Velasquez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided May 15, 2024·No. 19-1703V·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 19-1703V (not to be published)

************************* * FIDENCIO VELASQUEZ, * * Petitioner, * Chief Special Master Corcoran * v. * Filed: April 16, 2024 * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * *************************

Scot Tyler Scheuerman, Scheuerman Law Firm, PLLC, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner.

Zoe Wade, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1

On November 1, 2019, Fidencio Velasquez filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine and Injury Compensation Program (the “Vaccine Program”). 2 (ECF No. 1) (“Pet.”). Petitioner alleged that he developed Guillain-Barré syndrome (“GBS”) related to his receipt of an influenza vaccine on November 1, 2016. Pet. at 1. After briefing the claim, I ultimately denied entitlement, and that determination was not appealed. Decision, dated January 31, 2024 (ECF No. 62) (“Decision”).

1 Although I have not formally designated this Decision for publication, it will nevertheless be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012). As provided by 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B), however, the parties may object to the Decision’s inclusion of certain kinds of confidential information. Specifically, under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public. Id. 2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012) [hereinafter “Vaccine Act” or “the Act”]. Individual section references hereafter will be to Section 300aa of the Act (but will omit the statutory prefix).

1 Petitioner has now filed a motion for a final award of attorney’s fees and costs. Motion, dated March 12, 2024 (ECF No. 65) (“Final Fees Mot.”). Petitioner requests a total of $87,510.22, reflecting $62,398.00 in fees incurred for the services of Mr. Tyler Scheuerman, Esq., plus $25,112.22 in costs. Final Fees Mot. at 1. Respondent reacted to the final fees request on March 14, 2024. Response (ECF No. 66) (“Response”). Respondent agrees that Petitioner has satisfied the statutory requirements for a fees award, and otherwise defers the calculation of the amount to be awarded to my discretion. Response at 2–3.

For the reasons set forth below, I hereby GRANT in part Petitioner’s motion, awarding fees and costs in the total amount of $85,912.12.

ANALYSIS

I. Petitioner’s Claim had Reasonable Basis

Although the Vaccine Act only guarantees a fees award to successful petitioners, a special master may also award fees and costs in an unsuccessful case if: (1) the “petition was brought in good faith”; and (2) “there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” Section 15(e)(1). I have in prior decisions set forth at length the criteria to be applied when determining if a claim possessed “reasonable basis” sufficient for a fees award. See, e.g., Sterling v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-551V, 2020 WL 549443, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 3, 2020). Importantly, establishing reasonable basis does not automatically entitle an unsuccessful claimant to fees, but is instead a threshold obligation; fees can still thereafter be limited, if unreasonable, or even denied entirely.

A claim’s reasonable basis 3 must be demonstrated through some objective evidentiary showing. Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 971 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Simmons v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 875 F.3d 632, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). This objective inquiry is focused on the claim—counsel’s conduct is irrelevant (although it may bulwark good faith). Simmons, 875 F.3d at 635. In addition, reasonable basis inquiries are not static—they evaluate not only what was known at the time the petition was filed, but also take into account what is learned about the evidentiary support for the claim as the matter progresses. Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 33 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (upholding the finding that a reasonable basis for petitioners’ claims ceased to exist once they had reviewed their expert's opinion, which consisted entirely of unsupported speculation). As a result, a claim can “lose” reasonable basis over time.

3 Because this claim’s good faith is not in dispute, I do not include a discussion of the standards applicable to that fees prong.

2 The standard for finding the existence of reasonable basis is lesser (and thus inherently easier to satisfy) than the preponderant standard applied when assessing entitlement, as cases that fail can still have sufficient objective grounding for a fees award. Braun v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 144 Fed. Cl. 72, 77 (2019). The Court of Federal Claims has affirmed that “[r]easonable basis is a standard that petitioners, at least generally, meet by submitting evidence.” Chuisano v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 287 (Fed. Cl. 2014) (internal quotations omitted) (affirming special master). The factual basis and medical support for the claim is among the evidence that should be considered. Carter v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 132 Fed. Cl. 372, 378 (Fed. Cl. 2017). Under the Vaccine Act, special masters have “maximum discretion” in applying the reasonable basis standard. See, e.g., Silva v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 108 Fed. Cl. 401, 401–02 (Fed. Cl. 2012). 4

Petitioner’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful, but I find it possessed sufficient objective basis to justify a fees and costs award. Although the record clearly establishes that Petitioner developed GBS after receiving a flu vaccine, issues of timing and alternative causation prevented him from establishing entitlement. Decision at 22-25. But Petitioner offered reasonable, contemporaneous treater support for his claim, and raised fair issues about vaccine causation under the circumstances of his treatment course. Thus (and in light of the low bar to reasonable basis determinations generally), I find that sufficient objective proof on this issue existed. And there is no other basis for a denial of fees.

II. Calculation of Fees

Determining the appropriate amount of the fees award is a two-part process. The first part involves application of the lodestar method - “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)).

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