Vere v. Bianchi

33 P.R. 621
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedAugust 2, 1924
DocketNo. 2977
StatusPublished

This text of 33 P.R. 621 (Vere v. Bianchi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vere v. Bianchi, 33 P.R. 621 (prsupreme 1924).

Opinions

Mb. Justice Wolf

delivered the opinion of the court.

We are principally concerned with the following contract :

“Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the Undersigned this ninth day of June. — Mr. Servejean, principal shareholder and, at the same time, representative of other shareholders of the ‘Su-crerie Céntrale Coloso’ of Paris, France, commissioned Mr. Charles Vere, a merchant of San Juan, to negotiate the sale of said company in the following manner:
“6,500 shares @ 100 francs_ 650,000 fcs.
‘ ‘ 2, 750 bonds @ 460 francs- 1, 265, 000 ‘ ‘
“These shares and bonds make up the whole working capital of said company.
“The purchasers would also assume charge or take over the debt of the corporation amounting to 1,200,000 francs in a bank in France to be hereafter mentioned.
“And Mr. Vere having, in turn, commissioned Messrs. Carlos Cabrera and Cayetano Coll Cuchí to negotiate the deal; and the parties hereto having agreed upon the following conditions: we hereby declare that Messrs. Francisco Bianchi and Miguel Esteves have agreed to make the purchase subject to the following conditions :
“First: To accept the conditions proposed by Mr. Servejean; making a cash payment for the shares and bonds at the rate of exchange ruling on the day the deal is consummated in francs on Paris.
“Second: Taking over the debt of the Bank.
“Third: Payment of a commission to Messrs. Vere, Coll y Cu-chí and Cabrera of 132,525 dollars, the third part of which shall be jiaid in cash and the rest by notes to be given by the purchasers and made payable the 30th day. of June, 1917.
“Fourth: If on the day when the principal amount is paid the exchange should exceed 15%, the purchasers shall advance, within the margin denoted by the exchange, a sum sufficient to raise the commission, in toto, to $140,000.
“This agreement is subject to the approval of the transaction in Paris.
(sd.) Cli. Vere,
Miguel Esteves,
Francisco Bianchi.”

[623]*623The Sucrerie Central Coloso is a mill located at or near Aguadilla, in Porto Rico. It is a fact that Servejean set on foot the negotiation which ultimately resulted in the sale of the said central. Servejean communicated the possibility of the sale to Charles Vere, the complainant in this case, who, in turn, communicated with Coll and Cabrera, and the three of them interested the other defendants in the purchase of the said Central Coloso. Under all the facts and circumstances of this case we have no doubt that Charles Vere was the procuring cause of the said sale. The principal difficulty that we have had is whether his commissions are payable by the defendants, and, if so, what should be the rate of the commissions.

Very shortly after the foregoing contract was signed and after Vere had written and cabled to Servejean ashing for an option, then Servejean communicated to defendant through Vere the fact that the contract could not be carried out on the terms therein exhibited, but that the Central Co-loso could be bought for the sum of $1,500,000.

Upon the receipt of the information that the terms mentioned could not be carried out, the defendants, through Vere, sent a cable to Servejean offering to come to Paris in order to make slight modifications in the terms of said contract and that, to said proposition, Servejean replied that the voyage was useless.

There is no question that the defendants knew that the original contract could not be carried out. Nevertheless, through Vere they sent a cable to Servejean in which they protested against the abandonment of the contract and notified him that lawyers here thought the Central Coloso could be held responsible on said contract. From this point on, however, it appears that the defendants took up matters directly with Servejean and that Francisco Bianchi went to Paris himself and concluded the purchase for something like $1,480,000. . -

At no-time- did-the defendants notify Vere that-his serv[624]*624ices were no longer required, nor was there any definite-break in the continuity of the negotiations. The mere fact of transfer of operations to Paris cannot be construed as a break, inasmuch as the negotiations, instead of being carried out through Yere and subsequently through Servejean, were carried out through Servejean directly. "While Servejean was an owner of stock and an influential member in the Central Coloso he did not own or control the whole stock and to a certain extent was a mere intermediary similar to Vere. It is deducible from the records that the defendants-understood that Servejean had no full authority and this particularly appears from the contract itself which we have copied, as it made the obligation of the contract to depend upon its approval in Paris. Yere and Servejean between them were the procuring cause of the final purchase. It was Yere, however, who found a purchaser ready, willing and anxious to buy.

The books are full of cases.where an agent is employed to sell a piece of property and he finds a purchaser ready and willing to buy, if the owner takes the negotiations out of the hands of his broker and concludes the sale either at the same price or a reduced price yet the broker is entitled to a commission. McMillin v. Beves, 147 Fed. 218; In re Breon Lumber Co., 181 Fed. 909; Hoadley v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 44 L.R.A. 321 and note; Lerner v. Harvey (Mich.) 155 N. W. 427, 428; Coon v. St. Paul Park Realty Co., 101 Minn. 391, 394; Southwick v. Swavienski, 114 N. Y. App. Div. 681, 683; Lord v. U. S. Transportation Co., 143 N. Y. App. Div. 437, 455; Friedenwald v. Welch, 174 Mich. 399, 401; Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co. v. Gamble, 201 Fed. 329, 331; Phoenix Securities Co. v. Dittmar, 224 Fed. 892; French v. McKay, 181 Mass. 485; Carnes v. Finigan, 198 Mass. 128. Likewise .the authorities show that even where a. specific contract is made, fixing the price and the commission to be paid, yet if the parties finally conclude the transaction on a different -basis, the broker is entitled to a [625]*625reasonable commission or by way of a quantum meruit. Lockhart v. Hamlin, 190 N. Y. 132-137; Sussdorf v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319; Sturtevant v. Fiss et al., 173 App. Div. 113; Boumann v. Manhattan Consumer’s Brewing Co., 97 App. Div. 410; Phoenix Securities Co. v. Dittmar, 224 Fed. 892, and some of tbe foregoing cases. In Crowe v. Trickey, 204 U. S. 228, and in Carrington v. Graves, 89 Atlantic, 237, whereon appellees partially rely, there are certain general expressions which indicate that the broker, in order to recover commissions, should conclude the contract on the terms, specified, but the facts of these cases show that the respective sales were not consummated. It is the consummation of the sale, with the broker as one of the procuring causes, that constitutes the distinction.

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Related

Crowe v. Trickey
204 U.S. 228 (Supreme Court, 1907)
Lockhart v. . Hamlin
82 N.E. 1094 (New York Court of Appeals, 1907)
Sussdorff v. . Schmidt
55 N.Y. 319 (New York Court of Appeals, 1873)
People ex rel. Dougan v. Greene
97 A.D. 404 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1904)
Sturtevant v. Fiss, Doerr & Carroll Horse Co.
173 A.D. 113 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1916)
French v. McKay
63 N.E. 1068 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1902)
Carnes v. Finigan
84 N.E. 324 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1908)
Hoadley v. Savings Bank
44 L.R.A. 321 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1899)
Friedenwald v. Welch
140 N.W. 564 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1913)
Lerner v. Harvey
155 N.W. 427 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1915)
Coon v. St. Paul Park Realty Co.
112 N.W. 526 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1907)
McMillin v. Beves
147 F. 218 (Second Circuit, 1906)
In re Breon Lumber Co.
181 F. 909 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1910)
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Gamble
201 F. 329 (Sixth Circuit, 1912)
Phœnix Securities Co. v. Dittmar
224 F. 892 (Ninth Circuit, 1915)

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Bluebook (online)
33 P.R. 621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vere-v-bianchi-prsupreme-1924.