Vaval v. Malone

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Vaval v. Malone

2 A.D.3d 839, 769 N.Y.S.2d 382

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 29, 2003

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 2 A.D.3d 839 (Vaval v. Malone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Vaval v. Malone, 2 A.D.3d 839, 769 N.Y.S.2d 382 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dye, J.), dated June 28, 2002, which, inter alia, denied their motion to vacate a prior order of the same court dated October 25, 2001, granting the motion of the defendant Bernard Malone to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him pursuant to CPLR 3126 upon the plaintiffs’ default in opposing it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

It is well settled that a plaintiff seeking to vacate a default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Parker v City of New York, 272 AD2d 310 [2000]). The plaintiffs failed to satisfy this standard. Therefore, the Supreme [840]*840Court properly denied their motion. Santucci, J.P., Goldstein, Schmidt and Cozier, JJ., concur.

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— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dye, J.), dated June 28, 2002, which, inter alia, denied their motion to vacate a prior order of the same court dated October 25, 2001, granting the motion of the defendant Bernard Malone to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him pursuant to CPLR 3126 upon the plaintiffs’ default in opposing it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

It is well settled that a plaintiff seeking to vacate a default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Parker v City of New York, 272 AD2d 310 [2000]). The plaintiffs failed to satisfy this standard. Therefore, the Supreme [840]*840Court properly denied their motion. Santucci, J.P., Goldstein, Schmidt and Cozier, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

2 A.D.3d 839, 769 N.Y.S.2d 382, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vaval-v-malone-nyappdiv-2003.

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