Veaux v. Southern Oregon Sales, Inc.

33 F. Supp. 605, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 610, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2877
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedMay 13, 1940
DocketNo. E-9675
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 33 F. Supp. 605 (Veaux v. Southern Oregon Sales, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Veaux v. Southern Oregon Sales, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 605, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 610, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2877 (D. Or. 1940).

Opinion

JAMES ALGER FEE, District Judge.

This cause was initiated by formal pleadings under the former equity practice. After adoption of the Federal Rules, pretrial procedure was held which eventuated in a thoroughly comprehensive pre-trial order. According to Rule 16, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, this order controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. A summary of the agreed facts from the order is as follows:

Veaux filed his first application for patent on January 22, 1930. On February 10, 1930, one Ridley filed an application for patent. Veaux, on October 12, 1931, filed another application for patent. This second application and that of Ridley were placed in interference, as a result of which, priority was awarded to Veaux. The patent in suit was issued to Veaux on May 21, 1935, based on this second application, patent No. 2,002,102. No further proceedings were taken upon the Ridley application of which Southern Oregon Sales, Inc., the defendant, is the assignee and was in control thereof'and of the prosecution of that application in the Patent Office and in the interference proceeding, and was advised of all matters relating thereto. All these applications and the patent in suit purported to cover a form of apple and pear box with cleats at both ends of the box, but upon one side only.

The defendant adopted a type of box which it used, manufactured and sold since sometime in August, 1929, and without interruption since that date, which is substantially the same as that exemplified in the Ridley application and in the patent in suit.

The plaintiff, Veaux, contends that defendant has infringed his patent and asks for an injunction and treble damages. The defendant claims (1) that Veaux was not the first inventor of the article, (2) that there is no novelty or invention involved in view of the prior art, (3) that plaintiff has been guilty of laches in reduction to practice and in the prosecution in the Patent Office, (4) that in view of these circumstances, the two years prior publication and use dates from the second application in view of the claimed abandonment of the first application, (5) plaintiff’s patent was anticipated by other patents noticed. Plaintiff, however, claims that defendant is estopped to contest the validity of the Veaux patent because of the contentions made by it in the interference proceeding and the change of the position of plaintiff and the expenses incurred by him as a result thereof.

Issues to be tried were set out in a list of questions, set out in the order on the pre-trial procedure. The court will speak upon these issues generally, but will answer the specific questions, as part of the findings.

Containers for vegetables and fruit, and particularly apples and pears, have been used in railroad and ship transportation for about forty years and the construction thereof is a comparatively old art. Gradually the forms have become more or less standardized. Cleats have been used upon every portion of rectangular containers for almost every purpose, commencing with simple nailing cleats to hold the box together and developing into cleats used to prevent the crushing of fruits in transit, to assure better ventilation of the contents of the container and to permit stacking. The use of the bulged rectangular container has accelerated the development of cleats for all such purposes. The use of car stripping in railroad transportation and dunnage in water transit, coupled with the placing of the bulged boxes upon the sides instead of upon the bottoms, has developed a method of protection by the carriers, even where uncleated containers were used. Generally speaking, most of this art is already in the public domain. Generally speaking, also, most of this art seems to be as, simple as placing two sticks together. Given an apple box and a supply of lumber, it would seem that a competent carpenter would be able to devise means of protecting the contents of the box by nailing pieces of wood on it. Simplicity does not negative invention. It is nevertheless difficult'to find invention in such an operation in view of the prior art,' or to find long-felt need or genuine commercial utility for either the box o.f plaintiff or that of defendant.

Into this field of an extremely crowded art largely dedicated to the public Veaux and Ridley1 entered. It is peculiar that the identical differentiation should have been made in the same trade territory with regard to the identical article, the Northwest apple box, and that each should have claimed it as an invention.

[607]*607The first application of Veaux was filed January 22, 1930, and that of Ridley February 10, 1930. The gist of the disclosure in each document is substantially identical. The identical box had been in use from the spring of 1929 and large quantities had been shipped and sold by defendant before either of these applications had been presented. These facts might indicate that either Veaux copied from Ridley, or Ridley from Veaux. But, it is much easier to believe that each attemptéd to capitalize upon a simple change in the construction of apple boxes, suggested by the desire to eliminate car stripping, by obtaining a monopoly by patent thereon.

The testimony of Veaux and his witnesses concerning his invention of the box is utterly unconvincing, although undenied. Each witness upon the point was favorably inclined to plaintiff and apparently willing to give color to his testimony in response to suggestive questions. The model box constructed by Veaux as an exemplification of the idea was never produced. The record shows that a box was sent to the Patent Office in 1932, but even this was not placed in evidence. No testimony was produced as to invention by Ridley and it is shrouded in mystery. The court could not find on the record that either Veaux or Ridley was the inventor. The statutory presumption alone designates plaintiff for the honor.

The testimony adduced by plaintiff shows that over one hundred men on the Seattle waterfront knew of this device in 1925, but that Veaux did not nail two sticks on a box until 1928. There was wide use of the box by defendant in 1929, but Veaux made no application for patent until January, 1930. Since simplicity is the characteristic of the device, and there are no difficulties shown, and no explanation of the delay, laches sufficient to void the grant is established. No one would have the right thus to extend the term of patentable monopoly over a period of time by inertia,2 especially in the face of the fact that it is well established defendant and the public were using quantities of these boxes in the year 1929.3 Difficulties for Veaux are only enhanced by the proceedings in the patent office. ITis first application was for a method and an article. Claims on both were denied. The denial became final.4 Veaux abandoned the first application and permitted entry of final rejection. It is-true that he filed a second application on October 12, 1931, but in this application for the "article alone he made no reference to the prior rejected application, apparently hoping thereby to avoid the references. Veaux is forced by the circumstances to rely upon the first application to establish ■continuity in order to avoid the defense of public use more than two years prior to the filing of the second. If the claims were substantially identical in disclosure, the rejection should be held complete since no appeal was taken. If these were not substantially identical, continuity of prosecution would not be established.

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123 F.2d 455 (Ninth Circuit, 1941)
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
33 F. Supp. 605, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 610, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2877, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/veaux-v-southern-oregon-sales-inc-ord-1940.