NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3825-16T2
VICTOR CAMPOS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MIGUEL CRUZ and CITY OF PASSAIC,
Defendants-Respondents. ______________________________
Submitted May 24, 2018 – Decided July 12, 2018
Before Judges Mayer and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L- 3602-15.
Mallon & Tranger, attorneys for appellant (Randall L. Tranger, of counsel; M. Anthony Barsimanto, on the brief).
Law Offices of William E. Staehle, attorneys for respondents (Stephen C. Cahir, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Victor Campos appeals from the trial court's March
28, 2017, order of summary judgment dismissing his claims as barred by the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to
-142 (the Act). We affirm.
This case arises from a December 23, 2013 car accident in
which defendant Miguel Cruz (Cruz) ran a red light and struck
plaintiff's vehicle. Both plaintiff and Cruz are employees of
defendant of City of Passaic (City). Plaintiff works for the
City's Department of Public Works (DPW), and defendant is a Passaic
police officer. On the date of the accident, plaintiff was working
at City Hall when he began to feel ill. He decided to go home
early; however, in order to do so he first had to return to the
DPW office to notify his employer that he was finished for the day
and to complete paperwork for his supervisor to sign. The accident
happened as plaintiff was en route from City Hall to the DPW
office.
On January 15, 2014, plaintiff filed an "Employee's Claim
Petition" seeking workers' compensation benefits from the City.
On October 21, 2015, plaintiff filed suit against defendants Miguel
Cruz and the City. On June 13, 2016, the parties to the workers'
compensation action agreed to an "Order Approving Settlement with
Dismissal" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-20 (Section 20).
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint on summary
judgment, finding plaintiff's claims were barred by Section 8 of
the Act because he received workers' compensation benefits. In
2 A-3825-16T2 addition, the judge found that plaintiff was acting in the scope
of his employment with the City at the time of the accident. This
appeal ensued.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts the trial judge erred in finding
that at the time of the accident he was acting in the scope of his
employment. Plaintiff asserts that he stopped working when he
left City Hall. Plaintiff claims that he was returning to
headquarters solely for a personal purpose, i.e., to fill out
paperwork so he could go home. In addition, plaintiff asserts
that the settlement of his claim pursuant to Section 20 does not
bar a third-party claim against his employer, as it was not
dispositive of the issue of compensability.1
In reviewing orders for summary judgment, an appellate court
uses the same standard as the trial court. Globe Motor Co. v.
Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998). We
decide first whether there was any genuine issue of material fact.
If there was not, we then decide whether the trial court's ruling
on the law was correct. Walker v. Atl. Chrysler Plymouth, 216
N.J. Super. 255, 258 (App. Div. 1987). Because the issues on
1 We will not address defendants' arguments concerning the injury threshold in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). The trial court made no findings on the issue.
3 A-3825-16T2 appeal are primarily legal in nature, our review of the trial
court's legal rulings are de novo. Estate of Hanges v. Metro.
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382-83 (2010); see also
Manalapan Realty LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995) ("A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to
any special deference.").
In New Jersey, it is well settled that workers' compensation
laws provide an "expeditious and certain remedy for employees who
sustain work injuries by the statutory imposition of absolute but
limited and determinate liability upon the employer." Wilson v.
Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 116 (1958) (citing Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947)). The statutory scheme represents
a compromise whereby "[t]he employee surrenders his right to seek
damages in an action at law in return for swift recovery
independent of proof of fault." Ibid. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-
8:
If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.
The statute grants absolute immunity to employers from common
law negligence suits by employees. Cellucci v. Bronstein, 277
4 A-3825-16T2 N.J. Super. 506, 518 (App. Div. 1994); see also McDaniel v, Lee,
419 N.J. Super. 482, 490 (App. Div. 2011) ("The statute's
exclusivity bar also prohibits an injured employee's legal action
to recover for injuries caused by a fellow employee.") (citing
Basil v. Wolf, 193 N.J. 38, 53 (2007)).
In order to be compensable under the Act, thereby invoking
the statutory bar, an employee must be acting in the scope of his
or her employment at the time of the accident. N.J.S.A. 34:15-7.
Whether plaintiff in this case was acting in the scope of his
employment requires a determination of when plaintiff left work.
N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 provides in pertinent part:
Employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer's place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer's place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer; provided, however, when the employee is required by the employer to be away from the employer's place of employment, the employee shall be deemed to be in the course of employment when the employee is engaged in the direct performance of duties assigned or directed by the employer . . . .
[(Emphasis added).]
On the date of the accident, plaintiff had driven his car to
the City Hall location where he was performing maintenance work.
He left that location, not to go home, or to go to lunch, or to
accomplish some personal errand. He left the City Hall location
5 A-3825-16T2 to go to the DPW office, to submit paperwork in order to take a
half-day off. Only after completing the paperwork required by his
employer was he permitted to leave work to go home. His return
to the DPW office was thus in the performance of duties "assigned
or directed by the employer" at the time of the accident. See
Ward v. Davidowitz, 191 N.J. Super. 518, 523-524 (App. Div. 1983)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3825-16T2
VICTOR CAMPOS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MIGUEL CRUZ and CITY OF PASSAIC,
Defendants-Respondents. ______________________________
Submitted May 24, 2018 – Decided July 12, 2018
Before Judges Mayer and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L- 3602-15.
Mallon & Tranger, attorneys for appellant (Randall L. Tranger, of counsel; M. Anthony Barsimanto, on the brief).
Law Offices of William E. Staehle, attorneys for respondents (Stephen C. Cahir, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Victor Campos appeals from the trial court's March
28, 2017, order of summary judgment dismissing his claims as barred by the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to
-142 (the Act). We affirm.
This case arises from a December 23, 2013 car accident in
which defendant Miguel Cruz (Cruz) ran a red light and struck
plaintiff's vehicle. Both plaintiff and Cruz are employees of
defendant of City of Passaic (City). Plaintiff works for the
City's Department of Public Works (DPW), and defendant is a Passaic
police officer. On the date of the accident, plaintiff was working
at City Hall when he began to feel ill. He decided to go home
early; however, in order to do so he first had to return to the
DPW office to notify his employer that he was finished for the day
and to complete paperwork for his supervisor to sign. The accident
happened as plaintiff was en route from City Hall to the DPW
office.
On January 15, 2014, plaintiff filed an "Employee's Claim
Petition" seeking workers' compensation benefits from the City.
On October 21, 2015, plaintiff filed suit against defendants Miguel
Cruz and the City. On June 13, 2016, the parties to the workers'
compensation action agreed to an "Order Approving Settlement with
Dismissal" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-20 (Section 20).
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint on summary
judgment, finding plaintiff's claims were barred by Section 8 of
the Act because he received workers' compensation benefits. In
2 A-3825-16T2 addition, the judge found that plaintiff was acting in the scope
of his employment with the City at the time of the accident. This
appeal ensued.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts the trial judge erred in finding
that at the time of the accident he was acting in the scope of his
employment. Plaintiff asserts that he stopped working when he
left City Hall. Plaintiff claims that he was returning to
headquarters solely for a personal purpose, i.e., to fill out
paperwork so he could go home. In addition, plaintiff asserts
that the settlement of his claim pursuant to Section 20 does not
bar a third-party claim against his employer, as it was not
dispositive of the issue of compensability.1
In reviewing orders for summary judgment, an appellate court
uses the same standard as the trial court. Globe Motor Co. v.
Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998). We
decide first whether there was any genuine issue of material fact.
If there was not, we then decide whether the trial court's ruling
on the law was correct. Walker v. Atl. Chrysler Plymouth, 216
N.J. Super. 255, 258 (App. Div. 1987). Because the issues on
1 We will not address defendants' arguments concerning the injury threshold in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). The trial court made no findings on the issue.
3 A-3825-16T2 appeal are primarily legal in nature, our review of the trial
court's legal rulings are de novo. Estate of Hanges v. Metro.
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382-83 (2010); see also
Manalapan Realty LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995) ("A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to
any special deference.").
In New Jersey, it is well settled that workers' compensation
laws provide an "expeditious and certain remedy for employees who
sustain work injuries by the statutory imposition of absolute but
limited and determinate liability upon the employer." Wilson v.
Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 116 (1958) (citing Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947)). The statutory scheme represents
a compromise whereby "[t]he employee surrenders his right to seek
damages in an action at law in return for swift recovery
independent of proof of fault." Ibid. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-
8:
If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.
The statute grants absolute immunity to employers from common
law negligence suits by employees. Cellucci v. Bronstein, 277
4 A-3825-16T2 N.J. Super. 506, 518 (App. Div. 1994); see also McDaniel v, Lee,
419 N.J. Super. 482, 490 (App. Div. 2011) ("The statute's
exclusivity bar also prohibits an injured employee's legal action
to recover for injuries caused by a fellow employee.") (citing
Basil v. Wolf, 193 N.J. 38, 53 (2007)).
In order to be compensable under the Act, thereby invoking
the statutory bar, an employee must be acting in the scope of his
or her employment at the time of the accident. N.J.S.A. 34:15-7.
Whether plaintiff in this case was acting in the scope of his
employment requires a determination of when plaintiff left work.
N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 provides in pertinent part:
Employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer's place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer's place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer; provided, however, when the employee is required by the employer to be away from the employer's place of employment, the employee shall be deemed to be in the course of employment when the employee is engaged in the direct performance of duties assigned or directed by the employer . . . .
[(Emphasis added).]
On the date of the accident, plaintiff had driven his car to
the City Hall location where he was performing maintenance work.
He left that location, not to go home, or to go to lunch, or to
accomplish some personal errand. He left the City Hall location
5 A-3825-16T2 to go to the DPW office, to submit paperwork in order to take a
half-day off. Only after completing the paperwork required by his
employer was he permitted to leave work to go home. His return
to the DPW office was thus in the performance of duties "assigned
or directed by the employer" at the time of the accident. See
Ward v. Davidowitz, 191 N.J. Super. 518, 523-524 (App. Div. 1983)
("the determining element of compensability rests upon the direct
performance of duties assigned or directed by the employer rather
than on the place of employment."). That plaintiff was not
physically at his workplace when the accident occurred is thus of
no moment. Indeed, as a DPW worker, plaintiff could have been
working in any part of the City when he was involved in the
accident.
The cases cited by plaintiff are inapposite as involving
situations in which the employee had clearly left work at the time
of the accident. See, e.g., Mule v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.,
356 N.J. Super. 389, 397-98 (App. Div. 2003) (holding the employee
was not acting in the scope of employment after he left for a
picnic at 1 p.m. and was not expected to return but returned to
place of employment around 8:15 p.m. in order to shower and change
his clothes); Zahner v. Pathmark Stores Inc., 321 N.J. Super. 471,
480-81 (App. Div. 1999) (holding a cashier not acting in the scope
of employment after she "punched out" for the day but remained in
6 A-3825-16T2 the store to do food shopping); Sparrow v. La Cachet, 305 N.J.
Super. 301, 306-07 (App. Div. 1997) (holding a beautician who was
told to go home was not acting in the scope of employment when she
remained on the premises to have a facial for her own personal
benefit).
In this case, we reject plaintiff's argument that he was
returning to headquarters for a purely personal reason. The City
had a policy requiring him to fill out paperwork prior to going
home for the day. Plaintiff was complying with that policy as
directed by his employer. The trial court was therefore correct
in finding that plaintiff's work day did not end until he completed
the employer-required paperwork permitting him to take a half-day
off. Based on that finding, there was no error in the court's
determination that plaintiff was acting in the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident, and summary judgment was
appropriately granted.
Although the scope of employment determination is dispositive
of plaintiff's appeal, we will briefly address plaintiff's
alternative argument that a Section 20 settlement does not bar his
damages claim against his employer and co-employee.
N.J.S.A. 34:15-20 expressly provides that a Section 20
settlement "shall have the force and effect of a dismissal of the
claim petition." Sperling v. Bd. of Review, 301 N.J. Super. 1, 5
7 A-3825-16T2 (App. Div. 1997). "Receipt of a lump sum settlement under N.J.S.A.
34:15-20 constitutes an implied acknowledgment that the claimant's
disability was work-related and compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act." Ibid. In Hawksby v. DePietro, 165 N.J. 58
(2000), the Supreme Court held that a Section 20 settlement barred
a subsequent medical malpractice claim against a co-employee
doctor. In so holding, the Court reasoned:
A contrary holding would result "in burdening the employer indirectly with common-law damages superimposed upon [its] workmen's compensation liability by reason of either a legal, moral or practical obligation to indemnify the sued [doctor], director, officer or supervisory employee, or with the expense of carrying insurance to cover the personal liability of such . . . personnel."
[Hawksby, 165 N.J. at 66-67 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Muscarelle, 67 N.J. Super. 305, 321 (App. Div. 1961)).]
This case presents an even clearer example of the type of double
recovery prohibited by the Court in Hawksby. Having recovered a
workers' compensation award for his injuries, plaintiff now seeks
to pursue a negligence claim for damages involving the same
accident and resultant injuries. Because plaintiff's present
claims are prohibited by both statute and common law, the trial
court did not err in finding that plaintiff's receipt of workers'
compensation benefits bars any further recovery at law. Summary
judgment was appropriately granted on that basis.
8 A-3825-16T2 Affirmed.
9 A-3825-16T2