Versar Environmental Services, LLC v. Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp.

District Court, D. Delaware·Decided September 9, 2025·No. 1:23-cv-01450·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

VERSAR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, LLC Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-01450-RGA Vv. BLACK & VEATCH SPECIAL PROJECTS CORP., Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER Plaintiff filed a complaint pleading fraud, or in the alternative, indemnification and breach of contract. (D.I. 1 at 44-49). Defendant moved to partially dismiss the claims for fraud and breach of contract. (D.I. 11). I granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted Plaintiff leave to amend its complaint. (D.I. 24). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint asserting the same causes of action. (D.I. 29 at 27-35). Before me is Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss Count II(B) of Plaintiff's amended complaint, which claims a breach of contract. (D.I. 30). [ have considered the parties’ briefing. (D.I. 31, 32, 33). For the reasons set forth below, this motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND! Defendant Black & Veatch provides “architectural, engineering, and waste management services, including advisory, consulting and planning services.” (D.I. 29 17). Plaintiff Versar purchased “Project Evergreen” from Defendant pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement

'T summarize the factual background in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

(“APA”). Ud. J] 18, 97). Project Evergreen was Defendant’s “full-service, environmental business unit specializing in investigation, assessment, design, remediation, and operations and maintenance for government clients across the United States.” (/d. 18). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made misrepresentations in the APA that support a fraud claim, breached representations and warranties in the APA that entitle Plaintiff to indemnification, and breached the section of the APA concerning the Purchase Price Adjustment. (/d. at 27-35). Defendant only moves to dismiss the claim for breach of contract. The APA states: (c) Prior to the date hereof, Seller has delivered to Buyer and attached hereto on Schedule 1.4(b): (i) an estimated balance sheet of Seller as of immediately prior to the Closing, reflecting thereon Seller’s best estimate of balance sheet items of Sellers [sic] calculated in accordance with GAAP (the “Estimated Closing Balance Sheet”); (ii) the Working Capital as of the Closing, based on the Estimated Closing Balance Sheet, calculated in accordance with GAAP and the Illustrative Working Capital Example, along with supporting calculations and materials (the “Estimated Working Capital”); and (iii) the calculation of the Closing Cash Payment, along with supporting calculations and materials, based on the calculation of the foregoing amounts, in each case, without giving effect to the consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement (collectively, the “Estimated Statements”). (D.I. 29-2 at 6 of 130, Ex. 1, § 1.4(c)). (a) Within ninety (90) days after the Closing Date, Buyer shall prepare and deliver to Seller: (A) a balance sheet of Seller as of the Closing, reflecting Buyer’s good faith determination, but adjusted to take into account the actual balances as of the Closing (the “Closing Balance Sheet”); and (B) the Working Capital as of the Closing, based on the Closing Balance Sheet, calculated in accordance with GAAP and the Illustrative Working Capital Example, along with supporting calculations and materials (the “Closing Working Capital” and, together with the Closing Balance Sheet, the “Closing Statements”). (b) Unless Seller delivers a Dispute Notice within thirty (30) days after receipt of the Closing Statements, the Closing Statements shall be deemed the “Final Closing Statements” and shall be binding upon the parties hereto and shall not be subject to dispute or review. If Seller disagrees with any of the Closing Statements, Seller may, within thirty (30) days after receipt thereof, notify Buyer in writing (the “Dispute Notice”), which Dispute Notice shall provide reasonable detail of the nature of each disputed item on the Closing Statements, including all supporting documentation thereto along with a dollar value of

Seller’s proposed adjustments to the Closing Statements, and Seller shall be deemed to have agreed with all other items and amounts contained in the Closing Statements that are not disputed in the Dispute Notice. Buyer and Seller shall first attempt to resolve such dispute between themselves and, if Buyer and Seller are able to resolve such dispute, the Closing Statements shall be revised to the extent necessary to reflect such resolution, and such revised statements shall be deemed the “Final Closing Statements” and shall be conclusive and binding upon the parties hereto and shall not be subject to further dispute or review. If Seller and Buyer are unable to resolve such dispute within thirty (30) days after receipt by Buyer of the Dispute Notice, Buyer and Seller shall submit those items which remain in dispute to a mutually agreeable independent regionally recognized financial consulting or public accounting firm, which shall at the time of such submission certify its independence from Buyer and Seller (the “Accountants”). . .. (c) Following the final determination of the Final Closing Statements pursuant to Section 1.5(b), the Purchase Price shall be adjusted on a dollar-for-dollar basis as follows (the absolute value of the amount of the adjustment shall be referred to herein as the “Post-Closing Purchase Price Adjustment”): (i) Downward by the amount that the Closing Working Capital as set forth in the Final Closing Statements is less than the Estimated Working Capital; or (ii) Upward by the amount that the Closing Working Capital as set forth in the Final Closing Statements is greater than the Estimated Working Capital. (Id. at 6-7 of 130, Ex. 1, § 1.5). Il. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complainant to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief... .” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows the accused party to bring a motion to dismiss the claim for failing to meet this standard. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be granted only if, accepting the well- pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the complainant, a court concludes that those allegations “could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

“Though ‘detailed factual allegations’ are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Iam “not required to credit bald assertions or legal conclusions improperly alleged in the complaint.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 216 Gd Cir. 2002). A complaint may not be dismissed, however, “for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014). A complainant must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has “substantive plausibility.” Jd. at 12. That plausibility must be found on the face of the complaint. Ashcroft v. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The facial plausibility standard is satisfied when the complaint’s factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Jd.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Versar Environmental Services, LLC v. Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp., (D. Del. 2025).

Versar Environmental Services, LLC v. Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp. (Versar Environmental Services, LLC v. Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Collette Davis v. Abington Mem Hosp
765 F.3d 236 (Third Circuit, 2014)
Carol Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Associati
903 F.3d 100 (Third Circuit, 2018)