Veeraswamy v. Stern

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Veeraswamy v. Stern

50 A.D.3d 1127, 855 N.Y.S.2d 690

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 29, 2008

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 50 A.D.3d 1127 (Veeraswamy v. Stern) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Veeraswamy v. Stern, 50 A.D.3d 1127, 855 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2008).

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Opinion

In an action to recover a down payment made pursuant to a contract for the sale of real property, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the [1128]*1128Supreme Court, Queens County (Agate, J.), entered December 13, 2007, which denied their motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case” (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Here, the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Triable issues of fact exist, inter alia, as to whether the plaintiffs can be charged with an anticipatory breach or repudiation of the subject contract (see IBM Credit Fin. Corp. v Mazda Motor Mfg. [USA] Corp., 92 NY2d 989, 993 [1998]; Morgan v McCaffrey, 14 AD3d 670, 671 [2005]), and whether they are entitled to the return of their down payment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Skelos, Santucci and Belen, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover a down payment made pursuant to a contract for the sale of real property, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the [1128]*1128Supreme Court, Queens County (Agate, J.), entered December 13, 2007, which denied their motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case” (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Here, the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Triable issues of fact exist, inter alia, as to whether the plaintiffs can be charged with an anticipatory breach or repudiation of the subject contract (see IBM Credit Fin. Corp. v Mazda Motor Mfg. [USA] Corp., 92 NY2d 989, 993 [1998]; Morgan v McCaffrey, 14 AD3d 670, 671 [2005]), and whether they are entitled to the return of their down payment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Skelos, Santucci and Belen, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

50 A.D.3d 1127, 855 N.Y.S.2d 690, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/veeraswamy-v-stern-nyappdiv-2008.

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