Ventura-Rivas v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 14, 2025
• Docket: 24-235
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SARA NOEMI VENTURA-RIVAS; No. 24-235 OSCAR ALEXANDER LAZO- Agency Nos. VENTURA, A220-203-636 A220-203-637 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 12, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: NGUYEN, FORREST, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Sara Noemi Ventura-Rivas and her minor son petition for review of the Board

of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of their appeal from an immigration

judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We deny the petition.

Where the BIA summarily adopts and affirms the IJ without opinion, as it did

here, “we ‘review the IJ’s decision as if it were the BIA’s decision.’” Antonio v.

Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079,

1083 (9th Cir. 2011)). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal

conclusions de novo. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir.

2022). Under the substantial evidence standard, we reverse a factual finding only if

“‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary’ based

on the evidence in the record.” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059

(9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).2

1. Asylum and Withholding of Removal. For both asylum and statutory

withholding of removal claims, a petitioner must demonstrate “[past] persecution or

a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Singh v. Garland, 57

F.4th 643, 652 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). For a particular social group to be

cognizable, it must have an immutable characteristic, be defined with particularity,

1 Ventura-Rivas’s son is a derivative beneficiary of his mother’s asylum application. 2 The government argues that Ventura-Rivas has waived any right to judicial review because she failed to “meaningfully challenge” the IJ’s decision in her opening brief. Assuming without deciding that Ventura-Rivas has not waived her right to review, we address her claims on the merits.

2 24-235 and be socially distinct. Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2020).

A well-founded fear of persecution must be subjectively genuine and objectively

reasonable, meaning it “requires a showing, by credible, direct, and specific

evidence in the record, of facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution.”

Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705, 719 (9th Cir. 2021).

Ventura-Rivas asserts that she will be persecuted if removed based on her

membership in the social group of “individuals taking concrete steps to oppose gang

membership and gang authority,” and she challenges the IJ’s conclusion that her

proposed social group is not cognizable. We affirm because Ventura-Rivas makes

only a conclusory argument and her proposed social group is not cognizable. See

Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)

(concluding that while “those who had testified against M–18 gang members in open

court” constituted a cognizable social group, a group of “persons opposing gang

members” likely did not).

Because failure to demonstrate membership in a cognizable social group is an

independent basis for denying asylum and withholding of removal, we do not

address whether Ventura-Rivas established the requisite nexus between her

proposed social group and alleged persecution. Cordoba v. Barr, 962 F.3d 479, 483

(9th Cir. 2020).

3 24-235 2. CAT Relief. For relief under CAT, Ventura-Rivas must “establish that

it is more likely than not that . . . she would be tortured if removed to” El Salvador.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Torture is “any act by which severe pain or suffering,

whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . when such pain

or suffering is inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or

acquiescence of, a public official . . . or other person acting in an official capacity.”

8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

On appeal, Ventura-Rivas maintains that she fears she will be beaten or killed

by the gang members, and that “El Salvador’s lack of enforcement of its laws

encourages the MS-13 Street gang to rape and kill . . . and in effect amounts to

acquiescence, by the government.” The country-conditions report corroborates

Ventura-Rivas’s arguments that there is substantial gang violence in El Salvador,

but as the IJ properly noted, it also demonstrates that El Salvador is taking concrete

steps to combat these issues. See B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 845 (9th Cir. 2022).

Thus, we conclude the record does not compel a determination that the Salvadoran

government is likely to consent or acquiesce to torture, and we affirm the IJ’s denial

of CAT protection.

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-235