Vickers v. Durham.

44 S.E. 685, 132 N.C. 880, 1903 N.C. LEXIS 367
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJune 10, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 44 S.E. 685 (Vickers v. Durham.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vickers v. Durham., 44 S.E. 685, 132 N.C. 880, 1903 N.C. LEXIS 367 (N.C. 1903).

Opinions

Montgomery, J.

Our former courts of equity, from a very early Jay, as will be seen from [he reported cases, have exercised jurisdiction to prevent by injunction threatened evils of the nature of nuisance, when the injury, if done, could not be repaid in damages — the foundation of the interference of equity resting in the necessity of preventing irrepa[881]*881rable mischief and multiplicity of suits; and under The Code still larger powers have been conferred,- affording additional remedies for the protection of rights and the prevention of the committing or continuing of wrongs connected with the free use and enjoyment of property. Indeed, so common has it become to resort to the courts for such relief that injunction can not properly be longer called a high prerogative writ. Nevertheless, such jurisdiction ought to be carefully exercised and the party seeking relief by injunction should be required to show that the matter complained of is of more than trivial consequence and that he has a strong apparent right to relief. Little difficulty is experienced in administering rights under injunction proceedings where the matter in litigation is in existence and constitutes a nuisance per se, under that head being embraced offences against the public morals, the unlawful obstruction or use of the public highways, acts endangering the health or safety of human beings, the overhanging of another’s land, for the reason that proof, other than the fact of their existence, is not necessary to establish the nuisance. It-is not necessary to go into the ill effects of such nuisance. Relief is granted in' such cases as matter of course, upon its being shown that the fact exists. Bell v. Blount, 11 N. C., 384; 15 Am. Dec., 526. So, where the threatened and apprehended mischief would be a nuisance per se, upon an apparent cause being shown, an injunction would issue. In all other cases a different rule prevails, and its application to the different phases of each particular case is often attended with trouble, and has given rise to many conflicts in the decisions of the different courts. In the case now before us, the apprehended mischief complained of is not a nuisance per se. In the complaint, used as an affidavit, the allegation is that the defendant intends to discharge and deposit the sewage of the city of Durham upon the plaintiff’s premises near its residence and there leave it. That [882]*882threat, if carried out, would constitute a nuisance prima facie, but not a nuisance per se. Evans v. Railroad, 96 N. C., 46; Wood on Nuisances, Sec. 569. We are then in the present case required to examine the evidence with the view to see whether the judge who heard the matter was in error, as the plaintiff alleges, when he held that the restraining order should be dissolved.

The complainant must set forth and show that the acts which he seeks to restrain will be a nuisance^that the injury to him will be real and the damage irreparable, and that the apprehension is based on imminent danger. How, or to what degree of certainty must the complainant make out his case?, That is the main question in this matter. We think the rule has been laid down by this court and that is, that injunctions should be issued only in cases where, upon the evidence, there is a probability that the act complained of is, or will be, a nuisance if permitted to remain or be committed. In Raleigh v. Hunter, 16 N. C., 12, the court, after an examination of the evidence, said: “With us under all the circumstances of the case a probability is sufficient,” and in Lowe v. Commissioners, 70 N. C., 532, where the injunc-tive relief was the main relief sought in the action: “In such case where a reasonable doubt exists in the mind of the court, whether the equity of the complaint is sufficiently negatived by the answer, the court will not dissolve the injunction, but continue it to the hearing.” The plaintiff’s counsel accepted the rule of the probability of resulting injury as the correct one in this case.

Upon a careful examination of the evidence, and fully alive to the importance of the matter involved, we have come to the conclusion that it is not probable that the plaintiff will be injured by the erection of the defendant’s sewage plant, or that it will be a nuisance after it is erected and put in use. The answer of the defendant and the affidavits filed in addi[883]*883tion thereto, leave no doubt upon our minds of sufficient importance to induce us to reverse the action of the judge. The complaint of the plaintiff and the affidavit signed by twenty-four citizens of Durham County constituted the plaintiff’s evidence in the case before the judge. The substance of the complaint is that the defendant intended to extend its sewage system out of the city and to deposit the sewage upon the lands of the plaintiff near his house, and that if the act was done it would injure the health of his family and thereby cause him irreparable damage and injure the value of his property. The defendants in their answer aver their purpose to discharge the sewage of the city of Durham, not on the lands of the plaintiff, but in a sewerage disposal plant, built with brick and cement, and, then, by most approved methods known to science, have it purified before its discharge into the streams. The defendants further allege that the plant will not in any way endanger the health of the plaintiff or in any way interfere with or interrupt his comfort. The defendants further answered as follows: “That after great diligence and inquiry as to his fitness, ability and skill, it employed J. L. Ludlow, an engineer of great experience in such matters, to make the plans by which its system of sewerage is being constructed, and to supervise the erection and building of the sewage disposal plant; that it is necessary, in order to prevent disease, preserve health and render the disposal of sewage harmless and inoffensive in every way, to purify the same in the manner above set out, and that owing to the topographical situation of the city of Durham it is necessary and most expedient to locate one of said plants at the place designated in the complaint and above referred to, and that by locating the same at that point the plaintiff will not be injured in health, nor will his comfort or happiness be in any wise disturbed; that the disposal plant aforesaid will be entirely harmless and inoffensive, and the defendant again [884]*884denies any and all allegations of injury to plaintiff, irreparable or otherwise.” The affidavit of J. L. Ludlow, a sanitary and hydraulic engineer of experience and reputation, contains the following: “Owing to the absence of nearby running streams of sufficient size to satisfactorily dispose of the raw sewage from the city of Durham, I have incorporated in my plans disposal works for purifying the sewage before being turned into the streams. In determining the system to be adopted for this disposal and the preparation of plans for the same, I have not been restricted in any way by the city authorities of Durham, but have been given full license to adopt the best methods available.

“The plan comprehends a bacterial treatment of the sewage by a system known as septic tank and contact beds, which constitutes the best method of sewage purification known to the science of engineering and sanitation.

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Bluebook (online)
44 S.E. 685, 132 N.C. 880, 1903 N.C. LEXIS 367, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vickers-v-durham-nc-1903.