Veronica Martinez v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 24, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00909
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Veronica Martinez, No. CV-25-00909-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff Veronica Martinez (“Plaintiff”) seeks this Court’s review of the Social 16 Security Administration (“SSA”) Commissioner’s (the “Commissioner”) denial of her 17 application for disability insurance benefits. (Doc. 9). The matter is fully briefed. (Docs. 18 10, 11).1 Having reviewed the briefs and the Administrative Record (Docs. 8-1–8-55, 19 “AR.”) and for the reasons set out below, the Court affirms the ALJ’s decision. 20 I. Procedural Background 21 On May 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits, 22 alleging a disability onset of June 15, 2015. (AR. 2364). Plaintiff’s claim was first denied 23 on September 18, 2018, then again upon reconsideration on September 26, 2019. (Id.) 24 After these denials, Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing, which was granted, and a 25 telephonic hearing was held before the ALJ on April 28, 2021. (Id.) The ALJ issued his 26 decision, determining that Plaintiff was not disabled on July 2, 2021. (Id.) The Appeals 27 Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on May 23, 2022. (Id.) This denial prompted

28 1 Plaintiff’s Reply brief was filed with tracked changes still visible. (See Doc. 11). In the future, Plaintiff should exercise greater care in submitting filings to the Court. 1 Plaintiff to file a complaint with the District Court, but Plaintiff and the Commissioner then 2 stipulated to remand the case for further proceedings. (Id.) The Court accordingly entered 3 a judgment remanding Plaintiff’s case. (Id.) 4 Based on the prior District Court Order, the Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to: 5 - Give further consideration to the medical source opinions and prior administrative medical findings pursuant to the provisions of 20 CFR 6 404.1520c. 7 - Further evaluate the claimant’s alleged symptoms and provide rationale in 8 accordance with the disability regulations pertaining to evaluation of 9 symptoms.

10 - Give further consideration to the claimant's maximum residual functional 11 capacity and provide appropriate rationale with specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed limitations. 12 13 - Give further consideration to whether the claimant has past relevant work and, if so, can perform it. 14 - If warranted by the expanded record, obtain supplemental evidence from a 15 vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on the 16 claimant’s occupational base. 17 (Id. at 2365; see also id. at 2490–92). 18 With the Appeals Council’s instructions, the ALJ conducted a subsequent hearing 19 with Plaintiff on November 19, 2024. (Id. at 2364). The ALJ issued his decision on 20 February 24, 2025, again determining that Plaintiff was not disabled. (See id. at 2364– 21 78).2 Following this decision, Plaintiff filed the present action, seeking Court review, on 22 March 19, 2025. (See Doc. 1). 23 II. The ALJ’s Decision 24 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 25 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). First, the ALJ determines whether 26 2 As the ALJ noted in his decision, Plaintiff had a prior unfavorable disability determination 27 issued on February 4, 2014. The ALJ stated that, although a presumption of continuing nondisability applies, the presumption was rebutted by new and material evidence. (Id. at 28 2365). Therefore, the findings concerning the Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC from the 2014 decision were not adopted in the February 24, 2025 decision. (Id.) 1 the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 2 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 3 medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 4 Third, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 5 impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 6 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically 7 found to be disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional 8 capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past 9 relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step, 10 where they determine whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national 11 economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 12 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the ALJ determines no such work is available, then the claimant is 13 disabled. Id. 14 Here, the ALJ first found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 15 activity during the period from her onset date of June 15, 2015, through her date last insured 16 of June 15, 2018. (AR. 2368). Second, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from 17 severe impairments in the form of lumbar degenerative disc disease status post fusion, 18 diabetes mellitus, polyneuropathy, cubital tunnel syndrome, and obesity. (Id.) And at the 19 third step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or a combination 20 of impairments that met or medically equaled an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 21 Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. (Id. at 2369). 22 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform light work as 23 defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except: The claimant could lift and carry 20 pounds 24 occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. The claimant could stand and walk for six hours 25 in an eight-hour day, and sit for six hours in an eight hour day. The claimant could 26 frequently balance and stoop and occasionally climb, kneel, crouch and crawl. The 27 claimant could frequently reach, handle and finger with both upper extremities. The 28 claimant could not perform work with concentrated exposure to extreme cold, vibration 1 and hazards.” (Id.) Plaintiff was found to have no past relevant work within five years of 2 the date last insured. (Id. at 2377). Fifth and finally, based on Plaintiff’s age, education, 3 work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in 4 significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Id.) As a result, 5 the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged onset through the date last 6 insured. (Id. at 2378). 7 II. Standard of Review 8 In considering whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 9 those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 10 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 11 determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 12 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 13 that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the 14 record as a whole. Id. 15 To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court must 16 consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum 17 of supporting evidence.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 630. The ALJ must “set forth the reasoning 18 behind its decisions in a way that allows for meaningful review.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 19 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts, 20 addressing ambiguity, and determining credibility. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 21 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). While the 22 Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may neither reweigh the evidence 23 nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 24 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one 25 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion 26 must be upheld.” Id. at 954 (citations omitted). 27 III. Discussion 28 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in rendering its decision for two reasons. First, 1 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected certain medical opinions. Second, 2 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. The 3 Court will address each of Plaintiff’s arguments in turn. 4 A. Medical Opinions 5 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly consider the medical opinions of 6 Dr. Charles W. Sternbergh, Dr. Mark P. Garrett, and Dr. C. Hutchinson. (Doc. 9 at 4–8). 7 Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not discuss supportability and consistency 8 and failed to back his opinions with substantial evidence. (See id.). The Commissioner 9 disagrees, arguing that the ALJ reasonably concluded that the medical opinions were not 10 consistent with or supported by evidence from the relevant time period. (See Doc. 10 at 5– 11 10). 12 An ALJ “cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or 13 inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence. The 14 agency must ‘articulate . . . how persuasive’ it finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each 15 doctor or other source” and “explain how [it] considered the supportability and consistency 16 factors’ in reaching these findings.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) 17 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)). The SSA regulations provide that the most important 18 factors to consider when evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions are 19 “supportability” and “consistency.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Supportability refers to 20 “the extent to which a medical source supports the medical opinion by explaining the 21 ‘relevant . . . objective medical evidence.’ ” Woods, 32 F.4th at 791–92 (quoting 20 C.F.R. 22 § 404.1520c(c)(1)). Consistency refers to “the extent to which a medical opinion is 23 ‘consistent . . . with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in 24 the claim.” Id. at 792 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)). 25 Woods makes clear that to properly reject a medical opinion under the substantial 26 evidence standard, the ALJ “must articulate how persuasive it finds all the medical 27 opinions from each doctor or other source and explain how it considered the supportability 28 and consistency factors in reaching these findings.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 1 404.1520c(b)). 2 1. Dr. Sternbergh 3 Plaintiff, first, argues that the ALJ failed to give reasons based on supportability and 4 consistency for his rejection of Dr. Sternbergh’s opinion. (Doc. 9 at 5–7). The 5 Commissioner maintains that the ALJ reasonably discredited Dr. Sternbergh’s opinion, 6 based on its supportability and consistency. (Doc. 10 at 5–7). Dr. Sternbergh was a 7 neurosurgeon at Plaintiff’s disability insurance carrier, and, in review of Dr. Sternbergh’s 8 opinion, the ALJ stated: 9 The undersigned considered the opinion of neurosurgeon, Charles W. Sternbergh, M.D. (Ex. B7F/71). On February 27, 2013, Dr. Sternbergh, 10 opined the claimant could sustain full-time sedentary physical demand work 11 activities including lifting 10 pounds occasionally. He opined she needs to reposition every 60 minutes. He further opined these restrictions and 12 limitations would be valid from November 1, 2012 “going forward.” Dr. 13 Sternbergh’s opinion is not persuasive. His opinion is not supported by his treatment notes which show the claimant’s right lower extremity neuropathy 14 began to resolve with small dosed [sic] of medication following the lumbar 15 fusion. Further, his opinion is inconsistent with the evidence as a whole which shows she was able to ambulate normally with some mild strength 16 reduction in the lower extremities, mild decrease of lumbar movement and 17 no indication of tenderness or pain with movement, normal joint range of motion, and normal gait and station during the period at issue (Exs. B6F; 18 B7F/35, 37, 52; B8F/2). 19 (AR. 2375). 20 Based on the above assessment, the Court concludes that there is substantial 21 evidence to support the ALJ’s decision to disregard Dr. Sternbergh’s opinions. To start, 22 the ALJ reasonably found that Dr. Sternbergh’s opinion was unpersuasive because it was 23 not supported by his own treatment notes. (Id.) Indeed, Dr. Sternbergh’s notes state that 24 “motor and sensory abnormalities” and “electrodiagnostic abnormalities” in the lower right 25 extremity had “resolved,” “[n]eurological abnormalities” in the lower right extremity 26 “began to resolve,” and the back and leg pain that resurfaced was treated with “tramadol 27 used in small doses.” (Id. at 614); see Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (upholding the ALJ’s 28 rejection of doctor’s opinion because it was not supported by doctor’s treatment notes). 1 The ALJ also found Dr. Sternbergh’s opinion inconsistent with the record evidence that 2 showed Plaintiff was able to ambulate normally, had a normal gait, and experienced mild 3 decreases of lower extremity strength and lumbar movement. (AR at 2375). In noting this 4 inconsistency, the ALJ cited to evidence demonstrating normal function or only mild 5 abnormalities. (See id.); see Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 739–40 (9th Cir. 2023) 6 (noting that an ALJ can rely on consistency with other medical sources in assessing a 7 medical opinion). “In assessing a medical opinion, an ALJ need only explain her 8 consideration of the factors of supportability and consistency, which the ALJ did here[.]” 9 Connolly v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 17484335, *1 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, the ALJ properly 10 considered supportability and consistency in rejecting Dr. Sternbergh’s opinion. 11 2. Dr. Garrett 12 Plaintiff next contends that the opinion of Dr. Garrett was not properly considered. 13 (Doc. 9 at 7–8). At the same time, the Commissioner claims that the ALJ reasonably found 14 his opinion unpersuasive as it was rendered three years after Plaintiff’s date last insured 15 (“DLI”). (Doc. 10 at 7–9). Dr. Garrett treated Plaintiff in March of 2021, due to Plaintiff’s 16 right leg pain and numbness. (AR. 2352). His opinion was submitted to the ALJ, and the 17 ALJ’s discussion of the opinion reads as follows: 18 The undersigned considered the opinion of Mark P Garrett, M.D... On March 25, 2021, Dr. Garrett opined the claimant was to avoid any bending or 19 twisting and could not lift more than 10 to 15 pounds…. These opinions are 20 not persuasive. Their opinions are supported by their examinations of the claimant. However, these opinions are inconsistent with the evidence of 21 record from 2015 through 2018 an [sic] colored by the fact that they were 22 written more than three years after the date last insured. 23 (AR. 2376). 24 Here, the relevant time period for Plaintiff’s disability determination was between 25 2015 and 2018. Plaintiff does not argue—and nor does the record show—that Dr. Garrett 26 treated or evaluated Plaintiff prior to 2021. Ciccarelli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 164 27 F.3d 629, *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A claimant seeking disability insurance benefits under Title 28 II of the Act must show that he became disabled during the period in which the special 1 insured status requirements were met.”). The opinion was rendered based on Plaintiff’s 2 state in 2021, and Dr. Garrett did not provide any opinions concerning past limitations. 3 (See id. at 2352–65); C.f. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 4 2011) (determining that the ALJ erred by failing to consider a doctor’s opinion that post- 5 dated the ALJ’s decision because the opinion concerned the claimant’s limitations during 6 the relevant period). Therefore, the ALJ appropriately accorded less weight to a medical 7 opinion given three years after Plaintiff’s DLI. See, e.g., Santos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 8 Admin., 2020 WL 3542178, *2 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2020) (“The ALJ correctly rejected this 9 opinion because it was based on a single examination after Plaintiff’s DLI. Though an ALJ 10 is required to consider a medical opinion offered after a claimant’s DLI, the ALJ may 11 discount the opinion because it is based on evidence outside the relevant period.”). 12 Moreover, “the ALJ’s finding that the symptoms noted in [Dr. Garrett’s] opinion 13 are not supported by the medical record for the relevant period constitutes a specific and 14 legitimate reason to discount his opinion[.]” Alvarez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 15 3108619, *9 (E.D. Cal. 2022). While the ALJ’s discussion was cursory, the Court does 16 not find that the ALJ erred in its assessment of Dr. Garrett’s opinion. See Lombardo v. 17 Schweiker, 749 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the ALJ properly 18 disregarded opinion of treating physician who examined claimant a year and a half after 19 the relevant period). 20 3. Dr. Hutchinson 21 Plaintiff succinctly argues that, although the ALJ found Dr. Hutchinson’s opinion 22 mostly persuasive, the ALJ failed to accurately apply the limitation against hazardous 23 machinery. (Doc. 9 at 8). Plaintiff claims that the “routing clerk” job identified as within 24 Plaintiff’s capabilities requires the use of machinery. (Id.) However, as the Commissioner 25 notes, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) states that moving mechanical parts 26 are “not present” in this occupation. (Doc. 10 at 10 (citing DOT 222.678-022)). Not to 27 mention, the other step-five occupations of mail router and sorter are not challenged by 28 Plaintiff and account for a significant number of national jobs. (See AR. 2378). 1 Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish any prejudicial error with 2 the ALJ’s application of Dr. Hutchinson’s opinion. 3 B. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony 4 Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in his rejection of Plaintiff’s subjective 5 symptom testimony as he relied on his own opinion or misstated Plaintiff’s testimony. 6 (Doc. 9 at 10–12). Plaintiff also argues that she was not informed of her correct DLI and 7 therefore not meaningfully able to participate in her hearing. (Id. at 12–13). The Court 8 disagrees. 9 An ALJ must perform a two-step analysis when determining whether a claimant’s 10 testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d 1028, 11 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the ALJ must determine whether Plaintiff presented 12 objective medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce 13 the symptoms alleged. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. “In this analysis, the claimant is not 14 required to show ‘that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity 15 of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused 16 some degree of the symptom.’ ” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th 17 Cir. 1996)). Second, if there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the 18 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons. Id. 19 at 1015; Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 488–89. 20 “[T]he ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible 21 and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 22 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). General findings regarding the Plaintiff’s credibility are 23 insufficient. Id. “Although the ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide 24 some reasoning in order for [the Court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s 25 conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 26 Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). However, “an ALJ [is not] required to 27 believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for 28 the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 1 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). “[T]he ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s 2 testimony or between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 3 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). For instance, the ALJ may consider “whether the claimant 4 engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” Id. (quoting 5 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040). 6 Additionally, “[a]lthough [a] lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis 7 for discounting pain [or symptom] testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his 8 credibility analysis.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). Albeit an ALJ 9 may not “effectively render a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony superfluous by 10 demanding positive objective medical evidence fully corroborating every allegation within 11 the subjective testimony.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 495 (9th Cir. 2022). 12 Here, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s testimony as follows: 13 In a Disability Report, the claimant alleged disability due to back pain, a herniated disc, hypertension and diabetes (Ex. B3E). At the hearing, she 14 testified that she had surgery on her back in 2011 and continues to have lower 15 back pain since the procedure. She alleged nerve pain secondary to nerve damage. The pain is in her shoulders, arms, neck, fingers, toes, legs and lower 16 back. It occurs twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week. She testified 17 that she had surgery on her back in February 2024. She stated that she continues to have pain in her back despite the surgery. She alleges difficulty 18 with standing and walking due to balance issues and pain. She testified that 19 her pain makes it difficult to sit. She alleges difficulty breathing but noted she has no respiratory illnesses. She testified that her pain increases her blood 20 pressure and blood sugar levels. She stated that she needs assistance from her 21 daughter and husband with daily activities including showering, getting dressed and meal preparation. 22 (AR. 2369–70). 23 The ALJ determined that, while Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments 24 could be reasonably expected to cause “some of the alleged symptoms,” Plaintiff’s 25 statements “concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 26 are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” 27 (Id. at 2370). 28 To support this conclusion, amongst other things, the ALJ discussed various MRI 1 scans Plaintiff underwent and concluded that, while “the foregoing objective reports are 2 consistent with some abnormality of the claimant’s lumbar spine, there is no evidence of 3 any nerve root impingement, severe stenosis, progressive neurologic deficits, infections, 4 tumors, or fractures to cause the severity of pain and limitations alleged prior to the date 5 last insured.” (Id.) The ALJ noted that, during the relevant period, clinical findings were 6 minimal and physical examinations revealed normal functioning or mild impairments. (Id.) 7 The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s “complaints of numbness, difficulty standing, walking, 8 bending and balance, weakness in her hands and her need for frequent rest” and found they 9 were not supported by the objective treatment recording. (Id. at 2371). The ALJ found 10 Plaintiff’s lack of treatment between 2015 to December 2017 notable, concluding that the 11 infrequent, conservative treatment inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling 12 plain. (Id.) 13 Furthermore, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s daily activities were not limited to 14 the extent that would be expected given Plaintiff’s testimony. (Id. at 2372). The ALJ took 15 note of Plaintiff’s ability to do laundry, wash dishes, clean up around the house, and go to 16 the grocery store by herself. (Id. at 2372–73). In addition, he noted that Plaintiff was able 17 to spend time and play games with her grandchildren. Moreover, “[d]uring the 2019 18 consultative examination she denied significant impact on activities of daily living.” (Id. 19 at 2373). The ALJ ultimately decided that the physical capabilities required to perform the 20 above tasks contradicted Plaintiff’s allegations. (Id.) 21 From the above, the Court finds that the reasons the ALJ used to find that Plaintiff’s 22 testimony was not “entirely consistent” with other evidence in the record are specific, clear, 23 and convincing, therefore, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 24 Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. While Plaintiff is correct that ALJ’s should not “play doctor” 25 in their assessments, here the ALJ relied on more than just his understanding of Plaintiff’s 26 condition as his discussion included references to objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s 27 lack of treatment, and daily activities. See Bifarella v. Colvin, 51 F. Supp. 3d 926, 934 28 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (“Plaintiff’s failure to seek treatment for an alleged impairment was a 1 valid consideration in assessing plaintiff’s testimony.”); Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 (affirming 2 the ALJ’s discrediting of the plaintiff’s symptom testimony based on daily activities of 3 personal care, cooking cleaning, and shopping; MRIs that showed “only mild degenerative 4 disc disease” and no apparent root impingement; and the plaintiff’s lack of consistent 5 treatment). In all, the ALJ identified the testimony it found not to be credible and explained 6 what evidence undermines the testimony, as required by the Ninth Circuit. See Holohan, 7 246 F.3d at 1208. 8 Finally, Plaintiff briefly contends that she was not afforded a full and fair hearing, 9 but the Court finds the Commissioner’s arguments to the contrary persuasive. Plaintiff 10 asserts that the ALJ criticized her testimony for relating to a time period after her DLI, but 11 Plaintiff was never informed of her DLI. (Doc. 9 at 12). Plaintiff also argues that she was 12 not given the opportunity to request a supplemental hearing and that she was denied a 13 meaningful opportunity to participate in her hearing as the relevant time period was not 14 clear. (Id. at 12–13). However, the Commissioner notes that Plaintiff was represented by 15 an attorney at her first hearing in 2021, who confirmed with the ALJ that Plaintiff’s DLI 16 was in June 2018 and questioned Plaintiff about her impairment progression since June 17 2015. (Doc. 10 at 15). Additionally, Plaintiff never requested a supplemental hearing or 18 any opportunity to further develop the record. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that she was “not given 19 the opportunity to request a supplemental hearing” but does not explain how she was 20 denied this opportunity. The record does not reflect any attempt to make such a request. 21 Plaintiff must actually raise an issue with the ALJ for it to be determined that she was 22 improperly denied her requested relief. The record also does not show nor does Plaintiff 23 argue that the ALJ’s duty to further develop the record was triggered. Tonapetyan v. 24 Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Ambiguous evidence, or the ALJ’s own 25 finding that the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers 26 the ALJ’s duty to ‘conduct an appropriate inquiry.’ ”). Based on the record before the 27 Court, Plaintiff’s due process rights were not violated. 28 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Administrative Law Judge’s February 24, 2025 decision 1s AFFIRMED. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter 4 judgment accordingly and terminate this action. Dated this 24th day of March, 2026.

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