Vaughn v. State

130 Ala. 18
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedNovember 15, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 130 Ala. 18 (Vaughn v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vaughn v. State, 130 Ala. 18 (Ala. 1900).

Opinion

HARALSON, J.

1. There was evidence tending to show that Jared Engram was dead. The witness, Smed-ley, for the State, stated that he was watchman for the L. & N. R. R. Co. at their draw bridge on the Appalachi-cola river, Jackson county, Florida, which river is formed by the junction of the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers; that on the 12th February, he discovered a dead human body floating down the river with a handkerchief protruding from its mouth. He secured the body, reported the fact to the coroner, who came, examined and buried it; that the coroner pulled the handkerchief out of the man’s mouth and throat into which it was crammed. This witness, on the trial, gave evidence tending to identify the handkerchief, as the one taken from the throat and mouth of the dead man. The question of its identification, in connection with all the evidence on the subject, was one for the jury, and the court committed no error in allowing the handkerchief to go to the jury, against the objection of defendants, that it had not been sufficiently identified.

2. The evidence for the State tended to show, that deceased was killed on the night of the 25th of December, 1899, at a house of ill fame kept by the defendants, Anna Vaughn and Gertrude Howard. The witness, Will Cameron, for the State, testified that deceased went to said house early that night, and witness found Mm there; [24]*24that he and deceased left and went away and deceased soon returned to the house, and in a short while witness returned and found deceased and Anna Vaughn in a bed, the deceased apparently asleep, and defendants, John Miller and Solon Moore, sitting by the fire; 'that- deceased appeared to be resting well, and this was about 9 or 10 o’clock; and at this time, defendants, Moore, Brazier and John Miller, besides the two 'women, ■were there. Witness left, but returned again later', and found Miller standing up putting on his clothes; that Miller said to Anna Vaughn, using an oath: “You have been the cause of one man’s death, and you think you will be the cause of mine, but I am going to get away.” Defendants moved to exclude this remark. Witness was asked whether Anna heard the remark. He replied, that Miller was talking to her; that they were only a step or two apart, and he spoke loud enough fur her to have heard it. The court allowed the evidence as against Anna, and an exception was reserved by her, because it was not shown that Anna heard it, nor was it shown that the remark referred to the deceased. The evidence having tended to show that deceased had been killed in this house, the fact whether Anna heard this remark, which had some tendency to incriminate her, and •whether it had reference to deceased as the man whose death she had caused, were questions for the jury, under all the evidence, to determine.

3. Dr. Copeland, a witness for defendants, testified that about 8 or 9 o’clock, Christmas night, he was telephoned to know if he would make a call that night at 11 o’clock; that he replied yes, and asked who it was that made the inquiry, and the person replied Jared Engram; that he did not recognize the voice, whose it was, and he was not familiar with Jared Engram’s voice. The State objected to this evidence, as to the telephone message, on the ground that it was illegal, irrelevant and immaterial, and it was excluded. If material, it was certainly not admissible against the State, in the absence of proof that it was the deceased who sent the message. From aught appearing another than, and a stranger to, deceased may have sent- it.

[25]*25It is urged by defendant’s counsel that in the exclusion of this evidence on motion of the State, there was error, because it was called for, as contended, on the cross examination of defendants’ witness by the State. It may be, if this evidence was called out 'by the State on cross examination, the court for that reason, might have properly refused to exclude it, yet, it might not follow, that the court would be put in error in its exclusion, since of its own motion the court may exclude illegal evidence at any stage of the trial, and the evidence, so far as appears, was certainly immaterial, hearsay and incompetent.—Liner v. The State, 124 Ala. 1, 6.

It satisfactorily appears, however,' that this evidence was not called out by the State, but by defendants. Dr. Copeland was being examined by defendants, to prove facts tending to show that Engrain could not have been killed at Anna Vaughn’s house on Christmas night, 1899. To this end, he was interrogated by defendants, in respect to the stains on the floor of said house, the object of the examination being to show, that these were not blood stains; also to show, that the body when found in the river, on the 12th February, 1900, about a hundred and fifty six miles below Eufaula, -was in too good a state of preservation for death to have occurred and the body to have been thrown in the liver, so far back as December 25th, 1899, and that at half past 9 o’clock on that night, which was at a later hour 'than some of the evidence for the State tended to show Engram was killed, the witness received the said telephone message purporting to be from deceased. All this was evidence of defensive matters, such as the defendants would naturally seek to produce, and the State would have no interest, to prove. Again, the State interposed other objections to some of the evidence as brought out, further on in the examination of the witness, as was done to the telephone message, which would not have been done, if it had been cross-examining the. witness. Indeed, the suggestion of a cross-examination of the witness by the State would not arise from anything asked or replied by him, but repelled, if it were not for the fact, that at the top of the page, 103 of the transcript, below which this telephone message and other defensive [26]*26matters appear, are the word’s, “Cross Examination.” Without these words the direct examination, from all the indications, continued down to the middle of page 111, where the words “Cross Examination,” .again occur, and where the cross-questioning of the witness by the State, on matters brought out to that point by defendant, began. It is clear, that the words “Cross Examination,” as they appear on the one or the other of these pages, is a clerical mistake, as there were not two cross-examinations, and no room is left to doubt, that the first heading is a clerical, self-correcting misprision, and the cross-examination of the witness really began on page 111, where the transcript shows a cross-examination began. This is further borne out, if more were needed, by the fact that when the State closed its cross-examination of this 'witness, the defendants next called and examined Dr. Mitchell, about a telephone message it was shown by him he received from some one giving his name as Jared Engrain, on the same night, about 11 o’clock, thus indicating that it was defendants, and not the State, who were seeking to prove the first of these messages, as well as the last, — 'both being in the interest of the defense, and against the interests of the prosecution.

4. The witness, Dr. Copeland, also testified that he took a plane to the house, where it" was alleged deceased was killed, and planed up some shavings. He was asked: “If the blood stains had been there, dry upon the floor for, say two months, would there have been evidence of blood or blood ¡stains upon the shavings you took up?” The witness replied, “that there would have been, unless some alkali or acid had been used, — a weak alkali.

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Bluebook (online)
130 Ala. 18, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vaughn-v-state-ala-1900.