Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Commonwealth

72 A.3d 799, 2013 WL 3369295, 2013 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 238
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 5, 2013
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 72 A.3d 799 (Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 72 A.3d 799, 2013 WL 3369295, 2013 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 238 (Pa. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

OPINION BY

Judge McCULLOUGH.

Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. (Verizon) petitions for review of the February 26, 2008 order of the Board of Finance and Revenue (Board) denying Verizon’s tax resettlement petition to reduce the amount of taxable gross receipts for the 2004 tax year under section 1101(a)(2) of the Tax Reform Code of 1971.1

Background and Procedural History

Verizon timely filed its Tax Report for the tax year ending December 31, 2004, reporting taxable intrastate gross receipts of $1,474,524,745 and a paid tax of $73,726,237. The Department of Revenue issued a settlement against Verizon, with the approval of the Department of the Auditor General, that increased Verizon’s taxable gross receipts by $953,151,788, raising the total to $2,427,676,533,2 and asserted a tax deficiency of $47,657,580. Verizon filed a resettlement petition with the Board of Appeals (BOA). The BOA reduced Verizon’s taxable gross receipts by $754,451,363, lowering the total to $1,673,225,170,3 and reduced the asserted [801]*801tax deficiency to $9,935,021. (Stipulation of Facts I, Nos. 6 — ll).4

Verizon filed a petition for review of the BOA resettlement with the Board. The Board denied Verizon’s petition for review in its entirety. (Stipulation of Facts I, Nos. 13, 14). In its order, the Board explained that Verizon, doing business within the Commonwealth as a provider of mobile telecommunications services, had an obligation to pay tax on all receipts from telephone messages transmitted. The Board determined that Verizon failed to provide proof of the amounts claimed as allowable deductions to compute taxable gross receipts, as well as total gross receipts for the 2004 tax year. In the absence of sufficient evidence to determine the amounts of the claimed deductions, the Board concluded that Verizon was not entitled to an adjustment of the settled tax. (Board’s order at 2, 3.)

Discussion

On appeal,5 Verizon argues that receipts from the provision of (1) private telephone lines; (2) directory assistance services; and (3) non-recurring service charges, including telephone line installation, moves of or changes to telephone lines and service, and repairs of telephone lines, are not taxable. We affirm with regard to the private telephone lines and directory assistance services and reverse with respect to the non-recurring service charges.

Belli

The Legislature first applied the gross receipts tax to telephone companies in section 23 of the Act of June 1,1889, P.L. 420 (the 1889 Act), 72 P.S. § 2181.6 Section 23 of the 1889 Act applied to gross receipts “received ... from telegraph, telephone or express business done wholly within this State....” Id.

■The Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas analyzed the scope of the 1889 Act in Commonwealth v. Bell Telephone Company, 12 Pa. D. & C. 617 (1929) (Bell I). In Bell I, The Bell Telephone Company of Philadelphia (Bell) challenged the inclusion of gross receipts received from directory advertising and charges for materials furnished and work done by Bell’s employees, including charges from: (i) installing standard telephone materials in excess of the materials needed for standard installations; (ii) the time and expense of Bell’s employees installing the excess materials; and (iii) repairing and rearranging equipment owned by Bell and others such as wires, cables, poles, brackets, insulators, and batteries, in calculating the gross receipts tax. The court in Bell I concluded that the receipts from all of the sources challenged by Bell were taxable under the broad scope of the “telephone business” language in the 1889 Act. In this regard, the court stated that “[t]he statute does not restrict the taxation to receipts from the transmission of telephone messages, but expressly taxes telephone business de[802]*802rived from the complete business of the corporation.” 12 Pa. D. & C. at 623-24.

Bell II

The 1889 Act was amended by the Legislature with the Act of May 14, 1925, P.L. 706, as amended, 72 P.S. § 2181. This amendment modified the language of section 23 of the 1889 Act to apply the gross receipts tax to gross receipts “received ... from telegraph or telephone, traffic or express business done wholly within this State....” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the change was to include in the gross receipts tax any receipts derived from “traffic.”

The Dauphin County Common Pleas Court construed this language in Commonwealth v. The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, 14 Pa. D. & C. 675 (1930) (Bell II). In Bell II, Bell alleged that the gross receipts tax should not include the following: removal charges; charges for materials furnished and for work done by Bell’s employees, including all receipts from custom work or for installation of Bell’s own equipment or service; sale of new and old materials; rental of wires; rental of conduits and charges for pole rights; and charges for directory advertising. Id. at 681-82. The court in Bell II determined that the amended language had a different meaning than the language in the 1889 Act, stating “[w]e cannot think that the legislature intended to do a vain thing if ‘traffic’ and ‘business’ are to be construed as synonymous.” Id. at 678. The court stated that amended language of a statute on the same subject signals that a new meaning is to be given to the enactment.- Id.

The court then compared the 1889 Act with the amended language in the 1925 statute as they related to electric light companies. In 1889, the gross receipts tax included the “business of electric light companies.” However, in 1925, the Legislature amended the statutory language to only include the “sale of electricity” in the gross receipts tax. The court noted that in Commonwealth v. Brush Electnc Light Company, 204 Pa. 249, 53 A. 1096 (1903), our Supreme Court had previously adopted the definition of “business” in the electric lighting context as dealing with gross receipts from the entire purpose of the company, and not just gross receipts from electric lighting. The court concluded that the term “business” had the same meaning when applied to telephone companies and that the Legislature’s substitution of the word “traffic” for “business” signified that “traffic” should be construed in a different manner than the broad definition associated with “business.” Bell II, 14 Pa. D. & C. at 679-80.

Further, the court analogized the concept of telephone traffic to that of railroad traffic, referenced in the same act; the taxable gross receipts for railroads included gross receipts “received from passengers and freight traffic.” However, the court noted that railroads derived receipts from more sources than passengers and freight, including tolls, rental of restaurants, newsstands, and barber shops. Based on the limiting statutory language, the court concluded that receipts from “freight traffic” are receipts from the transportation of freight. Thus, the court construed the statutory language “telephone traffic” to mean the “transportation” or “transmission” of messages. Id.

Considering the narrower definition of traffic, the court concluded that receipts from the following are not subject to the gross receipts tax because they are not.

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Related

Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Commonwealth
127 A.3d 745 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
72 A.3d 799, 2013 WL 3369295, 2013 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 238, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/verizon-pennsylvania-inc-v-commonwealth-pacommwct-2013.