Vene v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05131
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 TERRI V., CASE NO. 3:25-CV-5131-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. ORDER RE: SOCIAL SECURITY 12 DISABILITY APPEAL COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 13 SECURITY, 14 Defendant.

15 Plaintiff filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review of the denial 16 of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. 17 R. Civ. P. 73, and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have consented to proceed before the 18 undersigned. After considering the record, the Court finds no reversible error and affirms the 19 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff applied for DIB on October 10, 2021. Administrative Record (AR) 17. Her 22 alleged date of disability onset is July 16, 2021. Id. Her requested hearing was held before an 23 Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on April 11, 2024. AR 34–61. On July 26, 2024, the ALJ 24 1 issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. AR 14–33. The Appeals Council declined 2 Plaintiff’s timely request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency action subject 3 to judicial review. AR 1–6. On February 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court 4 seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. Dkt. 5.

5 II. STANDARD 6 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of 7 benefits if, and only if, the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by 8 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th 9 Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 In her opening brief, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment of her subjective symptom 12 testimony regarding her mental impairments and the medical opinion of Alysa Ruddell, PhD. 13 Dkt. 9. 14 A. Mental Symptom Testimony

15 Plaintiff testified she “can’t be around people” as a result of her post-traumatic stress 16 disorder; is hypervigilant and overwhelmed in public; has periodic anxiety; and has some issues 17 with memory and concentration. See AR 49–51, 293. 18 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony was captured, in part, by the Residual Functional 19 Capacity (RFC) assessment: 20 Due to her mental impairments, the claimant is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple and routine work, and she can work for two-hour intervals with 21 standard work breaks. Because she has alleged difficulty interacting with others and paranoid ideations, the claimant can tolerate only occasional contact with the public 22 and coworkers, but no job tasks requiring public interaction or collaboration with coworkers. 23 AR 26. 24 1 To the extent her testimony was inconsistent with the RFC, the ALJ properly rejected it 2 based on the medical evidence, Plaintiff’s activities, and some inconsistent statements in the 3 record. 4 Medical Evidence. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony inconsistent with the medical

5 evidence of record: 6 mental status examinations show that her memory was within normal limits [AR 757, 1165, 1366], she was consistently alert and oriented [AR 395, 757, 1172, 7 1445], and she generally had a normal mood and affect [AR 635, 950, 1461], which is inconsistent with the claimant’s testimony and subjective allegations. 8 AR 24. “Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s 9 subjective testimony.” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 10 2008) (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)). 11 The ALJ reasonably concluded the cited evidence was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 12 testimony. To the extent Plaintiff alleged she could not engage in the sorts of interactions the 13 RFC limited her to, for instance, that she was consistently alert and oriented during 14 appointments, can reasonably be found inconsistent with her claims of debilitating 15 hypervigilance and anxiety in social situations. To the extent Plaintiff alleged memory and 16 concentration difficulties beyond those accounted for in the RFC, the ALJ reasonably found 17 normal mental status examination results in those areas inconsistent with her allegations. 18 Plaintiff raises several arguments in response. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in 19 relying upon mental examinations from appointments related to physical symptoms and on 20 mental examinations from virtual appointments. See Dkt. 9 at 11. Neither fact renders the 21 examinations less than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence “is a highly deferential 22 standard of review,” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009), 23 24 1 simply requiring “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence, Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 2 (2019). 3 Providers treating a claimant for physical problems are nonetheless competent to make 4 observations about a claimant’s mental status. Cf. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th

5 Cir. 1987) (finding primary care physician competent to provide opinion on a claimant’s mental 6 health because “it is well established” physicians in family or general practice “identify and treat 7 the majority of Americans’ psychiatric disorders” and because he provided “clinical observations 8 of [the claimant’s] depression”).1 Similarly, telehealth providers nonetheless observe and treat a 9 patient’s symptoms, and this evidence is of value. And given that many of Plaintiff’s mental 10 health appointments were telehealth appointments (see Dkt. 9 at 2), it would make little sense to 11 exclude such evidence from the ALJ’s consideration in evaluating the medical evidence. 12 Second, Plaintiff contends the ALJ ignored significant evidence in reaching this finding 13 and ignored context in other treatment notes. Dkt. 9 at 12–13. Plaintiff points to evidence that in 14 some notes relied upon by the ALJ (AR 753, 1164–65, 1366), Plaintiff was tearful, depressed,

15 and occasionally reported hallucinations and OCD-related behavior. She also points to some 16 additional notes suggesting the same (AR 772, 797, 852–53, 971, 1379). 17 But the additional context and evidence Plaintiff identifies does little to cast doubt upon 18 the ALJ’s conclusion. Most of the evidence Plaintiff identifies consists of her own subjective 19 statements, rather than objective evidence. Evidence suggesting Plaintiff exhibited hallucinations 20

1 Plaintiff relies upon Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2017), in arguing to the contrary, but in that 21 case a medical opinion rendered by an orthopedist did not mention specific mental health problems. Because that provider would not be expected to mention those problems, the Court found that omission did not detract from the 22 claimant’s mental health complaints. Id. Here, however, the notes involving non-psychological complaints did include observations related to Plaintiff’s mental symptoms. The ALJ relied not upon the omission of mental health 23 complaints but, rather, upon recorded observations about mental health symptoms made by professionals competent to render them. See Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1232. That such observations might be unexpected in the context they were 24 made does not render them insignificant. 1 does not corroborate any of her subjective symptom testimony. See Dkt. 9 at 2–3. And as the 2 ALJ discussed elsewhere in finding Plaintiff had only moderate limitations in mental 3 functioning, “when the claimant reported auditory hallucinations and presented as anxious and 4 depressed, her memory, judgment, and insight were described as ‘fair,’” AR 25 (citing AR

5 1165), so such notations would not suggest Plaintiff is further limited than the RFC found her. 6 Similarly, while some notations indicated Plaintiff was tearful while describing trauma 7 related to her ex-husband (see AR 753, 772), relevant notations nevertheless described much of 8 her functioning as normal, and such abnormal mood exhibitions in such a context are not 9 necessarily probative as to her functioning in the workplace. “Where the evidence is susceptible 10 to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Morgan 11 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). 12 Finally, Plaintiff also argues the ALJ did not sufficiently explain why the cited evidence 13 was inconsistent with her testimony. Dkt. 9 at 10 (citing Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 14 492 (9th Cir. 2015)); Dkt. 14 at 2. The Court disagrees. The ALJ identified Plaintiff’s testimony,

15 identified evidence he relied upon, and indicated he was discounting Plaintiff’s testimony on that 16 basis. See AR 22, 24–25. “The ALJ’s explanation for her assessment of [Plaintiff’s] testimony 17 was thus more than a single general statement that the claimant’s statements are not credible and 18 is sufficient to allow appellate review.” Nadon v. Bisignano, 145 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 19 2025) (distinguishing and quoting Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493). The Court is “not deprived 20 of [its] faculties for drawing specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion,” 21 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989), and “‘magic words’ are not required of 22 an ALJ,” Honcoop v. Barnhart, 87 F. App’x 627, 629 (9th Cir. 2004) (unpublished). 23

24 1 Activities. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony inconsistent with her activities during the 2 relevant period, including selling jewelry, going on walks, and shopping in stores. AR 23, 24. 3 Activities of daily living are a valid reason to discount a claimant’s testimony if they are 4 inconsistent with her alleged symptoms. See Orn v. Astrue, 495, F.3d 623, 639 (9th Cir. 2007).

5 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony inconsistent with her activity of making and selling 6 jewelry at jewelry swap meets. See AR 23. Such an activity is reasonably found to involve 7 interacting with others, being in public, and exercising judgment to an extent beyond that alleged 8 by Plaintiff. Plaintiff points out that she was unable to continue selling jewelry after September 9 2021 (Dkt. 9 at 5), but such evidence is still probative as to her functioning during the relevant 10 period. Further, Plaintiff later indicated a desire to engage in jewelry swap meets (see AR 815, 11 822) with transportation as her barrier (AR 857), showing she still thought herself capable of 12 performing in excess of her allegations. 13 The ALJ also reasonably found Plaintiff’s testimony inconsistent with shopping in stores 14 and going on walks. See AR 24. As Plaintiff points out (Dkt. 9 at 8, 9), she did both activities

15 while accompanied by others. But even with this qualification, her tendency to perform some 16 activities in public is reasonably found inconsistent with her statements indicating an inability to 17 do the same. 18 Inconsistent Statements. The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony because some 19 statements she made were inconsistent with the record and therefore undermined her reliability. 20 As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff testified she had not traveled during the relevant period (AR 48) but 21 had taken a trip to the East Coast (see AR 530). She also testified she had stopped using cannabis 22 in 2021 (AR 48–49), but evidence showed she continued to use cannabis in 2022 and 2023 (see 23 AR 398, 693, 755, 1013).

24 1 An ALJ may use “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation” in assessing a claimant’s 2 testimony, which includes considering “prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms” 3 and “other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid[.]” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 4 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002)

5 (“conflicting information about [claimant’s drug and alcohol usage’” proper basis for rejecting 6 testimony). 7 Plaintiff argues the questions were not sufficiently specific to her testimony to constitute 8 a specific reason for rejecting it. See Dkt. 9 at 7–9. The “specific” prong of the “specific, clear, 9 and convincing” standard bars “general findings” of fact and requires the ALJ “identify what 10 testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. 11 Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 12 1993), where ALJ erroneously did not “point to specific facts in the record”). It does not bar an 13 ALJ from giving reasons applicable generally to the identified testimony where those reasons are 14 clear and convincing reasons for rejecting that testimony. See, e.g., Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959

15 (finding “specific, clear and convincing reasons” standard met by identifying inconsistent 16 statements and inferring they “carried over” to credibility of other allegations). 17 In sum, the ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 18 testimony. 19 B. Dr. Ruddell’s Medical Opinion 20 Dr. Ruddell completed an opinion in December 2021 based on a telephonic examination 21 of Plaintiff. AR 377–80. She opined Plaintiff would have marked limitations in adapting to 22 changes, maintaining appropriate behavior, completing a workday and workweek without 23 psychological interruptions, and setting realistic goals and planning independently. AR 379.

24 1 For applications, like Plaintiff’s, filed after March 27, 2017, ALJs need not “defer or give 2 any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to” particular medical opinions, 3 including those of treating or examining sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Rather, ALJs 4 must consider every medical opinion in the record and evaluate each opinion’s persuasiveness,

5 considering each opinion’s “supportability” and “consistency,” and, under some circumstances, 6 other factors. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2022); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)– 7 (c). Supportability concerns how a medical source supports a medical opinion with relevant 8 evidence, while consistency concerns how a medical opinion is consistent with other evidence 9 from medical and nonmedical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), (c)(2). 10 The ALJ found Dr. Ruddell’s opinion unpersuasive. AR 26. The ALJ discounted the 11 opinion because it was inconsistent with the evidence of record, including Plaintiff’s activities. 12 See AR 26. As discussed, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s activities. The ALJ could 13 reasonably find, for instance, that Plaintiff’s participation in swap meets for selling jewelry 14 indicated she had a less-than-marked limitation in her ability to set goals and plan independently

15 and maintain appropriate behavior. “A conflict between a treating physician’s opinion and a 16 claimant’s activity level is a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting the opinion.” Ford v. 17 Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020). 18 Furthermore, the ALJ properly found the medical opinions rendered by the psychological 19 consultants more persuasive because they were more consistent with evidence that she displayed 20 normal memory, orientation, and mood, and that her judgment, insight, and memory were 21 described as fair even when reporting auditory hallucinations. See AR 25. 22 In sum, the ALJ reasonably assessed the medical opinion evidence and gave adequate 23 reasons for finding Dr. Ruddell’s opinion unpersuasive.

24 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby AFFIRMS Defendant’s decision denying 3 benefits. 4 Dated this 4th day of September, 2025.

5 A 6 David W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24