Vazquez-Trujillo v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: 22-1280
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LORENA VAZQUEZ-TRUJILLO, No. 22-1280

Agency No. A208-305-038 Petitioner,

v.

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 22, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and SCARSI,*** District Judge.

Petitioner Lorena Vazquez-Trujillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions

for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding an

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

We review the agency’s legal conclusions, including whether a proposed

particular social group is cognizable, de novo. Macedo Templos v. Wilkinson, 987

F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 2021). We review the agency’s findings of fact for substantial

evidence. Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022). Under

substantial evidence review, “factual findings are ‘conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Manzano v. Garland,

104 F.4th 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Flores Molina, 37 F.4th at 632).

1. We agree with the agency that Petitioner’s proposed social group of

“women of low socio-economic status” is not cognizable. To be eligible for asylum

and withholding of removal, Petitioner must establish her membership in a particular

social group that is “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable

characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the

society in question.” Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2020)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The agency concluded that Petitioner’s proposed

social group is neither defined with particularity nor socially distinct.

With respect to particularity, we agree with the agency that there is not “a clear

benchmark for determining who falls within” Petitioner’s proposed social group, and

that the group fails to “be discrete and have definable boundaries.” Macedo Templos,

2 22-1280 987 F.3d at 882 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although “the size and breadth

of a group alone does not preclude a group from qualifying as [a particular] social

group,” Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010), a petitioner must

demonstrate that the “group’s boundaries are [not] so amorphous that it cannot be

considered a social group.” Mendoza-Alvarez v. Holder, 714 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th

Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, what it means to be of “low

socio-economic status” is uncertain. Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed social group

is too amorphous to meet the particularity requirement. See, e.g., Macedo Templos,

987 F.3d at 882 (rejecting proposed social group of wealthy business owners

“because it could include . . . various cross-sections of a community”); Mendoza-

Alvarez, 714 F.3d at 1164 (concluding proposed social group of “[i]ndividuals who

need but cannot obtain life-sustaining medication, including insulin, because of

poverty, inability to work, or lack of insurance” was not particular because it swept

up “people with different conditions and in different circumstances”); see also Li v.

INS, 92 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Populations whose only common

characteristic is their low economic status do not form a social group for asylum

purposes.”).

Nor does the record compel a conclusion that women of low socio-economic

status are perceived as a distinct group in Mexico. See Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at

1242 (“The BIA’s conclusion regarding social distinction . . . is a question of fact

3 22-1280 that we review for substantial evidence.”); Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d

1173, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[S]ocial distinction requires evidence showing that

society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular

characteristic to be a group.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).1

2. Because Petitioner did not show that she was a member of a cognizable

particular social group, we do not address the BIA’s alternative holding that she

failed to establish that the Mexican government is unable or unwilling to control the

private actor she fears. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016)

(recognizing that applicants for asylum and withholding must establish “the

existence of a cognizable particular social group” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

3. Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT

protection. The evidence does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner more likely

than not will suffer harm “inflicted by” the Mexican government “or at the

instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person

1 In her supplemental letter brief, Petitioner also argues that the agency erred by failing to consider the particular social group she proposed. Petitioner contends that the agency limited its analysis merely to “socio-economic status” and did not consider her proposed social group in its entirety, “women of low socio-economic status.” Petitioner forfeited this argument by failing to develop it in her opening brief. See Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2021). Even had Petitioner not forfeited this argument, it would be unavailing. The agency plainly acknowledged that Petitioner’s proposed social group comprised “women of low socio-economic status” and analyzed it accordingly.

4 22-1280 acting in an official capacity.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 2019)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Petition DENIED.2

2 The temporary administrative stay of removal is lifted, and the motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 2, is denied.

5 22-1280