Veronica Sosa v. Kilolo Kijakazi

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: August 23, 2022
• Docket: 2:21-cv-07194
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Case 2:21-cv-07194-GJS Document 21 Filed 08/23/22 Page 1 of 10 Page ID #:561

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 VERONICA S,1 Case No. 2:21-cv-7194-GJS

12 Plaintiff

13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16

17 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 18 Plaintiff Veronica S. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint seeking review of the 19 decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for 20 Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). 21 The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned United States 22 Magistrate Judge [Dkts. 11 and 12] and briefs addressing disputed issues in the case 23 [Dkt. 16 (“Pltf. Br.”), Dkt. 18 (“Def. Br.”), and Dkt. 19 (“Reply”)]. The Court has 24 taken the parties’ briefing under submission without oral argument. For the reasons 25 discussed below, the Court finds that this matter should be remanded for further 26

27 1 In the interest of privacy, this Order uses only the first name and the initial of the last name of the non-governmental party. 28 Case 2:21-cv-07194-GJS Document 21 Filed 08/23/22 Page 2 of 10 Page ID #:562

1 proceedings. 2 II. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION UNDER REVIEW 3 Plaintiff filed applications for SSI and DIB, alleging disability as of August 4 15, 2018. [Dkt. 14, Administrative Record (“AR”) 165-172.] Plaintiff’s 5 applications were denied at the initial level of review and on reconsideration. [AR 6 100-104, 107-108.] On August 17, 2020, a hearing was held before Administrative 7 Law Judge Tom Duann (“the ALJ”). [AR 29-57.] On December 31, 2020, the ALJ 8 issued an unfavorable decision. [AR 12-28.] 9 The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process to find Plaintiff 10 not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)-(g)(1). At step one, the ALJ found that 11 Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. 12 [AR 17.] At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from severe 13 impairments consisting of a depressive disorder and an anxiety disorder. [AR 17.] 14 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 15 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 16 the impairments listed in Appendix I of the Regulations, (“the Listings”). [AR 18]. 17 Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 18 perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following 19 limitations:

20 [claimant is] unable to perform fast-paced production 21 work; able to interact occasionally with coworkers and the public; able to adapt to occasional changes in the work 22 setting; and able to engage in occasional work-related 23 decision-making. 24 [AR 21.] Applying this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not return to her 25 past relevant work as an institution child attendant and children’s tutor, but the ALJ 26 determined that based on Plaintiff’s age (38 years old) and high school education, 27 she could perform representative occupations such as cleaner II, equipment cleaner, 28 2 Case 2:21-cv-07194-GJS Document 21 Filed 08/23/22 Page 3 of 10 Page ID #:563

1 and furniture cleaner. [AR 22-23.] 2 The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision on July 29, 2021. 3 [AR 1-9.] This action followed. 4 III. GOVERNING STANDARD 5 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 6 determine if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial 7 evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards. Carmickle v. 8 Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 9 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is “such relevant 10 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 11 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal citation and quotations 12 omitted); see also Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1074. 13 IV. DISCUSSION 14 In her sole issue, Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to properly consider her 15 credibility. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide a legally 16 sufficient reason to reject her testimony and instead performed no credibility 17 analysis at all. (Pltf.’s Br. at 5-7.). The Commissioner responds that while the ALJ 18 primarily discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints as inconsistent with the 19 objective medical evidence, the ALJ also examined the inconsistencies between 20 Plaintiff’s “admitted activities” and “her symptom complaints” and that Plaintiff’s 21 symptoms “improved with treatment” as credibility considerations. (Def.’s Br. at 4- 22 8). The Court disagrees with the Commissioner and finds that reversal is warranted. 23 A. Relevant Law 24 In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ must 25 engage in a two-step analysis. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 26 (9th Cir. 2007). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented 27 objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which “could reasonably 28 be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. (quoting Bunnell 3 Case 2:21-cv-07194-GJS Document 21 Filed 08/23/22 Page 4 of 10 Page ID #:564

1 v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). And second, if the 2 claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can 3 only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives 4 “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for the rejection. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 5 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). “At the same time, the ALJ is not required to believe 6 every allegation of [symptoms], or else disability benefits would be available for the 7 asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).” Molina v. Astrue, 8 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 9 “The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s credibility, 10 including (1) the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies in the 11 claimant’s testimony or between his testimony and conduct; (3) claimant’s daily 12 living activities; (4) claimant’s work record; and (5) testimony from physicians or 13 third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of claimant’s condition.” 14 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). Even if “the ALJ 15 provided one or more invalid reasons for disbelieving a claimant’s testimony,” if she 16 “also provided valid reasons that were supported by the record,” the ALJ’s error “is 17 harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s 18 decision and the error does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate 19 conclusion.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (internal citation and quotations omitted). 20 B. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony 21 At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she is unable to work due 22 to anxiety. [AR 41.] For several months. Plaintiff’s anxiety prevented her from 23 leaving her home or driving in a car. [AR 41.] To alleviate her anxiety and panic 24 attacks, Plaintiff takes “strong medication” which makes her drowsy. [AR 41.] Her 25 medication has helped alleviate her panic attacks, which are “infrequent now,” but 26 she still experiences panic attacks when she is not at home. [AR 43.] 27 C. The ALJ’s Findings and Conclusions 28 The ALJ made the following findings as to the RFC and credibility 4 Case 2:21-cv-07194-GJS Document 21 Filed 08/23/22 Page 5 of 10 Page ID #:565

1 determination overall:

2 After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that 3 the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not “entirely consistent with the 4 medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons 5 explained in the decision.

6 The undersigned has translated the broad areas of mental functioning 7 limitations as described in the above “paragraph B” criteria analysis into the specific function-by-function work restrictions as set forth in 8 the residual functional capacity described herein. Notably, at a 9 minimum, the record does not document any psychiatric 10 hospitalizations.

11 Additionally, while the claimant testified that she often has medication 12 side effects, including sleepiness, dizziness, and lethargy, treatment records nonetheless refer only fleetingly to such complaints. Notably, 13 October 2019 treatment records relate her allegation of decreased 14 drowsiness with her medication, and April 2020 treatment records show that she alleges decreased fatigue, albeit with a tendency to doze, 15 off and on. 16 In consideration of the overall record, including the claimant’s 17 subjective complaints, she is therefore found to have had a residual 18 functional capacity, including prophylactic restrictions, as follows: unable to perform fast-paced production work; able to interact 19 occasionally with coworkers and the public; able to adapt to occasional 20 changes in the work setting; and able to engage in occasional work- related decision making. 21 22 [AR 21-22.] 23 D. Analysis 24 Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the ALJ offered 25 only one reason for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony: that the objective medical 26 evidence does not support Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling limitations. [AR 22.] 27 As seen above, the ALJ vaguely concluded that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints 28 were not credible to the extent they conflicted with the ALJ’s “specific function-by- 5 Case 2:21-cv-07194-GJS Document 21 Filed 08/23/22 Page 6 of 10 Page ID #:566

1 function work restrictions” set forth in the residual functional capacity assessment. 2 [AR 22.] The ALJ offered only one reason to support that conclusion: “the record 3 does not document any psychiatric hospitalizations.” [AR 22.] Thus, construed 4 broadly, the ALJ asserts that the objective medical evidence (the lack of psychiatric 5 hospitalizations) does not support Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms. 6 [AR 21-22.] 7 Defendant argues that the ALJ discussed two other valid reasons for rejecting 8 Plaintiff’s credibility. Pointing to the “paragraph B2” mental function analysis at 9 step three of the sequential evaluation, Defendant argues that the ALJ also found (1) 10 “[that] Plaintiff’s symptoms improved with treatment” and (2) that Plaintiff’s 11 admitted daily activities were inconsistent with the severity of her alleged 12 limitations. (Def.’s Br. at 4-8.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff only has 13 a moderate limitation in her ability to interact with others because despite her claims 14 that “she rarely leaves the house,” Plaintiff admittedly volunteers three times a week 15 at her son’s school, and she has begun to inquire about possibly working at a local 16 coffee shop or restaurant. [AR 19.] Additionally, June, August, and October 2019 17 treatment records demonstrate that Plaintiff’s anxiety has been improving. [AR 19.] 18 Defendant asserts that the ALJ permissibly rejected Plaintiff’s credibility for those 19 reasons because improvement with treatment and inconsistency between Plaintiff’s 20

21 2 Paragraph B contains four functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2) 22 social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1 §§ 12.00(C). An ALJ 23 uses the “special technique” to rate a claimant’s degree of limitation in each area, based on the extent to which the claimant’s impairment “interferes with [the 24 claimant’s] ability to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1620a(c)(2). An ALJ rates a claimant’s degree of 25 limitation in the first three areas, using the terminology: “none,” “mild,” 26 “moderate,” “marked,” or “extreme.” Id. at § 404.1620a(c)(4). In order to satisfy paragraph B, a claimant must exhibit either “marked” limitations in two of the first 27 three areas, or “marked” limitation in one of the first three areas with repeated episodes of decompensation. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1 §§ 28 12.02, 12.06. 6 Case 2:21-cv-07194-GJS Document 21 Filed 08/23/22 Page 7 of 10 Page ID #:567

1 activities and her alleged limitations are legally valid reasons to discredit Plaintiff’s 2 subjective testimony. While the Court agrees that improvement with medication 3 (see Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) and an inconsistency 4 between a claimant’s testimony and her conduct may support an ALJ’s rejection of a 5 claimant’s credibility (see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–59 (9th Cir. 6 2002)), the Court is not persuaded that the ALJ’s discussion of the Paragraph B 7 criteria at step three of the sequential evaluation satisfied the ALJ’s obligation to 8 specify the basis for rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility in this case for several reasons. 9 First, when the ALJ identified Plaintiff’s volunteer work and her musings 10 about returning to work, the ALJ was considering whether Plaintiff had a limitation 11 in her ability to “interact with others” for purposes of determining whether her 12 impairments met or equaled a listing (AR 19)—not evaluating Plaintiff’s specific 13 activities of daily living as typically used in a credibility analysis which reviews 14 “activities of daily living” in relation to specific testimony. Many Courts have 15 recognized that an ALJ’s citations at step three are essentially findings relating to 16 the listing determination concerning rudimentary abilities to even obtain medical 17 care and present oneself at a doctor to receive help— which is not the same inquiry 18 as whether Plaintiff’s testimony is credible. See, e.g., Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. 19 Sec., No. 1:21-cv-00068-SAB, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104073, 2022 WL 2110709 20 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2022) (rejecting Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ properly 21 incorporated “paragraph B” criteria into the credibility analysis); Gardner v. Colvin, 22 No. EDCV 13-1272 JC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8721, 2014 WL 255621, at *4 (C.D. 23 Cal. Jan. 23, 2014) (stating the court was “not persuaded that the foregoing finding 24 by the ALJ satisfied the ALJ’s obligation to specify the basis for rejecting plaintiff’s 25 credibility in this case [as] [t]he ALJ identified the foregoing mild limitation in 26 plaintiff’s mental abilities when considering the ‘paragraph B Criteria’ used to 27 determine the severity of plaintiff’s mental impairments at step two . . . not when 28 evaluating plaintiff’s credibility in connection with the ALJ’s residual functional 7 Case 2:21-cv-07194-GJS Document 21 Filed 08/23/22 Page 8 of 10 Page ID #:568

1 capacity assessment at step four.”); Cohoon v. Astrue, 2011 WL 3841568, at *6 (D. 2 Or. Aug. 30, 2011) (rejecting the argument that the ALJ’s findings concerning the 3 Paragraph B criteria at Step 2 and 3 were part of the subsequent assessment of 4 plaintiff’s credibility which is done as part of arriving at an RFC); see also SSR 96– 5 8P, at *4 (“[L]imitations identified in the ‘paragraph B’ ... criteria are not [a residual 6 functional capacity] assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental 7 impairment(s) at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process.”). 8 While Defendant insists that the discussion of the paragraph B criteria was 9 properly incorporated into the rest of the opinion, as the ALJ’s opinion itself 10 indicates, the “limitations identified in the ‘paragraph B’ criteria are not a residual 11 functional capacity assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental 12 impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process,” and “[t]he mental 13 residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential 14 evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment of the areas of mental 15 functioning.” [AR 21.] 16 Second, despite the ALJ’s comments at step three that Plaintiff’s “anxiety has 17 been improving” and that an “October 2019 mental status examination shows that 18 she presented with less anxiety,” the ALJ never cited effective treatment as a reason 19 to discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. This Court may not affirm the ALJ’s 20 credibility determination based on reasons not articulated by the ALJ. See Bray v. 21 Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Long-standing 22 principles of administrative law require [the Court] to review the ALJ’s decision 23 based on the reasoning and actual findings offered by the ALJ—not post hoc 24 rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been 25 thinking.”); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We 26 are constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”). Further, while the ALJ 27 made some observations about Plaintiff’s success with treatment, the ALJ did not 28 connect his findings at step three to his reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s overall 8 Case 2:21-cv-07194-GJS Document 21 Filed 08/23/22 Page 9 of 10 Page ID #:569

1 symptom testimony. The purported improvement with medication identified by the 2 ALJ is not analyzed—how or why this limited improvement was considered 3 relevant for the purposes of credibility by the ALJ is not discussed. Further, the 4 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has unequivocally stated that its “decisions make 5 clear that we may not take a general finding—an unspecified conflict between 6 Claimant’s testimony about daily activities and her reports to doctors—and comb 7 the administrative record to find specific conflicts.” Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 8 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2014). 9 For these reasons, the Court finds the ALJ’s statements at step three cannot 10 save the ALJ’s failure to properly use Plaintiff’s daily activities or improvement 11 with treatment in the credibility analysis, and as such, the Court does not find the 12 ALJ’s reliance on these reasons to be a clear and convincing reasons supported by 13 substantial evidence in the record for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. 14 Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide specific, clear and 15 convincing reasons, apart from the lack of objective medical evidence, for 16 discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 17 18 V. CONCLUSION 19 The decision of whether to remand for further proceedings or order an 20 immediate award of benefits is within the district court’s discretion. Harman v. 21 Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000). When no useful purpose would be 22 served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has been fully 23 developed, it is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award 24 of benefits. Id. at 1179 (“the decision of whether to remand for further proceedings 25 turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings”). But when there are outstanding 26 issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and it 27 is not clear from the record the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled 28 if all the evidence were properly evaluated, remand is appropriate. Id. A remand 9 Case 2:21-cv-07194-GJS Document 21 Filed 08/23/22 Page 10o0f10 Page ID #:570

1 || for an immediate award of benefits is appropriate “only in rare circumstances.” 2 || Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citation 3 |} omitted). 4 The Court finds that remand is appropriate because the circumstances of this 5 || case do not preclude the possibility that further administrative review could remedy 6 || the ALJ’s errors. On remand, the Commissioner must re-evaluate Plaintiff's 7 || subjective symptom assertions and testimony properly, which in turn may lead to 8 || the formulation of a new RFC and the need for additional vocational expert 9 || testimony. The Court therefore declines to exercise its discretion to remand for an 10 || immediate award of benefits. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (upon 11 || reversal of an administrative determination, the proper course is remand for 12 || additional agency investigation or explanation, “except in rare circumstances”’); 13. || Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court 14 || concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it 15 || may not remand with a direction to provide benefits.”’). 16 For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that: 17 (1) the Decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this matter 18 REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further 19 administrative proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and 20 Order; and 21 (2) Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff. 22 23 IT IS ORDERED. 24 77 25 || DATED: August 23, 2022 6 GAIL’J. STANDISH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28 10