Vaughn v. Solvay Process Co.

176 So. 241
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 5, 1937
DocketNo. 1731.
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 176 So. 241 (Vaughn v. Solvay Process Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vaughn v. Solvay Process Co., 176 So. 241 (La. Ct. App. 1937).

Opinion

OTT, Judge.

Plaintiff sues for compensation in the total sum of $2,995.20, with interest, plus medical expenses in the sum of $250, on account of an injury received by him on ■Decembér 17, 1934, while in the employ of the defendant company. The claim is for *242 total temporary disability for 295 weeks at $10.40 per week.

The injury was sustained when plaintiff slipped and fell, and in attempting to break the forcé of the fall plaintiff struck his right hand against a piece of timber measuring 6 by 6 inches. It is alleged that the force and violence of the fall caused the muscles, nerves, tendons, and tissues of the right arm and wrist to become strained, bruised, and wrenched, thereby causing an enlargement of the tissues to such an extent that his right hand, back to the wrist, is so stiffened and drawn that he-cannot close his fingers or bend his wrist to the natural position; that he has lost the grip in his right hand; that the injury caused spicules and erosions in the bone of his right arm and_ wrist.

Defendant admits that plaintiff received an injury to his right wrist, causing a sprain and contusion thereof, while in its employ, and further admits that plaintiff was receiving $16 per week at the time of the injury, and avers that plaintiff vas paid compensation from the date of the injury to March 27, 1935, a period of 13 veeks, at $10.40 per week, but that no fur-her compensation is due for the reason hat plaintiff sustained no further disability, in the alternative, 'and in case the court ihould hold that it was liable for further compensation, defendant asked that it be ;iven credit for $21.70 expended by it for medical expenses in addition to the amount ■aid for compensation.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for total temporary dis-ibility not to exceed 300 weeks at $10.40 per week, subject to a credit for compensa-ion already paid of $135.20, and for $250 medical expenses, less a credit of $21.70 paid thereon. The defendant has appealed.

The only question at issue is whether or not plaintiff suffered, and is now offering, any further disability on account of said injury than that for which he has been compensated, and, if so, the nature and extent of that disability.

Outside of the testimony of the plaintiff himself, all of the other evidence is purely medical and expert. We are confronted with the Herculean task of analyzing and, if possible, reconciling the findings and opinions of ten medical experts — -four called by the plaintiff and six by the defendant. We are impressed with the thought that, if these ten eminent physicians and medical experts have been unable to determine the nature and extent of the injury sustained by this negro laborer, we fear that the true nature of his condition has little prospect of being known through human agencies. The learned trial judge must have met with somewhat the same bewilderment with wfiich we are confronted by this maze of highly technical evidence, as he has written a rather lengthy and well-considered opinion in an effort to reach a correct conclusion. Likewise, the briefs filed in this court by both sides to this controversy indicate that the attorneys have given the case considerable study and effort, and that they are aware of the difficulty involved in reaching a correct conclusion from the evidence in the case.

Plaintiff was cut off from compensation the latter part of March, 1935. He filed this suit on May 27, 1935, but the last part of the testimony was not taken until May, 1936. The case was argued and submitted in the lower court on March IS, 1937, and judgment was rendered March 29, 1937. Two years had therefore elapsed from the time plaintiff ceased receiving compensation until the judgment was rendered from which this appeal is taken. Much of this delay, we assume, was caused by reason of the medical examinations of plaintiff and the taking of expert testimony in connection therewith.

After plaintiff was cut off from further compensation by defendant, he was examined by Dr. Pipes of Baton Rouge in April, 1935, and in the following month Dr. Pipes began treating plaintiff, and continued to do so from.time to time up to the trial of the case.

Dr. Pipes sent plaintiff to the Charity Hospital in New Orleans, where he stayed a few days.

Plaintiff testified that Dr. McHugh, the defendant’s physician, treated him during the time that he was drawing compensation from the company; that Dr. McHugh put splints on his arm for about 3 weeks; that the doctor gave him some liniment with which to rub his arm, and also baked his arm with an electric machine. After Dr. McHugh discharged him, he went to see Dr. Pipes.

Plaintiff claims that he has tried to work but cannot do any kind of hard work like rolling a wheelbarrow or chopping wood; that he Cannot bend his fingers and wrist, and suffers severe pain when he tries to do so; that his arm, wrist, and fingers *243 feel numb and paralyzed. He states that he tried to work for the WPA in the early part of 1936, but could not hold a job, even that of night watchman, on account of the severe pain in his arm and wrist.

In February, 1936, more than a year after the accident, plaintiff was examined by four specialists in New Orleans, Dr. J. C. Rodick, a roentgenologist, Dr. Gilbert C. Anderson, a specialist in. neurological surgery, Dr. N. H. Polmer, practising physical therapy, and Dr. E. S. Hatch, an orthopedist, or specialist in bones and joints. All of these experts were called by the defendant, but in order to better analyse and understand the other medical testimony we will first consider that of these four specialists.

Dr. Rodick made X-ray pictures of plaintiff’s right wrist. According to his report, an examination of the right wrist on anterior posterior, oblique, and lateral projections revealed an area of cortical erosion along the lateral aspect of the semilunar bone as seen in the anterior posterior projection and in the lateral projection; some irregularity of the posterior aspect of the bone as well as a small spicule splinter or nodule — apparently projecting downward from its anterior aspect. On the distomesial aspect of the semilunar there was found an area of cortical erosion which is 'not as large nor as extensive as that found on the lateral aspect. This doctor ventured the opinion that these eroded areas may be the result of an accident. He also found that the dorsolateral aspect of the scaphoid is irregular, which he thought might be the result of an injury.

On his examination with reference to this report, Dr. Rodick states that his purpose was merely to state what the picture shows and not to assign a cause for the condition nor undertake to prescribe treatment nor give an opinion as to the effect of the condition. However, we must conclude from his examination and report that there is something abnormal in the bones of plaintiff’s right arm and wrist. In fact, all of the doctors admit that these pictures show some abnormality in plaintiff’s right wrist, but they differ in their opinions as to its cause and its effect.

Dr. Anderson found nothing wrong with the nerves that control movement of wrist and fingers of plaintiff’s right hand. He found a' slight wasting of the muscles, but no more than would be expected from non-use.

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Bluebook (online)
176 So. 241, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vaughn-v-solvay-process-co-lactapp-1937.