Velez v. Annucci

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Velez v. Annucci

72 A.D.3d 1298, 897 N.Y.S.2d 923

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 15, 2010

StatusPublished

This text of 72 A.D.3d 1298 (Velez v. Annucci) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Velez v. Annucci, 72 A.D.3d 1298, 897 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

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Opinion

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Sackett, J.), entered May 7, 2009 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition.

In 2006, petitioner was sentenced as a second felony offender to a prison term of IV2 to 3 years upon his conviction of attempted robbery in the third degree. Neither the sentence and [1299]*1299commitment order nor the sentencing minutes specified the manner in which this sentence was to run relative to petitioner’s prior undischarged prison term. The Department of Correctional Services calculated petitioner’s 2006 sentence as running consecutively to his prior undischarged term, prompting petitioner to commence this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge that computation. Supreme Court granted respondent’s subsequent (and apparently unopposed) motion to dismiss and this appeal by petitioner ensued.

There is no dispute that petitioner was sentenced in 2006 as a second felony offender and, therefore, was subject to the consecutive sentencing provisions of Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a). Where, as here, a statute compels the sentencing court to impose a consecutive sentence, the court is deemed to have imposed the consecutive sentence the law requires—even in the absence of an express judicial directive to that effect (see People ex rel. Gill v Greene, 12 NY3d 1, 4 [2009], cert denied sub nom. Gill v Rock, 558 US —, 130 S Ct 86 [2009]; Matter of Lowman v Fischer, 67 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2009]; Matter of High v Rabsatt, 67 AD3d 1262, 1263 [2009]). Accordingly, we discern no error in the computation of petitioner’s sentence (see Matter of Garner v Rivera, 68 AD3d 1230, 1231 [2009]).

Mercure, J.P., Lahtinen, Kavanagh, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

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Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Sackett, J.), entered May 7, 2009 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition.

In 2006, petitioner was sentenced as a second felony offender to a prison term of IV2 to 3 years upon his conviction of attempted robbery in the third degree. Neither the sentence and [1299]*1299commitment order nor the sentencing minutes specified the manner in which this sentence was to run relative to petitioner’s prior undischarged prison term. The Department of Correctional Services calculated petitioner’s 2006 sentence as running consecutively to his prior undischarged term, prompting petitioner to commence this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge that computation. Supreme Court granted respondent’s subsequent (and apparently unopposed) motion to dismiss and this appeal by petitioner ensued.

There is no dispute that petitioner was sentenced in 2006 as a second felony offender and, therefore, was subject to the consecutive sentencing provisions of Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a). Where, as here, a statute compels the sentencing court to impose a consecutive sentence, the court is deemed to have imposed the consecutive sentence the law requires—even in the absence of an express judicial directive to that effect (see People ex rel. Gill v Greene, 12 NY3d 1, 4 [2009], cert denied sub nom. Gill v Rock, 558 US —, 130 S Ct 86 [2009]; Matter of Lowman v Fischer, 67 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2009]; Matter of High v Rabsatt, 67 AD3d 1262, 1263 [2009]). Accordingly, we discern no error in the computation of petitioner’s sentence (see Matter of Garner v Rivera, 68 AD3d 1230, 1231 [2009]).

Mercure, J.P., Lahtinen, Kavanagh, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

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Bluebook (online)

72 A.D.3d 1298, 897 N.Y.S.2d 923, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/velez-v-annucci-nyappdiv-2010.

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