 that 3 Plaintiff had a “tight ass,” and Marquez also said Plaintiff had a “big black dick,” Marquez 4 refused to give Plaintiff a bonus or raise in March 2022, Plaintiff filed an internal complaint 5 with HR in May 2022, and Defendant terminated Plaintiff in retaliation for this complaint 6 on July 11, 2022. (Doc 44 at 19). In the “DATE DISCRIMINATION TOOK PLACE” 7 field, Plaintiff wrote that the latest act of discrimination took place on June 11, 2022, 8 apparently referring to his termination. Id. 9 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s sex and race discrimination claims were untimely 10 because Marquez’ alleged comments took place in 2021, more than 300 days before the 11 January 5, 2023 Charge. However, the dates of Marquez’ comments then are not 12 dispositive. Plaintiff clearly identified his July 11, 2022 termination as Defendant’s 13 discriminatory action. This was only 178 days before the Charge, well within the statutory 14 period. Thus, a January 5, 2023 charge of discrimination based on the termination is timely. 15 Marquez’ comments may not be actionable as discrete acts but may be considered “as 16 background evidence in support of [Plaintiff’s] timely claim” of discriminatory termination 17 or may be considered timely if constituting part of a claim for a hostile work environment. 18 i. Discrimination on the Basis of Age 19 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim for age discrimination is also barred because it 20 was not included in Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination. Like Title VII’s administrative 21 exhaustion requirement4, the ACRA requires an employee to file a charge of discrimination 22 with the Arizona Civil Rights Division. Peterson v. City of Surprise, 418 P.3d 1020, 1024 23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) (stating a Plaintiff who fails to timely file a charge with the ACRA 24 loses the right to sue); see also Lopez v. Produce Exchange, 171 F. App’x. 11, 12 (9th Cir. 25 2006) (stating a Title VII Plaintiff must have exhausted his administrative remedies and 26 “title VII and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA) are generally identical.”) However, 27 4 See Lopez v. Produce Exchange, 171 F. App’x. 11, 12 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating a Title VII 28 Plaintiff must have exhausted his administrative remedies and “title VII and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA) are generally identical.”) 1 the court may consider “any charges of discrimination that are like or reasonably related to 2 the allegations made before the EEOC, as well as charges that are within the scope of an 3 EEOC investigation that reasonably could be expected to grow out of the allegations.” 4 Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122; see also Green v. Los Angeles Cnty. Superintendent 5 of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Incidents of discrimination not included 6 in an EEOC charge may not be considered by a federal court unless the new claims are like 7 or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.”) To determine 8 whether a claim is like or reasonably related to an EEOC charge, courts consider “such 9 factors as the alleged basis of the discrimination, dates of discriminatory acts specified 10 within the charge, perpetrators of discrimination named in the charge, and any locations at 11 which discrimination is alleged to have occurred.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 12 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 2, 2004). 13 Here, Plaintiff’s EEOC charge notes Marquez’ sexual and racial comments and 14 Plaintiff’s July 2022 termination. Plaintiff explicitly alleged he was discriminated against 15 “because of [his] race, Black, sex, male, and for opposing a practice made unlawful,” and 16 checked the boxes for “RACE,” “SEX,” and “RETALIATION” under the “CAUSE OF 17 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON” section. While Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim 18 arises from the same general events as the claims in the Charge, there is nothing to suggest 19 Defendant was on notice of a possible age discrimination claim based on the allegations in 20 the EEOC charge. Plaintiff now alleges age discrimination based upon the fact that he was 21 64 years old at the time of his termination and was replaced by a man 11 years younger 22 than him. (Docs. 42 ¶ 37; 53 ¶ 37). Mr. Large was 53 years old at the time of Plaintiff’s 23 termination and does not fall outside Plaintiff’s protected class for purposes of age, and 24 neither his nor Plaintiff’s age is referenced in the Charge. The Court finds Plaintiff’s age 25 discrimination claim is not “like or reasonably related to” Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge. 26 Because Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim is not administratively exhausted, 27 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted as to this claim. 28 b. Retaliation 1 “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show that (1) he 2 engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment 3 action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” 4 Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240. In the context of retaliation, an “adverse 5 employment action is adverse treatment that is reasonably likely to deter employees from 6 engaging in protected activity.” Id. at 1237. If the employer proffers a legitimate, 7 nonretaliatory reason for its action, the plaintiff must then show the articulated reason is 8 pretextual because it is unworthy of credence or because a retaliatory reason more likely 9 than not motivated the action. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1987). 10 Plaintiff alleges he was terminated in retaliation for filing a complaint about the 11 behavior of his supervisor, Marquez. Defendant argues it is entitled to Summary Judgment 12 because Plaintiff cannot show a causal link between his complaint and termination, nor can 13 he establish that Defendant’s articulated reason for the termination was pretextual. 14 Defendant asserts Plaintiff was terminated on the basis of his statements about 15 Department leadership during the recorded calls. The termination paperwork stated 16 Plaintiff, 17 “has engaged in insubordinate behavior and made unprofessional, profane, racially charged, and derogatory 18 statements to a co-worker while on duty . . . . Mr. Daniels’ supervisory chain has been working with him since 2019 to 19 address concerns related to impatience, disrespect, and lack of courtesy that has led to confrontational interactions with 20 customers and coworkers. Executive leadership does not believe further corrective action will be effective in light of Mr. 21 Daniels’ failure to respond to the coaching and correction he has previously received, coupled with his articulated disdain 22 and lack of respect for his chain of command that would administer corrective action.” 23 24 (Doc. 44 at 67). Plaintiff has presented sufficient admissible evidence to raise a triable 25 question of fact whether this explanation is pretextual and a retaliatory reason more likely 26 than not motivated the action. 27 Defendant’s explanation characterizes Plaintiff’s comments as insubordinate 28 behavior, unprofessional, profane, racially charged, and derogatory and therefore 1 providing the basis for his termination. However, there is no admissible evidence that 2 Plaintiff’s allegedly derogatory statements were intended to be conveyed to the individuals 3 he was speaking about. (See Doc. 51-4 at 29 (Plaintiff tells Large, “Yeah, so don’t repeat 4 any of that . . . . but that’s what’s going on.”)) Nor is there a clear and reasonable 5 explanation for why angry workplace griping about leadership to a coworker who 6 purportedly already intends to quit5 qualifies as insubordinate behavior. Furthermore, while 7 Plaintiff was terminated, the evidence does not appear to show that Derek Large was 8 disciplined in any way for recording a co-employee’s statements—indeed, it is at least 9 arguable he may have been rewarded with a promotion for recording a fellow employee 10 without his knowledge or consent or for his purported agreement with each of Plaintiff’s 11 statements. (See Doc. 51-4 at 26-36). And while it is by no means established as a matter 12 of law that Mr. Large acted at Defendant’s behest6, the coincidental timing of the 13 recordings and Mr. Large’s unexplained immediate replacement of Plaintiff raise at least a 14 possible admissible inference that Defendant arranged for Large to record the 15 conversations.7 16 Defendant’s explanation also refers to Plaintiff’s longstanding issues with 17 “patience, disrespect, and a lack of courtesy that has led to confrontational interactions with 18 customers and coworkers.” (Doc. 44 at 53). The evidence on summary judgment shows 19 Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s similar behaviors since at least 2019 and allegedly 20 investigated them in 2021. (Docs. 42-2 at 8-10; 44 at 67). The internal investigation 21 revealed allegations that Plaintiff was “unprofessional and brusque,” “regularly bad- 22 mouthed other employees, and especially talked poorly about Executive Leadership[,] 23 claiming that they didn’t know what they were doing” and even “ma[de] threats to his 24 5 Plaintiff avers in his declaration that in the recorded phone calls, Large claimed to have 25 given his two-weeks’ notice. (Doc. 42-1 at 3). 6 Plaintiff argues “[Defendant] admits that, after May 2, 2022, it began targeting Daniels 26 for termination through the recordings made by Mr. Large.” (Doc. 41 at 11). However, the statement Plaintiff relies on, that “Mr. Large had recorded those phone conversations for 27 the purpose of providing proof to ADVS of Daniels’ inappropriate comments and behavior towards coworkers,” (Doc. 42-2 at 6) speaks only to Mr. Large’s alleged motive and 28 includes no such admission by Defendant. 7 Defendant has not addressed its policy for surreptitious recordings of employees. 1 coworkers that he was going to take Marquez down and get him fired.” (Doc. 51-4 at 4). 2 Despite these issues, Plaintiff’s behaviors had never previously resulted in discipline 3 beyond reflection in his performance reviews, and he generally received merit-based raises. 4 A reasonable jury could infer the reason Defendant acted more harshly on this occasion by 5 resorting to termination was a desire to retaliate against Plaintiff for his complaint. 6 The timeline also supports a possible inference of retaliatory motive.8 Here, Plaintiff 7 filed his complaint on May 2, 2022. The first phone call Mr. Large recorded occurred on 8 May 18, approximately two weeks after Plaintiff filed his complaint. On June 15, 2022, 9 Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave pending an investigation. This occurred while 10 the investigation into Marquez’ behavior was still underway. Ultimately, both Marquez’ 11 resignation and Plaintiff’s termination became effective on the exact same day on July 11, 12 2022. This suggestive timeline taken with the other circumstantial evidence creates a 13 question of fact whether Defendant had a retaliatory motive. 14 c. Discrimination 15 To establish a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination, Plaintiff must show 16 that “(1) [he] belongs to a protected class; (2) [he] was qualified for [his] position; (3) [he] 17 was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside 18 [his] protected class were treated more favorably.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 19 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). “The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie 20 case for Title VII ... claims on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to 21 rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot 22 Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the 23 burden shifts to the defendant, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, to provide a 24 legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the alleged disparate treatment. Vasquez v. Cnty. 25 8 A causal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action “can be 26 inferred from circumstantial evidence such as the employer's knowledge of the protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse action.” 27 Dawson v. Entek Intern., 630 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Mueller v. Car Wash Partners Inc., 2021 WL 4247928, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 2021) (Summarizing cases in 28 which temporal proximity supported a causal link between protected action and termination). 1 of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003). If the employer can do so, the burden 2 shifts back to the Plaintiff to establish that the employer's reasoning is pretext for 3 discrimination. “The ultimate question [is] whether plaintiff has proven that the defendant 4 intentionally discriminated against [him] because of his race,” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. 5 Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (date?). 6 i. Race Discrimination 7 Defendant has misconstrued Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim as a hostile work 8 environment claim as explained further below. Although Plaintiff in his complaint 9 mentioned a “hostile work environment”, he actually stated a claim for disparate treatment 10 based upon his race, and he provided sufficient admissible evidence to create a genuine 11 issue of material fact whether his termination was a result of racial discrimination. 12 The first question is whether Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of racial 13 discrimination. There is no dispute Plaintiff belongs to a protected class, that he was 14 qualified for his position, and that he was subject to an adverse employment action when 15 he was terminated on July 11, 2022. After Plaintiff’s termination, he was replaced by Derek 16 Large, a white man. This is sufficient to create a prima facie case for race discrimination. 17 See Id. at 777-78 (“[Plaintiff] can satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case merely 18 by showing that she was replaced by someone outside her protected class.”) 19 Although Defendant has offered a nondiscriminatory explanation for Plaintiff’s 20 termination, Plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to reach a jury on the issue of pretext 21 by casting doubt on the validity of this explanation. 22 The termination paperwork cited both Plaintiff’s longstanding interpersonal 23 behavior issues and his statements on the recorded phone calls. However, these behaviors 24 had been noted since at least 2019 and had never resulted in discipline beyond notation in 25 performance evaluations. Swearing and yelling may have been generally accepted in the 26 Department,9 as demonstrated by Ms. Elena Adame’s statement that she had been yelled

27 9 The following allegations taken from the Office of Equal Opportunity’s Executive Summary of the investigation into Luis Marquez and used in support of the department’s 28 substantiation of the allegations of unprofessional behavior by Marquez are admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 801(d)(2). See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (A record 1 and sworn at by Marquez in the presence of Director Colonel Wanda Wright and CFO 2 Amy Besco, and that Besco laughed and Wright said nothing; Ms. Nicole Sullivan’s 3 statement that Wright and Assistant Director John Scott “were both aware of Mr. Marquez’ 4 behavior but chose not to get involved,”; Mr. Bryan Durham’s “uncomfortable exit 5 interview with the Director” in which he felt she was “condescending and rude”; Ms. Tera 6 Shere’s statement that Marquez’ was promoted to Assistant Deputy Director despite 7 previous complaints, and that when she spoke to Wright about concerns regarding 8 Marquez’ behavior, Wright “told her, in essence, that she was weak” and “told her she was 9 the problem because she was unable to accept other people’s behaviors”; Marquez’ claim 10 that profanity “is part of the culture”; and Danielle Salomon’s statement that she recalled 11 complaints regarding Marquez and his team and that she had personally found that 12 Marquez, Daniels, Besco, and Accounting Manager Elizabeth Rominger “can come across 13 very strong.” (Doc. 42-2 at 17-22). In light of this apparent environment, a jury could well 14 disbelieve Defendant’s explanation that Plaintiff was fired for unprofessional statements 15 in a phone call with a coworker. 16 Defendant’s descriptions of Plaintiff’s comments are also largely in line with the 17 descriptions from the 2021 investigation of Plaintiff’s behavior: “unprofessional,” 18 “insubordinate,” “derogatory,” and “disrespectful,” for which he had not previously been 19 disciplined. (Doc. 51-4 at 3-4). The inconsistency of Defendant’ response to these 20 behaviors—merely noting the issues in a performance evaluation after the investigation, 21 and then immediately terminating Plaintiff after the phone calls—with no evidence of 22 progressive discipline in between raises a possible inference that Plaintiff’s statements to 23 Large were not the true reason for his termination, but merely a pretext for discriminatory 24 motives. 25 Other circumstantial evidence creates a possible inference that Defendant may have

26 kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business from information transmitted by someone with knowledge, such as an HR investigative report, is an 27 exception to the rule against hearsay); Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (a statement offered against a party that is “one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true” is not 28 hearsay). 1 engineered Large’s actions to create a pretext for terminating Plaintiff. For example, the 2 investigation leading to Plaintiff’s termination was minimal; it consisted of a review of the 3 phone call transcripts and a conversation with Plaintiff during which, 4 Mr. Daniels stated that he does not remember having a conversation[] which included [certain statements from the 5 transcripts] with another individual while at work. [The interviewer] asked Mr. Daniels if he may have had a 6 conversation similar to the above mentioned statement using unprofessional comments while at work and he responded, 7 “Yeah, possibly.” 8 (Doc. 44 at 53). In contrast, the investigation into Luis Marquez included interviews of 9 eleven people and detailed factual findings. 10 Mr. Large, the same employee who created the recordings, was rewarded with 11 Plaintiff’s position. Plaintiff’s evidence indicates this was a substantial promotion: it was 12 three job grades higher than Large’s previous role, with a salary increased from $28.00 per 13 hour to $85,000 per year. (Doc. 42-4 at 2, 8). And Plaintiff has provided evidence in the 14 form of his sworn declaration that Mr. Large “frequently made negative 15 comments. . . [about] ADVS leadership.” (Doc. 42-1 at 3). The fact that Mr. Large 16 provided the evidence Defendant relied on in terminating Plaintiff raises a reasonable 17 inference that it was given in exchange for the job and Defendant’s explanation was a 18 pretext for racial discrimination. 19 Viewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, these are 20 “circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 21 778 (9th Cir. 2025). Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied on this 22 claim. 23 ii. Sex Discrimination 24 As with Plaintiff’s claim for racial discrimination, Defendant’s argument that 25 Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge was untimely does not provide sufficient basis for granting 26 summary judgment on the claim of sex discrimination. Although Defendant states the 27 Charge was based on two comments that both occurred more than 300 days before the 28 Charge was filed, Plaintiff contends the Charge was based on repeated conduct that 1 occurred repeatedly over the course of two years, as alleged in his internal complaint, 2 leaving a question of fact regarding the timeliness issue. Additionally, the adverse action 3 Plaintiff complains of is his termination, not merely Marquez’ conduct, and the termination 4 occurred July 11, 2022, 178 days before his Charge was filed with the EEOC and the 5 Arizona Civil Rights Division, and within the acceptable time range. Nevertheless, Plaintiff 6 has not carried his substantive burden of proof for discrimination on the basis of sex and 7 the Motion will be granted on this claim. 8 Defendant characterizes Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination on the basis of sex as a 9 hostile work environment claim. Plaintiff contends this is a mischaracterization, but argues 10 the claim meets the requirements for a hostile work environment regardless. (Doc. 54 at 3). 11 Under either theory, Plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material 12 fact. 13 Here, the only adverse employment action is Plaintiff’s termination. Plaintiff 14 alleged “similarly situated individuals outside [his] protected class were treated more 15 favorably” and points to Derek Large, who also made negative comments about ADVS 16 employees and leadership but was given Plaintiff’s job after the termination. But Derek 17 Large, a man, is not outside Plaintiff’s protected class for the purposes of sex and cannot 18 support an inference that Plaintiff’s termination was based on sex. In his Motion for 19 Summary Judgment, Plaintiff advances Colonel Wanda Wright, the department’s director, 20 as a similarly situated individual for the first time. Plaintiff argues Colonel Wright “made 21 racial slurs in the workplace” when she, after learning that Senator McCain had visited one 22 of the ADVS homes for only 15 minutes, taken pictures, and left, commented “that was 23 mighty white of him.” (Doc. 41 at 9). No action was taken against Wright for this alleged 24 comment. Employees are similarly situated “when they have similar jobs and display 25 similar conduct”; “employees in supervisory positions are generally deemed not to be 26 similarly situated to lower level employees.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 27 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff has not provided evidence indicating Wright’s position 28 as Director of ADVS was similar in any respect to his position, and one racial comment 1 about the behavior of a non-employee and public figure is not sufficiently similar to 2 Plaintiff’s alleged profanity-laced tirade against his supervisors. On the evidence provided, 3 no reasonable jury could conclude Plaintiff was terminated on the basis of sex. 4 To state a claim for a hostile work environment, Plaintiff must show unwelcome 5 conduct that was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] 6 employment and create an abusive working environment.” Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 7 876 (9th Cir. 1991). This standard requires extreme conduct. Faragher v. City of Boca 8 Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (“These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently 9 demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility code . . . . We have 10 made it clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and 11 conditions of employment”) (citation modified). “[W]hether an environment is “hostile” 12 or “abusive” can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include 13 the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 14 threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 15 interferes with an employee's work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 16 17, 23 (1993). 17 Plaintiff has presented evidence that over the course of two years, his supervisor 18 Luis Marquez (1) commented that the reason Plaintiff needed to sit down was because he 19 “had a tight ass,” (2) said on at least four occasions that Plaintiff’s work with other 20 employees was going well because they “like big black dick,” (3) commented to Plaintiff 21 that a song lyric sounded like it said “I want you to suck me,” and (4) said that Plaintiff 22 and another coworker had been “getting it on.” (Docs. 44 at 26, 29; 42-1 at 2). 23 Instances where the courts have found sex discrimination on the basis of a hostile 24 work environment have included themes such as physical touching, sexual advances and 25 requests for sexual favors, frequently repeated and long-lasting conduct, and threats.10 26 10 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998) (employee was 27 subjected to repeated humiliation, physical assault, and threat of rape); Fielder v. UAL 28 Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000) (employee was subjected to repeated unwelcome sexual advances, physical assault, and obscene phone calls, and her superiors enabled the 1 Although Plaintiff states “the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the 2 conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working environment,” this 3 statement is conclusory and unsupported by the evidence of a handful of “mere offensive 4 [comments]” of a sexual nature. Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S.17, 23; Panelli v. First 5 American Title Ins. Co., 704 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Nev. 2010) (finding no hostile work 6 environment where male supervisors pressured female plaintiffs to go to a brothel, 7 commented on who they would like “to do”, commented they “couldn’t wait for the men 8 to get a hold of” another female employee, grabber their own nipples and danced like 9 Austin Powers, and commented regarding a marketing executive that “all she has to do was 10 just shake her tits”); Pieszak v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 112 F. Supp. 2d 970 11 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding there was no hostile work environment where a plaintiff “was 12 subject to a barrage of harassing conduct” but “the substantial majority of that barrage was 13 not connected to sex or gender” and only “about fifteen to twenty different incidents over 14 an eighteen-month period” were connected to gender); Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 15 F. Supp. 1312 (Dist. Or. 1995) (finding a few offensive comments not of a sexual nature, 16 and one comment on the size of Plaintiff’s breasts, and one comment that women were 17 inferior did not constitute a hostile work environment); Lappin v. Laidlaw Transic Inc., 18 179 F.Supp.2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (Defendants’ comments on Plaintiff’s clothes, 19 references to other co-workers’ bodies, statements that Plaintiff had “nice legs,” a “tiny 20 butt,” and a “tight ass,” use of “‘the F word’ and the word ‘bitch’ in reference to her on 21 ‘probably several occasions,’” and two incidents where Defendant “stuck out his tongue 22 and wiggled it around at her” and another “stared at her while raising his eyebrows and 23 puckering his lips” did not “appear to establish conduct” amounting to a hostile work

24 behavior and retaliated against employee for complaining); Priest v. Rotary, 809 F. Supp 25 771 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (defendant subjected plaintiff and other employees to repeated unwelcome physical and verbal sexual conduct, including restraining, kissing, rubbing, 26 exposing his genitals, or unzipping plaintiff’s uniform); Miller v. D.F. Zee's, Inc., 31 F. 27 Supp. 2d 792 (D. Or. 1998) (defendant “created a sexualized atmosphere in the workplace which included joking, touching, requests for dates, requests for sex, and other sexual 28 comments and remarks” over the course of years despite many complaints). 1 environment). Only a few of Marquez’ alleged comments toward Plaintiff were of a sexual 2 nature, and over the course of two years of alleged harassment, Plaintiff has alleged fewer 3 than the fifteen to twenty incidents found insufficient in Pieszak. Plaintiff has not given 4 evidence of any physical touching or requests for sex. Particularly in light of Defendant’s 5 investigation of Marquez and Marquez’ subsequent forced resignation when Plaintiff 6 complained, the specific conduct Plaintiff complains of does not rise to the level necessary 7 to establish a hostile work environment. 8 Because Plaintiff’s evidence fails to establish the existence of genuine issues of 9 material fact as to his claim for discrimination on the basis of sex, Defendant’s Motion for 10 Summary Judgment will be granted on this claim. 11 d. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 12 Plaintiff has failed to establish the absence of genuine questions of material fact. 13 Plaintiff has proffered no direct admissible evidence of discrimination.11 Although Plaintiff 14 has proffered sufficient admissible circumstantial evidence to reach a jury on his racial 15 discrimination and retaliation claims as described above, when considering his motion for 16 summary judgment, Defendant’s “evidence. . . is to be believed, and all justifiable 17 inferences are to be drawn in [Defendant’s] favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 18 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Plaintiff’s termination paperwork states that his comments in the 19 recorded calls led management to conclude further attempts to remediate his alleged 20 longstanding behavioral issues would not be successful, thereby stating a non- 21 discriminatory reason for the termination. A reasonable jury could credit this explanation. 22 Plaintiff states “the State admits that it actively sought out a basis for terminating Daniels,” 23 (Doc. 41 at 10), but the State (Defendant) has made no such admission and, indeed, offers 24 evidence that Mr. Large acted alone and of his own volition. (Doc. 53 ¶ 18). Based upon 25 the admissible evidence, a reasonable jury could find for Defendant. Plaintiff’s Motion 26 (Doc. 41) will be denied. 27 Accordingly, 28 11 See supra, note 4 1 IT IS ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (Doc. 41), is 2|| DENIED. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 4|| 43), 1s GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED as to 5 || Counts One and Four of the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 28), Discrimination on the 6 || Basis of Sex and Discrimination on the Basis of Age, and DENIED as to Counts Two and 7|| Three, Discrimination on the Basis of Race and Retaliation. 8 Dated this 14th day of April, 2026. 9 fo . 10 ‘ — .

2 Senior United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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