Vickie Lynn Wharton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, W.D. Arkansas
• Decided: March 12, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01042
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS EL DORADO DIVISION

VICKIE LYNN WHARTON PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 1:25-cv-01042

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Vickie Lynn Wharton (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and period of disability under Title II of the Act. The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court 0F issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter. 1. Background: Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application on June 16, 2022. (Tr. 13). In this application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to inability to sit for long periods of time, not able to bend or twist, chronic pain, bursitis in both hips, osteoarthritis, and memory issues. (Tr. 179). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of January 1, 2021. (Tr. 13). This application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. Id.

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___” The transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document filed at ECF No. 7. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself and not the ECF page number. After these denials, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 112-145). Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on December 19, 2023. (Tr. 27-61). Plaintiff was present and was represented by Kevin Greene at this hearing. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Rachel Hawkins testified at this hearing. Id.

On January 24, 2024, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (Tr. 13-22). In this decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff last met the insured requirements of the Act on March 31, 2023. (Tr. 15, Finding 1). The ALJ also found Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) from January 1, 2021, through her date last insured. (Tr. 15, Finding 2). The ALJ then determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis, abnormality of a major joint, disorder of the spine, and obesity. (Tr. 15, Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ also determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings”). (Tr. 17, Finding 4).

In this decision, the ALJ indicted she evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and determined her Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 17-21, Finding 5). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary work except she cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but can occasionally balance, stoop, knee, crouch, crawl, climb ramps and stairs; and Plaintiff is limited to jobs that can be performed using a handheld assistive device for prolonged ambulation or on uneven terrain. Id. The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and determined Plaintiff was capable of performing her PRW as a service order dispatcher. (Tr. 21, Finding 6). Based on this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, at any time from January 1, 2021, through March 31, 2023. (Tr. 22, Finding 7). Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review the ALJ’s unfavorable disability determination. On April 1, 2025, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s disability

determination. (Tr. 1-5). On June 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 3. The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court. ECF No. 5. This case is now ready for decision. 2. Applicable Law: In reviewing this case, the Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision,

the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000). It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998). The Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff

must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts

to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 3. Discussion: In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 9, Pgs. 8-20. Specifically, Plaintiff raises the following arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ erred in considering her subjective complaints of pain and (2) the ALJ failed to consider how her mental impairments affected her ability to work. Id. Upon review, the Court finds the ALJ did not fully consider her subjective complaints when evaluating her disability. Accordingly, the Court will only address this issue for reversal. In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.1 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007). The factors 1F to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322. The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor if the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective allegations. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). If the ALJ properly applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference.

See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

1 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case. When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find

a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991). In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. Instead, the ALJ based her credibility determination almost entirely upon the fact that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not supported by her medical records. (Tr. 17-21). In her opinion, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s medical records and discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because they were not supported by the objective medical records. Indeed, in this opinion, the only non- medical evidence the ALJ considered was Plaintiff’s daily activities. (Tr. 20). The ALJ found these include that she could drive, go shopping, pay bills, count change, and handle bank accounts.

Id. Such activities can hardly be characterized as “extensive,” and they do not give the ALJ a basis for entirely discounting Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. Based upon this review, the Court finds the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints was improper. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”). Accordingly, because the ALJ provided an insufficient basis for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints during the relevant time period, this case must be reversed and remanded. 4. Conclusion: Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. As such, this case is reversed and remanded for further findings consistent with this opinion. A judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58. ENTERED this 12th day of March 2026.

Spencer G. Singleton /s/ HONORABLE SPENCER G. SINGLETON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE