Vicki Chang v. Andrew Vanderwielen

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 11, 2026
• Docket: 23-35284
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 11 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VICKI CHANG, No. 23-35284

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00013-SKV

v. MEMORANDUM* ANDREW VANDERWIELEN, Trooper, Washington State Patrol; BRIAN HUNT, Officer, Seattle Police Department; JANE GUREVICH, Security Guard, University of Washington; EDWARD COLLINS, Trooper, Washington State Patrol; RIDDHI KOTHARI, Doctor, University of Washington; CITY OF SEATTLE,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Sarah Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 11, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: O'SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Vicki Chang appeals pro se from the district court’s entry of judgment in her

action alleging 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims arising from her forcible

removal from the University of Washington Harborview Medical Center and a

subsequent visit to the same hospital. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1291 and review de novo. See Harper v. Nedd, 71 F.4th 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2023)

(dismissal for failure to state a claim); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th

Cir. 2006) (summary judgment). We affirm.

Summary judgment was proper on the Fourth Amendment claims alleging

that defendants Vanderwielen and Gurevich used excessive force. The district

court properly applied the facts of the altercation as depicted by the videotape of

the event and other relevant circumstances. Under the totality of the

circumstances, the defendants’ use of force was minimal and objectively

reasonable. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81 (2007) (holding that, absent

evidence that the videotape “differs from what actually happened”, the court

should “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape” of the event when

ruling on a motion for summary judgment); Williamson v. City of Nat’l City, 23

F.4th 1146, 1149-53 (9th Cir. 2022) (applying the unreasonable force standard and

videotape rule to find only minimal force where the protester resisted removal and

went limp, and then the officers lifted the protestor by her arms and dragged her

through the doorway by her wrist and forearm).

2 The district court properly dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim alleging

that defendant Vanderwielen seized Chang’s property. Chang failed to allege facts

showing that Vanderwielen meaningfully interfered with her possessory interest in

her purse. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (explaining that

a Fourth Amendment “seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful

interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Dismissal was also proper on the Fourteenth

Amendment claim alleging that Vanderwielen damaged Chang’s purse. Chang

cannot allege a Fourteenth Amendment claim because state law provides an

adequate post-deprivation remedy for property loss caused by the state. See

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that an unauthorized

intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not violate Fourteenth

Amendment due process if a meaningful state post-deprivation remedy exists); see

also Wash. Rev. Code § 4.92.090.

Summary judgment was proper on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

claims alleging that defendant Gurevich seized and damaged Chang’s purse. Chang

failed to offer evidence to establish that Gurevich meaningfully interfered with her

property interest or that she was deprived of the handbag or its contents. See

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (setting forth the standard); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533

(precluding due process property claims if meaningful state post-deprivation

3 remedies exist).

The district court properly dismissed the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

excessive force and property claims alleged against city defendant Hunt. Chang

failed to allege facts showing that Hunt, who arrived after the altercation and spoke

to Chang and the witnesses, caused or personally participated in any constitutional

violation. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring

that the defendant cause a constitutional violation). Dismissal was also proper for

the City of Seattle because Chang failed to allege facts showing an underlying

constitutional violation by Hunt. See Lockett v. Cnty of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737,

741 (9th Cir. 2020) (setting forth the elements of municipal liability, including the

requirement that the plaintiff establish an underlying constitutional violation).

The district court properly dismissed defendant Collins, Vanderwielen’s

supervisor, because Chang failed to allege facts to establish that Collins caused or

personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. See Starr v. Baca,

652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth the standard to hold a supervisor

liable under § 1983).

The district court properly dismissed the state tort claims alleged against all

defendants because Chang failed to allege that she filed complete and proper

verified claims with the state and city prior to filing her action. See Wash. Rev.

Code §§ 4.92.100 & 4.92.110 (requiring that a plaintiff present a verified claim to

4 the Office of Risk Management before commencing an action for damages against

any “state officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity” arising from

tortious conduct); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.96.010(1) & 4.96.020(4) (requiring that a

verified claim be presented to a designated agent before filing suit for damages

against municipal corporations and other local governmental entities arising from

tortious conduct); Levy v. State, 957 P.2d 1272, 1277 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)

(“Failure to file a claim in proper fashion results in dismissal of the suit.”).

To the extent that Chang attempted to allege a § 1983 claim against Dr.

Kothari for medical malpractice, negligence does not state a § 1983 claim. Jett,

439 F.3d at 1096.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chang’s motion to

disqualify Judge Coughenour. The judge’s actions of serving as an adjunct lecturer

at the University of Washington School of Law and donating all compensation for

his lectures to the law school do not create personal bias in this case. Harborview

Medical Center, not the law school, is involved in this action. See United States v.

Carey, 929 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2019) (setting forth the standard for recusal).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chang’s motion to

extend discovery for failure to establish good cause. Chang had ample opportunity

to explore her own injuries, which occurred four years before her request, and

conduct discovery related to the remaining defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

5 16(b)(4); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607, 609 (9th Cir.

1992) (setting forth the standard of review and explaining that good cause

primarily requires “diligence of the party seeking the amendment”). Nor did she

establish actual and substantial prejudice from the denial of discovery. Hallett v.

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).

All pending motions are DENIED.

AFFIRMED.