Vera Davis-Clewis v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Vera Davis-Clewis v. Department of Veterans Affairs. Read the opinion of the Court — 2024 MSPB 5
Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided February 10, 2026·No. DA-0752-23-0162-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

VERA TERESA DAVIS-CLEWIS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-23-0162-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: February 10, 2026 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Tracey Wallace , Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the appellant.

Mackenzie Novak , Esquire, and Daniel Morvant , Esquire, Denver, Colorado, for the agency.

Brandi M. Powell , Esquire, New Orleans, Louisiana, for the agency.

Emily Huang , Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal of a reduction in grade, finding that it was voluntary and thus outside of the Board’s jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

appellant’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

BACKGROUND The administrative judge issued an initial decision on August 30, 2024, dismissing the appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 71, Initial Decision (ID). The initial decision advised the appellant that the deadline to file a petition for review was October 4, 2024, and provided information as to how to file a petition for review. ID at 9-12. On November 1, 2024, the appellant filed a petition for review, claiming that the administrative judge erred in dismissing her appeal. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The Acting Clerk of the Board acknowledged the Board’s receipt of the petition for review and advised the appellant that it was filed after the October 4, 2024 deadline, and that the Board’s regulations require that a petition for review that appears to be untimely filed be accompanied by a motion to accept the filing as timely and/or waive the time limit for good cause. PFR File, Tab 2 at 1-2. The appellant responded, arguing that she was notified of the initial decision by her attorney 9 days after it was issued, that she was unable to timely file her petition for review because she was undergoing medical procedures, and that she did not know that she could request an extension of time. PFR File, Tab 3 at 4-5.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW A petition for review generally must be filed within 35 days after the date of the issuance of the initial decision or, if the appellant shows that the initial decision was received more than 5 days after the initial decision was issued, within 30 days after the date the appellant received the initial decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). It is the appellant’s burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish the timeliness of her petition for review. 5 C.F.R. 3

§ 1201.56(b)(2)(B); see McPherson v. Department of the Treasury, 104 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 4 (2007). As discussed above, the appellant’s petition for review was filed after the deadline and the appellant’s explanation that the attorney who represented her during her initial appeal notified her of the August 30, 2024, initial decision on September 8, 2024, does not show that she met the filing deadline. PFR File, Tab 3 at 4. The initial decision was electronically served on the appellant, as she was a registered e-filer. ID at 17, IAF, Tab 1 at 2. The Board’s regulations provide that registration as an e-filer constitutes consent to accept electronic service of documents issued by the Board, and documents served electronically on e-filers are deemed received on the date of electronic transmission. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(e)(2). Thus, the appellant is deemed to have received the initial decision on the date of issuance, August 30, 2024. Palermo v. Department of the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶ 3 (2014) (stating that, because the appellant and his representative were registered e-filers, they are deemed to have received the initial decision on the date it was issued). Even if the filing period did not commence until the appellant received the initial decision from her representative, the appellant’s petition for review would still be untimely filed because it would have been due 30 days after September 8, 2024, meaning the deadline would have been October 8, 2024. The record reflects, and the appellant does not dispute, that the petition for review was filed on November 1, 2024. PFR File, Tab 1. Accordingly, we find that the appellant has not shown that she filed her petition for review in a timely fashion. As the appellant filed her petition for review late, the issue is whether she established good cause to waive the time limit. The Board will waive a petition for review filing deadline only upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). To establish good cause for the untimely filing of a petition, a party must show that she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Rivera v. Social Security 4

Administration, 111 M.S.P.R. 581, ¶ 4 (2009) (citing Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980)). To determine whether an appellant has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of her excuse and her showing of due diligence, whether she is proceeding pro se, and whether she has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control which affected her ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune which similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to timely file her petition. Rivera, 111 M.S.P.R. 581, ¶ 4 (citing Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table)). As mentioned, the deadline to file a petition for review was October 4, 2024, and the appellant did not file her petition until November 1, 2024, 28 days late. The appellant has not established good cause for her delay in filing. Although we recognize that the appellant is now acting in a pro se capacity, a 28-day filing delay is significant. See Crook v. U.S. Postal Service, 108 M.S.P.R. 553, ¶ 6 (finding a 1-month filing delay significant), aff’d, 301 F. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Blankenship v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 641, ¶ 7 (2005) (finding a 25-day filing delay significant). The appellant has not offered a persuasive excuse, shown that she acted with diligence, or set forth evidence of circumstances beyond her control that affected her ability to comply with the filing deadline.

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