VibrantCare Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Deol

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 1, 2022·No. 2:20-cv-00791·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 VIBRANTCARE REHABILITATION, No. 2:20-cv-00791-MCE-AC INC, 12 Plaintiff, v. 14 KIRAN DEOL, and John and Jane Does 1 15 through 10, 16 Defendant. 17 18 This matter is before the court on defendant’s motion to compel discovery. ECF No. 46. 19 The matter was taken under submission on the papers. ECF No. 47. The parties submitted the 20 required joint statement. ECF No. 48. Based on a review of all papers filed, the court DENIES 21 defendant’s motion. 22 I. Relevant Background 23 Plaintiff VibrantCare is one of the largest providers of outpatient physical and 24 occupational therapy services in the Western United States. ECF No. 23 at 2. Plaintiff hired 25 defendant Kiran Deol in March of 2018 as a corporate recruiter. Id. In that role, Deol was 26 responsible for finding, soliciting, and hiring qualified therapists for VibrantCare’s operations. 27 Doel later promoted to Director of Recruiting, where she was responsible for the oversight of 28 recruiting operations in multiple states. Id. According to VibrantCare’s operative Amended 1 Complaint, Doel had access to VibrantCare’s confidential information and trade secrets regarding 2 its vendor and referral network, patient scheduling system, business strategies, costs and payment 3 structure, margins, and other highly sensitive information, which she used to attract candidates. 4 Id. 5 On January 19, 2020, Doel gave notice of her resignation effective January 31, 2020. Id. 6 VibrantCare alleges that it later discovered that by the time she resigned, Deol had been offered 7 and accepted the position of Director of Talent Acquisition for Golden Bear Physical Therapy and 8 Sports Injury Center, Inc. (“Golden Bear”), a direct competitor of VibrantCare’s in Northern 9 California. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Doel misappropriated a significant amount of VibrantCare’s 10 confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information before her resignation; specifically, Deol 11 allegedly emailed VibrantCare’s highly sensitive information and confidential patient information 12 to her personal e-mail account in the days before her final workday with VibrantCare. Id. at 3. 13 Plaintiff alleges defendant violated the VibrantCare Employee Agreement she had signed, 14 and brings a breach of contract claim. ECF No. 23. Plaintiff also brings claims for unfair 15 competition, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act, and violation of 16 the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Id. at 9-13. The parties have been engaging in 17 discovery. On May 17, 2021, the District Judge assigned to this case clarified that discovery 18 closes 365 days from defendant Doel’s answer (ECF No. 25); discovery therefore closes on April 19 11, 2023. See ECF No. 39. 20 II. Motion 21 Defendant filed the pending motion to compel on May 19, 2022. ECF No. 46. The 22 parties filed the required joint statement on June 1, 2022. ECF No. 48. 23 III. Analysis 24 A. Legal Standard on Motion to Compel 25 The scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) is broad. 26 Discovery may be obtained as to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 27 defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within 28 this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. The court, 1 however, may limit discovery if it is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained 2 from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;” or if the 3 party who seeks discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery;” 4 or if “the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 26(b)(2)(C). The purpose of discovery is to “make a trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and 6 more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent,” 7 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (citation omitted), and “to 8 narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 9 (1947). 10 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(3)(B), a motion to compel may be made if “a 11 party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33; or a party fails to produce 12 documents or fails to respond that inspection will be permitted ... as requested under Rule 34.” 13 The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery sought is 14 relevant or that its denial will cause substantial prejudice. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 15 (9th Cir. 2002). The opposing party is “required to carry a heavy burden of showing why 16 discovery was denied.” Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). 17 B. Interrogatory No. 5; Document Request Nos. 16-171 18 The parties dispute the adequacy of responses to the following interrogatories and requests 19 for production regarding VibrantCare’s general protection of trade secrets: 20 Interrogatory No. 5: 21 Identify all of Plaintiff’s current or former officers, executives, or employees having recruiting duties who are not or were not, during 22 their employment with VibrantCare, bound by any restrictive covenant agreement at any time from January 1, 2010 to the present. 23 VibrantCare’s Response: 24 VibrantCare objects to this interrogatory as not reasonably calculated 25 to the discovery of admissible evidence, overly broad in substance 26 1 The parties dispute several different discovery requests, which they jointly briefed by grouping 27 related interrogatories and requests for production together by topic. ECF No. 48. Each group is addressed in the order that the parties addressed it in their joint statement. Id. 28 1 and in time, unduly burdensome, calling for information not relevant to any claim or defense in this matter, and calling for information as 2 to other employees of VibrantCare that VibrantCare is legally prohibited from disclosing under California law. VibrantCare is not 3 seeking to enforce any restrictive covenant against Defendant in this matter other than the confidentiality provision in her agreement with 4 VibrantCare. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, VibrantCare states that its current or former employees 5 who were involved in recruiting were subject to confidentiality and non-disclosure restrictions similar or identical to those executed by 6 Defendant. 7 Request No. 16: 8 All agreements containing restrictive covenants of any kind signed by employees or former employees of VibrantCare from January 9 2018 to the present. 10 VibrantCare’s Response: 11 VibrantCare objects to this Request as overly broad, unduly burdensome, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 12 admissible evidence, calling for private records of unrelated third parties, and calling for information protected from disclosure by 13 California state law. This lawsuit only concerns VibrantCare’s enforcement of a confidentiality provision against Defendant. Any 14 dispute that VibrantCare may have had with any other employee is not relevant to any claim or defense in this matter. 15 Request No.

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