Veal v. Veal

Supreme Court of Georgia

Veal v. Veal

15 S.E.2d 725, 192 Ga. 503, 1941 Ga. LEXIS 516

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedJune 20, 1941

Docket13749.

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 15 S.E.2d 725 (Veal v. Veal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Veal v. Veal, 15 S.E.2d 725, 192 Ga. 503, 1941 Ga. LEXIS 516 (Ga. 1941).

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Opinion

Bell, Justice.

The facts are sufficiently indicated in the head-notes. As between the plaintiff in execution and the administrator, it was the duty of the latter to pay the taxes during the course of administration; and the title to the realty having vested in the heirs at law subject only to administration for the payment of debts and distribution, such duty as to payment of taxes extended, at least morally or equitably, to the heirs at law, since the administrator was a mere trustee holding the land for their benefit. While such burden would rest equally upon all of the heirs at law, the claimant being one of several, this fact would not exclude the principle stated in the Code, § 92-8105. See §§ 85-1004, 85-1005-54 A. L. R. 896; 85 A. L. R. 1537. Accordingly, as against such: plaintiff in execution, the claimant could not strengthen his title by purchasing the property at a tax sale; nor could he do so indi *505 xectly by purchasing from another person who had purchased at such a sale; and this is true even though he purchased from the latter after the period of redemption had expired. The conclusion here reached accords with the rulings in Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Bank of Tignall, 182 Ga. 233 (185 S. E. 108), and Caffey v. Parris, 186 Ga. 303 (2) (197 S. E. 898). Nor is it contrary to the decision in Edwards v. Hall, 176 Ga. 632 (168 S. E. 254), where it appeared that an owner of realty conveyed different estates therein to different grantees, the legal title to one as security for a debt, and the remaining equity to another. It was held in effect that as between a remote grantee of such equity and the holder of the security deed, there was no duty upon either with respect to the other to pay taxes that accrued before execution of the security deed, that is, before either estate was conveyed by the tax debtor, and consequently that the principle stated in the Code, § 93-8105, was inapplicable. It is thus seen that the facts of that ease were materially different from those here under consideration, and that the decision is not authority for the present claimant.

The evidence demanded the verdict as directed by the court in favor of the plaintiff in fi. fa. and against the heir at law as claimant. There was no merit in either of the special grounds of the motion for new trial, and the court did not err in overruling the motion. Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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Bell, Justice.

The facts are sufficiently indicated in the head-notes. As between the plaintiff in execution and the administrator, it was the duty of the latter to pay the taxes during the course of administration; and the title to the realty having vested in the heirs at law subject only to administration for the payment of debts and distribution, such duty as to payment of taxes extended, at least morally or equitably, to the heirs at law, since the administrator was a mere trustee holding the land for their benefit. While such burden would rest equally upon all of the heirs at law, the claimant being one of several, this fact would not exclude the principle stated in the Code, § 92-8105. See §§ 85-1004, 85-1005-54 A. L. R. 896; 85 A. L. R. 1537. Accordingly, as against such: plaintiff in execution, the claimant could not strengthen his title by purchasing the property at a tax sale; nor could he do so indi *505 xectly by purchasing from another person who had purchased at such a sale; and this is true even though he purchased from the latter after the period of redemption had expired. The conclusion here reached accords with the rulings in Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Bank of Tignall, 182 Ga. 233 (185 S. E. 108), and Caffey v. Parris, 186 Ga. 303 (2) (197 S. E. 898). Nor is it contrary to the decision in Edwards v. Hall, 176 Ga. 632 (168 S. E. 254), where it appeared that an owner of realty conveyed different estates therein to different grantees, the legal title to one as security for a debt, and the remaining equity to another. It was held in effect that as between a remote grantee of such equity and the holder of the security deed, there was no duty upon either with respect to the other to pay taxes that accrued before execution of the security deed, that is, before either estate was conveyed by the tax debtor, and consequently that the principle stated in the Code, § 93-8105, was inapplicable. It is thus seen that the facts of that ease were materially different from those here under consideration, and that the decision is not authority for the present claimant.

The evidence demanded the verdict as directed by the court in favor of the plaintiff in fi. fa. and against the heir at law as claimant. There was no merit in either of the special grounds of the motion for new trial, and the court did not err in overruling the motion. Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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15 S.E.2d 725, 192 Ga. 503, 1941 Ga. LEXIS 516, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/veal-v-veal-ga-1941.

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