Ventura County Flood Control District v. Security First National Bank

15 Cal. App. 3d 996, 93 Cal. Rptr. 653, 1971 Cal. App. LEXIS 972
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 12, 1971
DocketCiv. 36210
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 15 Cal. App. 3d 996 (Ventura County Flood Control District v. Security First National Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ventura County Flood Control District v. Security First National Bank, 15 Cal. App. 3d 996, 93 Cal. Rptr. 653, 1971 Cal. App. LEXIS 972 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).

Opinion

*999 Opinion

JEFFERSON, Acting P. J.

Plaintiff Ventura County Flood Control District (hereinafter referred to as County) appeals from a judgment in a condemnation case awarding to defendants $12,159 for 1.3142 acres of lemon ranch property, which was taken for a flood control channel right-of-way, and an additional $27,069, granted as severance damages. The case was tried by the court without a jury.

Plaintiff condemned a strip of property approximately 21.5 feet wide along the easterly portion of a parcel of approximately 30 acres in Ventura County which had been owned for 10 years by John Milton Diedrich and his wife. The property, which had been owned by members of the Diedrich family for approximately 80 years, had always been used for agricultural purposes and expert opinion supports the determination that this continues to be its highest and best use. An integral part of the agricultural property is a windbreak of cypress and eucalyptus trees situated on the condemned strip of property. The first eucalyptus and lemon trees were planted in 1952, when the cypress trees were already about 15 years old and well established.

The award made for the 1.3142 acres taken was based on expert opinion evidence of fair market value derived from market data and is not disputed by plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, contends that the trial court erred in its award of severance damages by basing its computations on inadmissible evidence, that is the loss of lemon productivity and income, which evidence was utilized by defendant’s appraiser in formulating his opinion of the decrease in value of the remainder.

As a general rule, frequently stated, the trier of fact in determining the fair market value of property taken by condemnation may not capitalize the income or profits realized from a particular use of the land by the landowner. (Stockton & Copperopolis R.R. Co. v. Galgiani, 49 Cal. 139.) “It is settled that evidence of profits derived from a business conducted on the land is too speculative, uncertain and remote to be considered as a basis for ascertaining market value. [Citations.] On the other hand, it is the general rule that income from property in the way of rents is a proper element to be considered in arriving at the measure of compensation to be paid for the taking of property. [Citations.]” (People v. Dunn, 46 Cal.2d 639, 641 [297 P.2d 964].) This rule, however, is not so broad or inflexible as to disqualify the opinion of defendants’ expert with respect to severance damages in the present case.

*1000 The elements considered by the trial court to constitute a diminution of the value of the remainder were the loss of 149 lemon trees which had to be destroyed to make room for planting a new windbreak, the cost of replacing the windbreak, and the reduction in fair market value of the grove during the 10-year period of growth to maturity of the trees composing the new or replacement windbreak. The appellant does not dispute the facts that the value of the windbreak and the destruction of 149 lemon trees rendered useless by the taking constitute proper considerations with respect to severance damages, but contends that the method of reckoning the depreciation in fair market value of the remainder was improper.

Testimony relating to severance damages was received from two appraisal experts, Mr. Pelmear for the appellant and Mr. Nielson for the respondents. The appellant’s expert witness testified that, in his opinion, the windbreak was relatively valueless to the remainder and the respondents were entitled to only nominal severance damages of $2,000 for its loss. Mr. Nielson gave testimony demonstrating that the windbreak contributed substantially to the overall value of the lemon orchard as an economic unit. He showed that the. windbreak protected the trees from winds which blow across the plain from the east and which occur frequently in the area. These winds cause extensive damage to citrus orchards, defoliating the trees, blowing off buds and fruit, scarring fruit which is then susceptible to disease, and scorching leaves, thus retarding growth of trees and maturation of fruit. Upon removal of the windbreak there would be no obstruction on the flat plain between the grove and Oxnard Air Force Base some miles to the east to restrict the force of these hot, dry and damaging winds. This opinion was corroborated by the opinion testimony of two other qualified witnesses. The trier of fact accepted the opinion of Mr. Nielson and took into consideration, in computation of the award of severance damages, the decreased fair market value of the remainder parcel as a consequence of the cost of replacement of the windbreak and the period of time for regrowth of the cypress and eucalyptus trees.

The trial court in determining severance damages found that the loss of 149 lemon trees was compensable at $43 per tree on the basis of Mr. Nielson’s expert opinion. Since it is not customary to transplant mature, bearing citrus trees for commercial use, the establishment of fair market value must be based upon evidence other than nursery sale prices. Mr. Nielson capitalized net income of one tree over 15 years to arrive at a value of $43 and total compensation for 149 trees was computed as $6,407. This method is reasonable as a basis for fair market value. The trial court included in severance damages Mr. Nielson’s estimate *1001 of $2,050 for the cost of planting trees to form a new windbreak equal in length to that taken, stating that this figure was not included in its computation of fair market value of the part taken. This item covers the cost of buying small trees, planting, watering and staking them and caring for them during the 10-year growing period. Because the windbreak constituted an improvement which enhanced the value of the property, this sum is a compensable portion of the severance damage. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1248, 1249, 1249.1; People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Flintkote Co., 264 Cal.App.2d 97 [70 Cal.Rptr. 27].)

The trial court awarded an additional sum of $18,612 for diminution of the fair market value of the remainder of the lemon orchard. In so doing, the court accepted the opinion of defendants’ expert that the highest and best use of the property during the immediately foreseeable future was agricultural; that transplanting mature 80-foot tall trees for a windbreak was impractical and prohibitively costly; and that approximately 10 years would be required for the young trees to become sufficiently large and mature to afford the same protection as the windbreak trees taken.

Mr. Nielson said that he had taken into consideration the contemplated reduction of lemon productivity and fruit quality over the 10-year growth period. He had obtained from the packing house where the fruit was processed crop production figures relating to quality and quantity of fruit produced by defendants’ trees over a period of five years preceding the take. The net figure obtained from the packing house was reduced by costs of cultivation to arrive at a net income which was further reduced by a figure representing reasonable ground rental for the Diedrich land. Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
15 Cal. App. 3d 996, 93 Cal. Rptr. 653, 1971 Cal. App. LEXIS 972, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ventura-county-flood-control-district-v-security-first-national-bank-calctapp-1971.