Venhure Yosef Tsegay v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: May 7, 2025
• Docket: 23-2128
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-2128 Filed May 7, 2025

VENHURE YOSEF TSEGAY, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Michael Carpenter,

Judge.

Venhure Yosef Tsegay appeals the denial of his application for

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Thomas M. McIntee, Williamsburg, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and

Chicchelly, JJ. 2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Venhure Yosef Tsegay appeals the denial of his application for

postconviction relief (PCR). Because the PCR court thoroughly addressed the

issue in its ruling, we affirm by memorandum opinion. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(d).

After pleading guilty to first-degree robbery, Tsegay applied for

postconviction relief, which the PCR court denied. He appeals. The only issue

before us is whether Tsegay’s trial counsel was ineffective regarding his guilty

plea.1 While we review ineffective-assistance claims de novo, we do “give weight

to the lower court’s findings concerning witness credibility.” Trane v. State,

16 N.W.3d 683, 692 (Iowa 2025) (citation omitted). Tsegay specifically challenges

the PCR court’s finding that Tsegay was not coerced into pleading guilty. But trial

counsel and Tsegay both testified, and those testimonies provided conflicting

narratives. While Tsegay claimed he was threatened and coerced by his trial

counsel into an undesirable plea deal, Tsegay’s trial counsel described a reluctant

but willing defendant weighing his limited options before ultimately accepting the

plea. The PCR found trial counsel more credible, and we give deference to such

findings. Further, it is Tsegay’s burden to establish ineffectiveness given the

presumption that “counsel performed competently.” See id. (citation omitted). We

1 Tsegay actually advances a litany of arguments that were neither presented to

nor ruled on by the PCR court; because they were not preserved for our review, we do not address them. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the [lower] court before we will decide them on appeal.”). 3

do not find he met such a burden. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Tsegay’s

application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.