2025 IL App (1st) 240676-U No. 1-24-0676 Order filed January 15, 2025 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ MOISES VAZQUEZ, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 23 M 1013471 ) LANDRO PAVON and ELIZABETH ENRIQUE, ) Honorable ) Stephen A. Swedlow, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Martin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the court’s judgment as plaintiff has not provided a sufficient record on appeal. We vacate the court’s void order ruling on plaintiff’s successive postjudgment motion.
¶2 Following a bench trial, plaintiff Moises Vazquez appeals pro se from the circuit court’s
judgment in favor of defendants Landro Pavon and Elizabeth Enrique in plaintiff’s property
damage action. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in granting judgment for defendants.
As the record on appeal is insufficient for us to meaningfully review the court’s judgment, we No. 1-24-0676
affirm. We also vacate the court’s order denying plaintiff’s successive postjudgment motion as the
court lacked jurisdiction over that motion.
¶3 The record on appeal consists of one volume of the common law record and lacks a report
of proceedings or acceptable substitute. The following facts are drawn from the common law
record.
¶4 On August 10, 2023, plaintiff filed pro se a complaint against defendants, his neighbors,
alleging that defendants had at least seven dogs that had been damaging his wooden fence for three
years. The complaint alleged that defendants had agreed to build their own fence to prevent their
dogs from damaging plaintiff’s fence. Plaintiff claimed that he had photographs and video of
defendants’ dogs biting his wooden fence and damaging his property. He claimed $30,000 in
damages.
¶5 On January 24, 2024, the court held a trial. On February 15, 2024, the court entered a trial
call order finding for defendants.
¶6 On March 7, 2024, the court entered an order denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. The
order reflects that plaintiff was in court. Plaintiff’s motion is not included in the record on appeal.
¶7 On March 8, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and default judgment. In his
motion, plaintiff argued that the court erred in entering judgment for defendants when Pavon had
not appeared at trial.
¶8 On March 22, 2024, the court entered a written order denying plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration and default judgment. The court stated:
“During the trial (prove up) for this case, the Plaintiff offered video evidence of the
condition of the fence at issue. The videos clearly showed his own dogs damaging the fence
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from his side of the property. Not only did the evidence fail to show the defendant was
responsible or liable for any damage to the fence, the evidence showed the Plaintiff’s own
dogs chewing through the fence. Further, while the defendant failed to appear for the final
trial date, Plaintiff failed to appear for prior trial.”
¶9 On March 27, 2024, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, identifying the dates of the orders or
judgments he wanted to appeal as January 24, 2024 (date of trial), February 15, 2024 (date court
entered judgment), and March 22, 2024 (date court denied his motion to reconsider).
¶ 10 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in granting judgment in favor of defendants.
He claims that defendants’ 18 dogs damaged his fence, and Pavon had agreed to build his own
fence to protect plaintiff’s fence. He states that the court observed “pictures of the entire wood
fence that is *** about 2 feet in side [sic] [plaintiff’s] property.” He repeats that Pavon did not
appear at trial.
¶ 11 On October 29, 2024, we entered an order taking the case on the record and plaintiff’s brief
only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976)
(where issues are simple, a court may decide case on appellant’s brief only).
¶ 12 Initially, we note that plaintiff’s brief violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct.
1, 2020) by failing to provide a comprehensive statement of facts free of argument and with
citations to the record and failing to provide any citations to relevant authority in his argument
section. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (appellant’s brief shall include a
statement of facts containing facts necessary to understanding the case “stated accurately and fairly
without argument or comment” and with citations to the record, and an argument section setting
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out contentions with citations to authority); see also Eberhardt v. Village of Tinley Park, 2024 IL
App (1st) 230139, ¶ 84 (failure to cite pertinent authority forfeits review of issue).
¶ 13 Most significantly, however, the record on appeal is insufficient for us to review plaintiff’s
appeal. The record on appeal shall include a report of proceedings containing “all the evidence
pertinent to the issues on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021); Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a) (eff.
July 1, 2017). If no verbatim transcript is available, a party may file a bystander’s report as an
acceptable substitute. Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 14 As the appellant, it is plaintiff’s burden to provide a complete record to support a claim of
error, and without such a record, we must presume the lower court’s order conformed with the law
and had sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). “From the very
nature of an appeal it is evident that the court of review must have before it the record to review
in order to determine whether there was the error claimed by the appellant.” Id. at 391. We must
construe any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record against the appellant. Id. at 392.
¶ 15 These principles are especially applicable here. Plaintiff challenges the court’s judgment
following a bench trial. When a trial court makes findings of fact following a bench trial, the
findings are reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard and therefore only
reversed if unreasonable, arbitrary, not based on the evidence, or the opposite conclusion is clearly
evident. Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd. v. O’Brien, 2024 IL 129599, ¶ 56. A sufficient
record on appeal is therefore paramount.
¶ 16 Without the ability to review a transcript of the proceedings or acceptable substitute, or the
evidence that the court viewed, we cannot conclude that the court’s findings were against the
manifest weight of the evidence. See O’Malley v. Udo, 2022 IL App (1st) 200007, ¶ 60 (reviewing
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court could not hold that trial court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence
without transcript of the findings). Despite his pro se status, it was plaintiff’s obligation as the
appellant to provide a sufficient record. Teton, Tack & Feed, LLC v. Jimenez, 2016 IL App (1st)
150584, ¶ 19. As he failed to do so, we must presume that the court’s judgment conformed with
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2025 IL App (1st) 240676-U No. 1-24-0676 Order filed January 15, 2025 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ MOISES VAZQUEZ, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 23 M 1013471 ) LANDRO PAVON and ELIZABETH ENRIQUE, ) Honorable ) Stephen A. Swedlow, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Martin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the court’s judgment as plaintiff has not provided a sufficient record on appeal. We vacate the court’s void order ruling on plaintiff’s successive postjudgment motion.
¶2 Following a bench trial, plaintiff Moises Vazquez appeals pro se from the circuit court’s
judgment in favor of defendants Landro Pavon and Elizabeth Enrique in plaintiff’s property
damage action. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in granting judgment for defendants.
As the record on appeal is insufficient for us to meaningfully review the court’s judgment, we No. 1-24-0676
affirm. We also vacate the court’s order denying plaintiff’s successive postjudgment motion as the
court lacked jurisdiction over that motion.
¶3 The record on appeal consists of one volume of the common law record and lacks a report
of proceedings or acceptable substitute. The following facts are drawn from the common law
record.
¶4 On August 10, 2023, plaintiff filed pro se a complaint against defendants, his neighbors,
alleging that defendants had at least seven dogs that had been damaging his wooden fence for three
years. The complaint alleged that defendants had agreed to build their own fence to prevent their
dogs from damaging plaintiff’s fence. Plaintiff claimed that he had photographs and video of
defendants’ dogs biting his wooden fence and damaging his property. He claimed $30,000 in
damages.
¶5 On January 24, 2024, the court held a trial. On February 15, 2024, the court entered a trial
call order finding for defendants.
¶6 On March 7, 2024, the court entered an order denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. The
order reflects that plaintiff was in court. Plaintiff’s motion is not included in the record on appeal.
¶7 On March 8, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and default judgment. In his
motion, plaintiff argued that the court erred in entering judgment for defendants when Pavon had
not appeared at trial.
¶8 On March 22, 2024, the court entered a written order denying plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration and default judgment. The court stated:
“During the trial (prove up) for this case, the Plaintiff offered video evidence of the
condition of the fence at issue. The videos clearly showed his own dogs damaging the fence
-2- No. 1-24-0676
from his side of the property. Not only did the evidence fail to show the defendant was
responsible or liable for any damage to the fence, the evidence showed the Plaintiff’s own
dogs chewing through the fence. Further, while the defendant failed to appear for the final
trial date, Plaintiff failed to appear for prior trial.”
¶9 On March 27, 2024, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, identifying the dates of the orders or
judgments he wanted to appeal as January 24, 2024 (date of trial), February 15, 2024 (date court
entered judgment), and March 22, 2024 (date court denied his motion to reconsider).
¶ 10 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in granting judgment in favor of defendants.
He claims that defendants’ 18 dogs damaged his fence, and Pavon had agreed to build his own
fence to protect plaintiff’s fence. He states that the court observed “pictures of the entire wood
fence that is *** about 2 feet in side [sic] [plaintiff’s] property.” He repeats that Pavon did not
appear at trial.
¶ 11 On October 29, 2024, we entered an order taking the case on the record and plaintiff’s brief
only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976)
(where issues are simple, a court may decide case on appellant’s brief only).
¶ 12 Initially, we note that plaintiff’s brief violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct.
1, 2020) by failing to provide a comprehensive statement of facts free of argument and with
citations to the record and failing to provide any citations to relevant authority in his argument
section. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (appellant’s brief shall include a
statement of facts containing facts necessary to understanding the case “stated accurately and fairly
without argument or comment” and with citations to the record, and an argument section setting
-3- No. 1-24-0676
out contentions with citations to authority); see also Eberhardt v. Village of Tinley Park, 2024 IL
App (1st) 230139, ¶ 84 (failure to cite pertinent authority forfeits review of issue).
¶ 13 Most significantly, however, the record on appeal is insufficient for us to review plaintiff’s
appeal. The record on appeal shall include a report of proceedings containing “all the evidence
pertinent to the issues on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021); Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a) (eff.
July 1, 2017). If no verbatim transcript is available, a party may file a bystander’s report as an
acceptable substitute. Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 14 As the appellant, it is plaintiff’s burden to provide a complete record to support a claim of
error, and without such a record, we must presume the lower court’s order conformed with the law
and had sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). “From the very
nature of an appeal it is evident that the court of review must have before it the record to review
in order to determine whether there was the error claimed by the appellant.” Id. at 391. We must
construe any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record against the appellant. Id. at 392.
¶ 15 These principles are especially applicable here. Plaintiff challenges the court’s judgment
following a bench trial. When a trial court makes findings of fact following a bench trial, the
findings are reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard and therefore only
reversed if unreasonable, arbitrary, not based on the evidence, or the opposite conclusion is clearly
evident. Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd. v. O’Brien, 2024 IL 129599, ¶ 56. A sufficient
record on appeal is therefore paramount.
¶ 16 Without the ability to review a transcript of the proceedings or acceptable substitute, or the
evidence that the court viewed, we cannot conclude that the court’s findings were against the
manifest weight of the evidence. See O’Malley v. Udo, 2022 IL App (1st) 200007, ¶ 60 (reviewing
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court could not hold that trial court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence
without transcript of the findings). Despite his pro se status, it was plaintiff’s obligation as the
appellant to provide a sufficient record. Teton, Tack & Feed, LLC v. Jimenez, 2016 IL App (1st)
150584, ¶ 19. As he failed to do so, we must presume that the court’s judgment conformed with
the law and had sufficient factual basis. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. We therefore affirm the
court’s judgment for defendants.
¶ 17 Lastly, plaintiff indicated in his notice of appeal that he wanted to appeal the court’s March
22, 2024, order denying his March 8, 2024, motion for reconsideration and default judgment.
However, we must vacate that order as the court lacked jurisdiction to enter it.
¶ 18 In non-jury cases, a party may file a motion to reconsider within 30 days following the
entry of judgment. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2022). However, unless the court modifies its
judgment pursuant to the party’s first postjudgment motion, the party may not file another
postjudgment motion. Ill. S. Ct. R. 274 (eff. July 1, 2019). Indeed, the court lacks jurisdiction to
hear successive postjudgment motions. Old Second National Bank, N.A. v. Karolewicz, 2022 IL
App (1st) 192091, ¶ 21. If a circuit court enters an order without jurisdiction, the order is void.
People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 28. In that scenario, we lack authority to review the merits of
that order and must vacate the order and dismiss the underlying motion. Id. ¶ 29.
¶ 19 Here, the court entered judgment on February 15, 2024. On March 7, 2024, the court
entered an order denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. On March 8, 2024, plaintiff filed a
motion to reconsider and for default judgment. As that motion was a successive postjudgment
motion, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. Ill. S. Ct. R. 274 (eff. July 1, 2019); Old Second
National Bank, N.A., 2022 IL App (1st) 192091, ¶ 21. Accordingly, the court’s March 22, 2024,
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order denying the motion is void. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 28. We therefore vacate that order
and dismiss plaintiff’s March 8, 2024, motion. Id. ¶ 29. 1
¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, we (1) affirm the judgment of the circuit court entered on
February 15, 2024; (2) vacate the court’s March 22, 2024, order denying plaintiff’s successive
postjudgment motion; and (3) dismiss plaintiff’s March 8, 2024, successive postjudgment motion
pursuant to our authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)
(reviewing court has power to “make any order that ought to have been given or made”).
¶ 21 Affirmed in part, vacated in part; motion dismissed.
1 As plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on March 27, 2024, within 30 days of the court’s March 7, 2024, order denying his first postjudgment motion, we have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s appeal of the trial court’s judgment in favor of defendants. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) (notice of appeal is timely if filed within 30 days of judgment or resolution of timely postjudgment motion).
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