1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 ISABEL VALDEZ VELA, ) Case No.: 1:20-cv-1152 JLT HBK ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ORDER ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND ) RECOMMENDATIONS DISMISSING THE 13 v. ) ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE ) 14 U.S. GOVERNMENT HEALTH AND ) (Doc. 7) HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD WELFARE, ) 15 ) Defendant. ) 16 )
17 Isabel Valdez Vela asserts her children were wrongfully removed from her home without a 18 warrant in 2015. In the complaint filed on August 17, 2020, Vela sought to hold the U.S. Government 19 Health and Human Services, Child Welfare Services, liable for a violation of the Fourteenth 20 Amendment, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245; and 42 U.S.C. § 14141. (See generally Doc. 1.) 21 On July 21, 2021, the magistrate judge found Vela’s “Complaint suffers from procedural and 22 substantive defects.” (Doc. 6 at 4.) The magistrate judge observed Vela did not “allege facts in support 23 of any constitutional claim.” (Id.) For example, the magistrate judge noted Vela did “not identify the 24 circumstances attendant to [her] children being removed from her home.” (Id.) Vela also did not 25 identify an agent of the government entity as the defendant, though “[a]n entity can only act through the 26 acts of its agents.” (Id.) Further, the magistrate judge observed that Vela identified “August 12, 2015 27 as the date the allegedly improper acts occurred,” and the applicable two-year statute of limitations may 28 bar Plaintiff’s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent it was raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1 1983. (Id.) Given these procedural and substantive issues, the magistrate judge directed Vela to either 2 file an amended complaint within thirty days or file a notice of voluntary dismissal if Vela believed the 3 deficiencies could not be cured. (Id. at 5.) 4 After Vela failed to respond to the Court’s order, the magistrate judge issued Findings and 5 Recommendations on November 18, 2021. (Doc. 7.) The magistrate judge again noted the substantive 6 and procedural defects of the complaint, and recommended the matter be dismissed for Vela’s failure to 7 state a claim. (Id. at 3-5.) In the alternative, the magistrate judge recommended the matter be 8 dismissed due to the failure to prosecute the matter pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure, because Vela did not take any action after filing her complaint in August 2020. (Id. at 5-6.) 10 Vela was granted fourteen days from the date of service to file any objections to the Findings and 11 Recommendations. (Id. at 7.) 12 On December 1, 2021, Vela filed a document entitled “Amended Complaint, Objection to 13 Fourteen-Day Objection Period.” (Doc. 8 at 1.) Vela asserted that her “pleadings must be read and 14 construed liberally” as she “is not licensed to practiced law.” (Id. at 1, citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 15 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1981).) Although Vela indicated her 16 objection to receiving only fourteen days to respond to the Findings and Recommendations, she did not 17 request an extension of time from the Court and was able to prepare substantive arguments and an 18 amended complaint, which the Court now addresses. 19 In the Objections and Amended Complaint, Vela indicated that she alleged violations of her 20 Fifth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 8 at 2-4.) 21 Further, Vela sought to invoke the following criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy); 18 22 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of rights); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims); 18 U.S.C. 23 § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the government); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (major fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 24 (interference with commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (racketeering); 18 U.S.C. § 2382 (misprision of 25 treason); and 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (false claims). (Id. at 5-17.) Finally, Vela indicated she sought to 26 challenge incentive payments authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 658, asserting payments to the state were 27 “unconstitutional due to the financial incentives it creates.” (Id. at 16-17.) 28 Notably, Vela again asserts the basis of her claims is the removal of her minor children from 1 her care, which occurred in August 2015.1 (Doc. 8 at 18.) However, Vela did not address the 2 timeliness issue identified by the magistrate judge, who observed that the Court applies the two-year 3 statute of limitations under California law to claims arising under Section 1983. See e.g., McDougal v. 4 County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1991) (“because § 1983 actions are best characterized 5 as actions for injuries to personal rights, courts should borrow the state statute of limitations that 6 applies to personal injury actions”) (internal citation omitted); see also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 7 (2008). Vela also has not identified any circumstances that would warrant tolling of this statute of 8 limitations until she filed her complaint on August 17, 2020. Consequently, any claims for violations 9 of her constitutional rights brought under Section 1983 are untimely and barred by the applicable 10 statute of limitations. 11 Moreover, Vela is unable to bring claims under the identified criminal statutes, which neither 12 create a private right of action nor provide a basis for civil liability. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 13 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1998)) (“neither the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 nor its legislative 14 history reflect an intent by Congress to create a private right of action”); Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 15 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the dismissal of claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 16 because the “criminal statutes… do no not give rise to civil liability”); Kumar v. Naiman, 2016 WL 17 397596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016) (“private citizens[] have no standing to prosecute criminal 18 claims”).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 ISABEL VALDEZ VELA, ) Case No.: 1:20-cv-1152 JLT HBK ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ORDER ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND ) RECOMMENDATIONS DISMISSING THE 13 v. ) ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE ) 14 U.S. GOVERNMENT HEALTH AND ) (Doc. 7) HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD WELFARE, ) 15 ) Defendant. ) 16 )
17 Isabel Valdez Vela asserts her children were wrongfully removed from her home without a 18 warrant in 2015. In the complaint filed on August 17, 2020, Vela sought to hold the U.S. Government 19 Health and Human Services, Child Welfare Services, liable for a violation of the Fourteenth 20 Amendment, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245; and 42 U.S.C. § 14141. (See generally Doc. 1.) 21 On July 21, 2021, the magistrate judge found Vela’s “Complaint suffers from procedural and 22 substantive defects.” (Doc. 6 at 4.) The magistrate judge observed Vela did not “allege facts in support 23 of any constitutional claim.” (Id.) For example, the magistrate judge noted Vela did “not identify the 24 circumstances attendant to [her] children being removed from her home.” (Id.) Vela also did not 25 identify an agent of the government entity as the defendant, though “[a]n entity can only act through the 26 acts of its agents.” (Id.) Further, the magistrate judge observed that Vela identified “August 12, 2015 27 as the date the allegedly improper acts occurred,” and the applicable two-year statute of limitations may 28 bar Plaintiff’s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent it was raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1 1983. (Id.) Given these procedural and substantive issues, the magistrate judge directed Vela to either 2 file an amended complaint within thirty days or file a notice of voluntary dismissal if Vela believed the 3 deficiencies could not be cured. (Id. at 5.) 4 After Vela failed to respond to the Court’s order, the magistrate judge issued Findings and 5 Recommendations on November 18, 2021. (Doc. 7.) The magistrate judge again noted the substantive 6 and procedural defects of the complaint, and recommended the matter be dismissed for Vela’s failure to 7 state a claim. (Id. at 3-5.) In the alternative, the magistrate judge recommended the matter be 8 dismissed due to the failure to prosecute the matter pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure, because Vela did not take any action after filing her complaint in August 2020. (Id. at 5-6.) 10 Vela was granted fourteen days from the date of service to file any objections to the Findings and 11 Recommendations. (Id. at 7.) 12 On December 1, 2021, Vela filed a document entitled “Amended Complaint, Objection to 13 Fourteen-Day Objection Period.” (Doc. 8 at 1.) Vela asserted that her “pleadings must be read and 14 construed liberally” as she “is not licensed to practiced law.” (Id. at 1, citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 15 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1981).) Although Vela indicated her 16 objection to receiving only fourteen days to respond to the Findings and Recommendations, she did not 17 request an extension of time from the Court and was able to prepare substantive arguments and an 18 amended complaint, which the Court now addresses. 19 In the Objections and Amended Complaint, Vela indicated that she alleged violations of her 20 Fifth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 8 at 2-4.) 21 Further, Vela sought to invoke the following criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy); 18 22 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of rights); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims); 18 U.S.C. 23 § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the government); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (major fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 24 (interference with commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (racketeering); 18 U.S.C. § 2382 (misprision of 25 treason); and 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (false claims). (Id. at 5-17.) Finally, Vela indicated she sought to 26 challenge incentive payments authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 658, asserting payments to the state were 27 “unconstitutional due to the financial incentives it creates.” (Id. at 16-17.) 28 Notably, Vela again asserts the basis of her claims is the removal of her minor children from 1 her care, which occurred in August 2015.1 (Doc. 8 at 18.) However, Vela did not address the 2 timeliness issue identified by the magistrate judge, who observed that the Court applies the two-year 3 statute of limitations under California law to claims arising under Section 1983. See e.g., McDougal v. 4 County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1991) (“because § 1983 actions are best characterized 5 as actions for injuries to personal rights, courts should borrow the state statute of limitations that 6 applies to personal injury actions”) (internal citation omitted); see also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 7 (2008). Vela also has not identified any circumstances that would warrant tolling of this statute of 8 limitations until she filed her complaint on August 17, 2020. Consequently, any claims for violations 9 of her constitutional rights brought under Section 1983 are untimely and barred by the applicable 10 statute of limitations. 11 Moreover, Vela is unable to bring claims under the identified criminal statutes, which neither 12 create a private right of action nor provide a basis for civil liability. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 13 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1998)) (“neither the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 nor its legislative 14 history reflect an intent by Congress to create a private right of action”); Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 15 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the dismissal of claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 16 because the “criminal statutes… do no not give rise to civil liability”); Kumar v. Naiman, 2016 WL 17 397596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016) (“private citizens[] have no standing to prosecute criminal 18 claims”). Only the federal government has the authority to prosecute the federal criminal claims. See 19 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). Similarly, Vela fails to show she has standing to 20 bring a claim challenging Section 658 and does not request any relief related to the statute. Thus, the 21 identified government statutes do not undermine the findings of the magistrate judge that Vela failed to 22 allege facts sufficient to support a timely claim upon which relief can be granted by this Court. 23 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and Britt v. Simi Valley United 24 School Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983), this Court conducted a de novo review of this case. 25 Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court finds the Findings and Recommendations are 26 supported by the record and proper analysis. Because Vela failed to cure the identified deficiencies in 27
28 1 Previously, Vela indicated the removal of occurred on August 12, 2015. (Doc. 1 at 4.) In the Objections, she 1 || her “Amended Complaint” filed in response to the Findings and Recommendations, the Court finds 2 || further leave to amend would be futile and dismissal is appropriate. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 11: 3 || 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (leave to amend is futile when the deficiencies cannot be cured). 4 Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS: 5 1. The Findings and Recommendations dated November 18, 2021 (Doc. 7) are adopted. 6 2. The action is DISMISSED without prejudice; and 7 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case, as this order terminates the matter in 8 its entirety. 9 10 IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _March 1, 2022 ( LAW ph L. wary 12 TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28