Vetro v. Middle Country Central School District

2017 NY Slip Op 1911, 148 A.D.3d 964, 48 N.Y.S.3d 607
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 15, 2017
Docket2014-11546
StatusPublished

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 1911 (Vetro v. Middle Country Central School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vetro v. Middle Country Central School District, 2017 NY Slip Op 1911, 148 A.D.3d 964, 48 N.Y.S.3d 607 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Baisley, Jr., J.), dated October 8, 2014, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

*965 Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred (see CPLR 214 [3]; 215 [3]; Education Law § 3813 [2]; General Municipal Law § 50-i [1]; Yang v Oceanside Union Free School Dist., 90 AD3d 649, 649 [2011]; cf. Drakeford v Brooklyn Dist. Attorney, 266 AD2d 134, 134 [1999]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the relevant statutes of limitation were tolled or were otherwise inapplicable (see Yang v Oceanside Union Free School Dist., 90 AD3d at 650).

Further, the causes of action alleging conspiracy and harassment asserted against the defendant Michelle Konik-Brosdal were properly dismissed because New York does not recognize a cause of action to recover damages for harassment (see Adeniran v State of New York, 106 AD3d 844, 845 [2013]), or an independent cause of action for conspiracy to commit a tort (see Oseff v Scotti, 130 AD3d 797, 799 [2015]).

In light of our determination, we need not address the parties’ remaining contentions.

Balkin, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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Related

Oseff v. Scotti
130 A.D.3d 797 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2015)
Yang v. Oceanside Union Free School District
90 A.D.3d 649 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2011)
Adeniran v. State
106 A.D.3d 844 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2013)
Drakeford v. Brooklyn District Attorney
266 A.D.2d 134 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2017 NY Slip Op 1911, 148 A.D.3d 964, 48 N.Y.S.3d 607, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vetro-v-middle-country-central-school-district-nyappdiv-2017.