Verzatt v. Halstead Property, LLC

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Verzatt v. Halstead Property, LLC

2017 NY Slip Op 3260, 149 A.D.3d 652, 50 N.Y.S.3d 873

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 27, 2017

Docket3493 162036/14

StatusPublished

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 3260 (Verzatt v. Halstead Property, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Verzatt v. Halstead Property, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 3260, 149 A.D.3d 652, 50 N.Y.S.3d 873 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Geoffrey D. *653 Wright, J.), entered May 28, 2015, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted the motion of defendants Halstead Property, LLC and Halstead Property Riverdale, LLC, to dismiss the second and fourth causes of action of the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion court properly granted the motion to dismiss of defendant real estate brokers and their agents, who sought to facilitate, not prevent, plaintiffs’ purchase of a cooperative apartment. To the extent that the challenged statements, which suggested, but did not require, that plaintiffs submit a letter describing the “longevity” and “solidity” of their relationship, and stating that they are married, can be construed as inquiry into their sexual orientation or marital status (of which defendants already were aware, but the cooperative board might not have been), when read in context with the relevant emails, they do not express any “limitation, specification or discrimination” on the basis of the couples’ sexual orientation, as opposed to financial concerns similar to any couple seeking to buy an apartment in the building (Executive Law § 296 [5] [c] [2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [5] [c] [2] ; Alexander’s, Inc. v White, 115 AD2d 424 [1st Dept 1985]; see also Soules v United States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F2d 817, 824 [2d Cir 1992]).

While the statements might be construed as a “limitation, specification or discrimination” on the basis of marital status, as plaintiffs acknowledged, they would not have been denied the apartment on the basis of their marital status had they disclosed their status to the board, since they were married. Thus, they were not “aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice” as required under the State and City Human Rights Laws (Executive Law § 297 [1], [9]; Administrative Code § 8-109).

Concur — Tom, J.P., Friedman, Mazzarelli, Kapnick and Kahn, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Geoffrey D. *653 Wright, J.), entered May 28, 2015, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted the motion of defendants Halstead Property, LLC and Halstead Property Riverdale, LLC, to dismiss the second and fourth causes of action of the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion court properly granted the motion to dismiss of defendant real estate brokers and their agents, who sought to facilitate, not prevent, plaintiffs’ purchase of a cooperative apartment. To the extent that the challenged statements, which suggested, but did not require, that plaintiffs submit a letter describing the “longevity” and “solidity” of their relationship, and stating that they are married, can be construed as inquiry into their sexual orientation or marital status (of which defendants already were aware, but the cooperative board might not have been), when read in context with the relevant emails, they do not express any “limitation, specification or discrimination” on the basis of the couples’ sexual orientation, as opposed to financial concerns similar to any couple seeking to buy an apartment in the building (Executive Law § 296 [5] [c] [2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [5] [c] [2] ; Alexander’s, Inc. v White, 115 AD2d 424 [1st Dept 1985]; see also Soules v United States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F2d 817, 824 [2d Cir 1992]).

While the statements might be construed as a “limitation, specification or discrimination” on the basis of marital status, as plaintiffs acknowledged, they would not have been denied the apartment on the basis of their marital status had they disclosed their status to the board, since they were married. Thus, they were not “aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice” as required under the State and City Human Rights Laws (Executive Law § 297 [1], [9]; Administrative Code § 8-109).

Concur — Tom, J.P., Friedman, Mazzarelli, Kapnick and Kahn, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 3260, 149 A.D.3d 652, 50 N.Y.S.3d 873, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/verzatt-v-halstead-property-llc-nyappdiv-2017.

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