Vickrey v. City of Sioux City

104 F. 164, 1900 U.S. App. LEXIS 4836
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Iowa
DecidedOctober 16, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 104 F. 164 (Vickrey v. City of Sioux City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vickrey v. City of Sioux City, 104 F. 164, 1900 U.S. App. LEXIS 4836 (circtnia 1900).

Opinion

SHIRAS, District Judge.

In the bill herein filed, and the amendments thereto, it is averred that the complainant is the owner of §19,400 of district improvement bonds issued by the city of Sioux City in the years 1888, 1889, 1890, and 1891; the same having been issued under, the provisions of the act of the 20th general assembly of the slate of Iowa approved March 15, 1884, and the ordinance of the city approved April 18, 1887, both of which are printed upon the back of the bonds. It is further averred that these bonds are wholly unpaid; that under the provisions of the act of the 20th general assembly it was the duty of the city to assess the proper special tax against the several properties in the bill described, abutting on the streets and alleys which were paved and improved under the resolutions of the city council, and to apply the several assessments, when collected, to the payment of the bonds issued for that particular improvement; that, by resolutions duly adopted, the city council from Time to time ordered improvements to be made upon the streets and alleys named in Hie resolutions, and issued improvement bonds therefor, and levied special assessments upon the abutting property in order to create the sinking fund required to pay the bonds issued as the same matured, and provided for in section 4 of the act of the 20th general assembly; that instead of applying the several special assessments, when collected, to the payment of the bonds issued for the improvement of the abutting property liable to the special assessment, the city, without right or authority so to do, created three so-called improvement districts in the city, and paid out and applied the assessments collected within the several improvement districts to the payment of the bonds as they matured, without reference to the rights of the -holders of the bonds yet to mature, thus diverting the special assessments levied for the improvement of particular streets and alleys to the payment of bonds issued upon wholly different improvements; that, through the misconduct of the city in this and other ways alleged in the bill, the sinking fund provided for in the act of the general assembly has been depleted and misapplied; that there now' remains in the city treasury an aggregate of §28,983.98 received and collected from the special assessments levied upon the property abutting on the several streets and alleys, and portions thereof, upon which improvements have been made under the resolutions of the city council adopted from time to time; that there remains unpaid of the improvement bonds issued by the city some §274,554, including those owned by complainant; that the bondholders are equitably the owners of the money in (.he city treasury collected from 11k; special assessments; that owing to the wrongful mingling of the moneys received from the several special assessments by the city, and the misapplication of a large part of the moneys thus derived, it is now impossible to separate out the particular moneys properly applicable ro the several bonds remaining unpaid, and equity can only be done by holding the money now in the treasury, and all amounts hereafter received from the special assessments, as a common trust fund for the benefit of all the holders of the improvement bonds remaining unpaid, and to that end this suit is brought, not only for- the benefit of the complainant, but also for the benefit of the other holders of improve[166]*166ment bonds wbo may wish to join in the proceedings, it being prayed that a proper accounting be had; that the complainant be awarded his proper share of the special assessment funds in the city treasury, with a judgment for the balance left unpaid of the bonds and coupons against the city. And an injunction is asked, restraining the city and its treasurer from paying out any portion of the special assessment funds until the rights of the complainant have been duly awarded and decreed. To this bill a demurrer has been interposed on behalf of the city, arid in support thereof it is urged that upon the face of the bill it appears that complainant has a sufficient remedy at law, and therefore a court of equity will not entertain a bill in his behalf. It cannot be well questioned that the bonds sued on contain an absolute promise on behalf of the city to pay the amounts thereof to the payee or bearer, and therefore it is true that in an action at law the holders of the bonds could recover judgment for the sums due thereon against the city. It is equally true that, under the provisions of the act of the general assembly authorizing the issuance of the bonds, the city assumed the duty of creating and properly applying the sinking fund provided for in the act, and to that end was charged with the duty of levying the special assessments called for by the act, collecting the same, and making proper payment thereof to the bondholders. In these particulars the city is charged with a duty amounting to a trust. The inducement held out to the purchasers of the bonds was that payment thereof would be provided for by the levy and collection of the special assessments upon the property abutting on the improved streets and alleys, and the bondholders have the right to call the city to account for the manner in which this trust duty has been performed. Thus, in Taylor v. Benham, 5 How. 232-274, 12 L. Ed. 130, it is said:

“Every person wlio receives money to be paid to another, or to be applied to a. particular purpose, to which he does not apply it. is a trustee, and may be sued either at law, for money had and received, or, in equity, as a trustee, for a breach of trust.”

In the bill riled herein it is averred that the city has failed to properly collect and apply the special assessments levied, and that it now has on hand several thousand dollars, the proceeds of the special assessments levied for the payment of the bonds in the bill described; and one object of the suit is to reach this fund, and compel its proper application in the payment of the bonds yet outstanding, — a purpose which cannot be accomplished in an action at law, but which demands the more efficient power of a court of equity. The fact, therefore, that the bondholders can obtain a judgment at law against the city for the amounts due upon the bonds does not oust the jurisdiction in equity, for the reason that the judgment at law would not enable the bondholders to control the fund in the possession of the city, nor to control -the action of the city with respect to the funds that may hereafter be collected from the special assessments; and therefore the legal remedy is not adequate and effectual to settle and protect the rights of the bondholders. Upon the general question of the trust relation assumed by the city with respect to the assessment, collection, and ai>plication of the special assessments necessary to [167]*167create the sinking fund provided for in the act authorizing the issuance of the bouds, see Warner v. City of New Orleans, 167 U. S. 467, 17 Sup. Ct. 892, 42 L. Ed. 299; Id., 175 U. S. 120-135, 20 Sup. Ct. 44, 44 L. Ed. 96; and Allen v. City of Davenport, 107 Iowa, 92, 77 N. W. 532.

The nature of the duty imposed upon the city with respect to these special assessments more clearly appears when we consider the next question presented by the demurrer, and that is whether, under the provisions of the act of the general assembly, and the terms of the bonds, the assessments, when collected, should be applied in payment of the particular bond issued for the improvement upon which the assessment is based.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Purcell v. City of Carlsbad
126 F.2d 748 (Tenth Circuit, 1942)
City of Carbon Hill v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co.
185 So. 387 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1938)
George v. City of Asheville, N. C.
80 F.2d 50 (Fourth Circuit, 1935)
City of Winter Haven v. Summerlin
154 So. 863 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1934)
State Ex Rel. Montgomery v. City of Fort Pierce
143 So. 733 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1932)
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Blake
36 F.2d 652 (Tenth Circuit, 1929)
Karel v. City of Eldorado
32 F.2d 795 (E.D. Illinois, 1929)
Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle
271 F. 958 (W.D. Washington, 1921)
Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Asia
2 F.2d 491 (W.D. Washington, 1921)
Miller v. Hamilton
233 F. 402 (Eighth Circuit, 1916)
Thompson v. Emmett Irr. Dist.
227 F. 560 (Ninth Circuit, 1915)
Olmsted v. City of Superior
155 F. 172 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Wisconsin, 1907)
Vickrey v. City of Sioux City
115 F. 437 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Iowa, 1902)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
104 F. 164, 1900 U.S. App. LEXIS 4836, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vickrey-v-city-of-sioux-city-circtnia-1900.